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Abstract 
 
 
China is moving from a decentralized to a centralized system of government. 
Nowhere is this change in central-local relations more evident than in the rural areas. 
The analysis of the political, fiscal, and administrative dimensions of 
(de-)centralization at the village level reveals a paradox: the apparent empowerment 
of villagers to hold village officials accountable for service provision through 
elections and other democratic institutions contrasts with the parallel 
disempowerment of popularly elected village committees.  
 
Using cross-sectional survey data from more than 100 villages in six provinces, this 
study investigates how the distribution of power (i.e., control over fiscal resources) 
between levels of the Party-state, and between Party and non-Party institutions at the 
village level, affects patterns of accountability and participation in service delivery 
across rural communities. The empirical analysis shows that in villages governed by 
democratically elected village committees, officials tend to be more accountable to 
villagers and to allocate more resources to the provision of infrastructure. However, 
village committees are powerless in most villages, even when – and especially when 
– they are democratically elected.  
 
The findings suggest that, by undermining the power of village committees and 
ultimately the effectiveness of village elections, the centralization of the fiscal and 
administrative systems has contributed to a reversal of political decentralization and 
to a widening of the “accountability gap” between villagers and officials – a gap that 
cannot be filled by the Party’s control mechanisms alone, whether fiscal (e.g., 
earmarked transfers), administrative (e.g., performance contracts) or political (e.g., 
intra-Party elections). In parts of rural China, this has led to a decline in the 
legitimacy of the (local) state and to the growth of clan and religious organizations 
that substitute for the state in the provision of basic infrastructure services. 
Participation in these organizations is a symptom of, not a solution to, problems of 
local governance. 
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1.1 Research Objectives  
 
Decentralization has long been viewed as a possible solution to the problems 
of lack of government accountability and poor service provision in developing 
countries. It is argued that the devolution of authority and resources to the local level 
can make government more accountable to citizens, by promoting local democracy 
and interjurisdictional competition (e.g., Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006b). At the 
same time, empirical evidence on the impact of decentralization on service provision 
shows that differences in the goals, design, implementation and context of 
decentralization reforms have led to different outcomes across and within countries 
(Crook and Manor 1998; Agrawal and Ribot 1999; Manor 1999; Olowu and Wunsch 
2004; Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006a; Smoke et al. 2006; Grindle 2007; Tsai 2007b; 
Faguet 2012; Lu 2015). Whether by design or default, decentralization has often 
failed to create the “internal democratic pressures” (i.e., democratic accountability) 
and the “external competitive pressures” (i.e., interjurisdictional competition) 
required to improve local governance and service delivery (Bardhan and Mookherjee 
2006b). One of the reasons is that “most decentralization efforts end up without 
increasing the powers of local authorities or peoples” (Agrawal and Ribot 1999: 473-
474).  
In recent years, China has taken “a surprising turn towards recentralization” 
(Oi et al. 2012: 649). Nowhere is this shift in central-local relations more evident 
than in the rural areas, where the central government has implemented a series of 
reforms aimed at: (i) eliminating agricultural taxes and fees and transferring 
resources to local governments through (mostly, earmarked) grants (e.g., Fock and 
Wong 2008); (ii) making grassroots governments more accountable to higher levels 
of government under the cadre responsibility system (e.g., Heberer and Trappel 
2013); (iii) limiting the autonomy and decision-making power of village officials 
(e.g., Oi et al. 2012); (iv) reinforcing the dominant role of the Party in village 
governance (e.g., Alpermann 2010, 2013); and (v) promoting “intra-Party 
democracy”, rather than “grassroots democracy” (e.g., Brown 2011).  
13 
 
Whether these reforms can improve local governance1 and public goods2 
provision in rural communities is an important question. The purpose of this study is 
to investigate how the distribution of power (i.e., control over fiscal resources) 
between levels of the Party-state, and between Party and non-Party institutions at the 
village level, affects patterns of accountability and participation in service delivery 
across rural communities. It pursues three objectives. The first one is to examine 
whether political decentralization, where it has occurred, has made village 
governments more accountable to villagers and improved their performance in 
providing basic infrastructure. Although villages are not considered an official level 
of government in China, they are regarded as “the most important level of the public 
sector in terms of building rural infrastructure and providing a solid fiscal foundation 
for the provision of rural public services” (Bird et al. 2011: 227).  
A second objective of this study is to examine whether recent fiscal, 
administrative and political reforms have undermined the power of village 
committees and the meaningfulness of village-level democratic institutions, creating 
an “accountability gap” in service provision that cannot be filled by the Party’s 
mechanisms of accountability alone, whether fiscal (i.e., earmarked transfers), 
administrative (i.e., performance contracts) or political (i.e., intra-Party elections).  
Our third objective is to investigate the interactive relationship between 
government performance and non-government provision of basic services. We 
examine whether and how the fact that villagers form their own organizations to 
address community needs reflects and contributes to the decline in the legitimacy of 
the (local) state. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 In line with Shah and Shah (2006: 1-2), local governance is defined as “the formulation and execution 
of collective action at the local level, which encompasses the direct and indirect roles of formal 
institutions of local government and government hierarchies, as well as the roles of informal norms, 
networks, community organizations, and neighbourhood associations in pursuing collective action by 
defining the framework for citizen-citizen and citizen-state interactions, collective decision making, 
and delivery of local public services”.  
 
2 The term “public goods” is used to refer to “local public goods”, that is, to “public goods whose 
benefits involve only a small jurisdiction” (Cornes and Sandler 1996: 32) and, in this case, villages. 
The terms “public goods” and “public services” are used interchangeably. 
14 
 
1.2 Research Questions  
 
1.2.1 Political Decentralization, Government Accountability, and Public Goods 
Provision 
 
In China, political decentralization reforms have only been implemented at 
the village level, and have been implemented unevenly across villages. Almost 
twenty years have passed since the enactment of the 1998 Organic Law of Village 
Committees and the introduction of elections in the country’s more than 600,000 
villages, but there are still significant differences among them in terms of how 
elections are conducted, and how much power is given to village committees 
(O’Brien and Zhao 2011). Any assessment of the degree of political decentralization 
in the rural Chinese context needs to consider whether those who govern rural 
communities are elected by and accountable to villagers. It needs to consider the 
procedural and substantive dimensions of village democracy: (i) the democratic 
quality of village elections, and (ii) the autonomy and authority of (elected) village 
committees vis-à-vis local Party organizations (O’Brien and Han 2009).  
One of the main questions addressed in this study is whether, and under what 
conditions, political decentralization leads to better local governance and public 
goods provision in rural China. In particular, do villages that are governed by 
democratically elected village committees have higher levels of investment in 
infrastructure? Are their leaders more responsive to villagers’ demands for better 
roads and irrigation systems or school buildings? Differences in the degree of 
political decentralization across villages may explain differences among them in 
terms of their responsiveness to the spending preferences of village residents and of 
their levels of investment in basic infrastructure. 
To date, however, there is little consensus in the empirical literature on 
whether village committee elections provide an effective mechanism for village 
residents to hold grassroots officials accountable for the quality of the infrastructure 
provided in their communities (Zhang et al. 2004; Luo et al. 2007, 2010; Tsai 2007ab; 
Wang and Yao 2007; Sato 2008; Kung et al. 2009; Martinez-Bravo et al. 2011; Meng 
and Zhang 2011; Mu and Zhang 2014; Lu 2015). Some studies provide evidence of 
a positive relationship between elections and public goods provision and                 
15 
 
argue that “directly elected leaders are more responsive to villager demands for 
public investment” (Luo et al. 2007: 599). In contrast, others raise questions about 
the usefulness of village elections, arguing that they are “neither necessary nor 
sufficient for governmental accountability and responsible provision of public 
goods” (Tsai 2007b: 203). 
A possible limitation of existing studies, and a possible reason why they have 
come to such different conclusions, is that, in their analysis of the relationship 
between village democratic reforms and public goods provision, they focus on 
whether and how village committee elections are conducted, but pay little attention 
to what happens between elections. They fail to engage with issues of power and, in 
particular, to examine who has control over fiscal resources. An often implicit 
assumption is that spending decisions on village infrastructure are made at the village 
level, and are made by village committees.  
However, this may often not be the case. One reason has to do with the 
(vertical) distribution of power between levels of government. The introduction of 
the tax-sharing system (1994), the implementation of the tax-for-fee reform (2002-
04), and the abolition of agricultural taxes (2004-06) have “hollowed out” village 
finances (Fock and Wong 2008: 22). They have limited the discretionary authority 
of village governments to determine the level and composition of their expenditures, 
by reducing their revenue-raising capacity, while making them heavily dependent on 
(mostly, earmarked) transfers from higher-level governments (Fock and Wong 2008; 
Liu M. et al. 2009; Tan 2010; Bird et al. 2011; Oi et al. 2012; Boyle et al 2014). One 
of the consequences is that higher-level governments finance a large share of village 
infrastructure investment (e.g., Oi et al. 2012) and, in some cases, also implement 
village infrastructure projects independently (e.g., Wong et al. 2013). 
Another reason why village committees may have no say in the provision of 
public goods has to do with the (horizontal) distribution of power between Party and 
non-Party institutions at the village level. The 2010 Organic Law of Village 
Committees has not established a clear division of competencies between village 
committees and village Party branches (e.g., Alpermann 2010, 2013). Indeed, by 
highlighting the “leading” role of Party organizations in local governance (Article 
16 
 
4)3, the Law places village committees in a subordinate position to village Party 
branches and, ultimately, to township Party committees. This implies that, even when 
villages can use their own funds to improve their infrastructure, it is often village 
Party secretaries, not village committee heads, the ones who decide whether to 
allocate resources for this purpose. 
For these reasons, an analysis of the impact of village committee elections on 
public goods provision that focuses on the accountability relations between village 
committees and villagers, without simultaneously examining the power relations 
between village committees, higher-level governments and village Party 
organizations, might assume a greater degree of decentralization than actually exists 
and, consequently, fail to provide an adequate explanation for the failure of elections 
to improve the accountability and performance of village governments in some 
villages but not in others. Only if village committees are given the power to govern 
(i.e., control over resources), can (free and fair) elections be expected to deliver 
accountability4. 
                                                 
3 In Article 4 of the 2010 Organic Law of Village Committees it is stated that: “the rural organization 
of the Chinese Communist Party… plays a leading role in guiding and supporting the villagers' 
committee's fulfillment of duties, and supports and ensures the villagers conduct self-governance and 
execute their right to democracy in accordance with the Constitution and other laws”. The full text of 
the law is available at: www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=8445 
 
4 To our knowledge, there is no study that simultaneously considers the way in which the “vertical” 
and “horizontal” distribution of power – or, in other words, the interplay between the fiscal and 
political dimensions of the (de-)centralization process – shapes the accountability role of village 
elections in rural communities after the implementation of the tax-for-fee reform. The study conducted 
by Zhang et al. (2004) examines how the (horizontal) distribution of power at the village level affects 
the level and composition of village spending. They distinguish three types of villages, depending on 
who has the power to make spending decisions: (i) “the party secretary or village head”; (ii) “the party 
secretary and village head”; or (iii) “the village committee rather than individual leaders” (Zhang et 
al. 2004: 17). One of their main findings is that “when decisions are made by a group of people rather 
than by one or two individuals, the efficiency of public spending is higher” (Zhang et al. 2004: 19). 
The main difference between their study and ours is that their analysis focuses on whether local 
spending decisions are made individually or collectively, rather than on whether they are made by 
appointed or democratically elected officials. Unlike Zhang et al.’s (2004) study, more recent studies 
have examined how the (vertical) distribution of power between different levels of government affects 
the relationship between village elections and public goods investment at the village level after the 
implementation of the tax-for-fee reform (Luo et al. 2007, 2010; Zhang et al. 2007; Martinez-Bravo 
et al. 2011). However, they arrive at different findings and conclusions. Research by Luo et al. (2007, 
2010) and Zhang et al. (2007) suggests that there is a positive relationship between village elections 
and all types of public goods investment at the village level, regardless of the source of investment 
(i.e., the village or higher levels). However, findings by Martinez-Bravo et al. (2011) show that, while 
there is a positive relationship between village elections and village-financed investment, there is no 
such relationship between elections and government-financed investment. In their view, “the effects 
of elections on public investment are entirely driven by increases in funding from villagers” (Martinez-
Bravo et al. 2011: 22). What these studies have in common is that do not examine the possible 
17 
 
To gain a better understanding of the accountability role of elections in rural 
China after the implementation of the tax-for-fee reform, this study examines 
whether inter-village differences in (i) the quality of local electoral institutions and 
practices, and in (ii) the features of the local power structure explain variation in 
public goods provision across villages. Using survey data from 115 villages collected 
by the Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy at the Chinese Academy of Sciences, 
it first evaluates the democratic quality of elections across villages, by examining the 
three most critical aspects or stages of the electoral process: how election 
committees5 were formed in the last election – whether their members were selected 
by villagers or local officials; how candidates were nominated – whether they were 
directly nominated by voters in open primaries or through other procedures; and how 
votes were cast – whether secretly or publicly; whether in person or by proxy; and 
whether at a polling station or at roving ballot boxes.  
Additionally, it examines whether the official(s) who have control over the 
village budget are subject to electoral control. The analysis distinguishes two types 
of villages. In the first type, those elected by villagers have the power to govern. This 
category includes: (i) villages with a “dual power structure” (Sun et al. 2013), where 
the elected village committee (head) plays (at least) as important a role as the village 
party branch (secretary) in the management of village finances; and (ii) villages with 
a “unitary power structure” (Sun et al. 2013), where the posts of village committee 
head and Party branch secretary have been merged, and where the village leader is 
elected by villagers in competitive elections. In the second type of villages, those 
who govern are not actually elected by villagers. This category includes: (i) villages 
with a dual power structure, where the village Party branch (secretary) has full 
control over village finances; and (ii) villages where the posts of village head and 
Party secretary are held by the same person, but (s)he is not elected through 
competitive elections. 
The basic hypothesis is that villages that are governed by democratically 
elected officials may allocate more resources to the provision of public goods. More 
                                                 
relationship between the (horizontal) distribution of power at the village level and the amount of 
investment made or received by villages. Our study aims to fill this gap. 
 
5 Village election committees are responsible for organizing and overseeing the electoral process. 
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specifically, villages where (i) elections are better implemented, and where (ii) 
popularly elected village committees (leaders) have control over the allocation of 
village funds, may invest more in infrastructure. They may allocate a larger share of 
the village budget to improving roads, drinking and irrigation water, and schools - 
the public goods most valued by villagers (Yi et al. 2011) – in order to increase their 
chances of re-election.  
Our analysis of the impact of local democracy on local public goods provision 
is mainly aimed at explaining differences in the amount of public investment made 
by villages6. Recent studies suggest that, when examining the determinants of public 
goods investment in village communities, it is necessary to distinguish investments 
by the source of funding - village governments or higher-level governments. 
Investments decisions made by different political actors may be influenced 
differently by the same factors (Luo et al. 2007; Zhang et al. 2007; Boyle et al. 2014). 
While higher-level governments may not necessarily allocate more transfers to more 
democratic villages, more democratic villages may be able to mobilize more 
resources from villagers for infrastructure projects. The question of how village 
officials allocate village funds is important in light of recent evidence showing that 
in some villages “transfers are only replacing local expenditures rather than adding 
resources, as local governments divert their own resources to other uses” (World 
Bank 2007: 31).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 In rural China, village infrastructure projects (e.g., roads, bridges, irrigation, drainage, drinking 
water, and schools) are typically financed either by village governments from current revenues, 
savings or debt, or by higher-level governments through capital grants (e.g., Luo et al. 2007, 2010; 
Zhang et al. 2007; Bird et al. 2011; Boyle et al. 2014). Following Park and Wang (2010) we use the 
terms “village-financed investment” and “government-financed investment” to refer to investment 
projects funded by village governments and higher-level governments, respectively. Our analysis 
focuses on explaining inter-village differences in village-financed investment. The question of what 
explains variation in government-financed investment across villages will also be explored.  
19 
 
1.2.2 The Use of Transfers, Performance Contracts and Intra-Party Elections: 
Implications for Political Decentralization and Public Goods Provision 
 
Despite the need to make village governments more accountable to rural 
residents, the issue of political decentralization does not figure prominently in the 
government’s strategy to “build a new socialist countryside” and to address the “three 
rural problems” (san nong wenti) of “farmers” (nongmin), “agriculture” (nongye) and 
“villages” (nongcun)7 (e.g, Fock and Wong 2008; Ahlers and Schubert 2009; 
Schubert and Ahlers 2011). To ensure accountability in the provision of rural public 
goods, the central government appears to have adopted a three-pronged approach: (i) 
transferring more resources to rural governments through earmarked grants (e.g., Luo 
et al. 2007, 2010; Fock and Wong 2008; Liu M. et al. 2009; Bird et al. 2011); (ii) 
enhancing the effectiveness of the cadre responsibility system, through the adoption 
of the “salary-from-above” and “cadre-in-residence” policies8 (e.g., Smith 2010; Oi 
et al. 2012); and (iii) making village Party secretaries more accountable to village 
Party members, through the introduction of elections for village Party branches (e.g., 
Guo and Bernstein 2004; Sun et al. 2013).  
These reforms have had three major consequences. First, most infrastructure 
investment in rural communities is now financed by (earmarked) transfers from the 
central government, which are allocated among villages on an ad hoc basis by county 
and township governments (Luo et al. 2007, 2010; World Bank 2007; Zhang et al. 
2007; Fock and Wong 2008; Bird et al. 2011; Yi et al. 2011; Oi et al. 2012; Boyle et 
al. 2014). Second, the salaries of the top village officials are now paid by higher-level 
governments rather than from village budgets (Oi et al. 2012; Chen 2015), and an 
“unprecedented” number of township officials works as “sent-down cadres” in 
villages (Smith 2010: 262). Third, the introduction of elections for village Party 
                                                 
7 The plan “to build a new socialist countryside” was approved by the National People’s Congress in 
March 2006. As pointed out by Schubert and Ahlers (2011: 28) it represents “the Chinese state’s most 
recent move to link its objectives of agricultural modernization, rural governance innovation, and 
fiscal reform in the local state”. The main objectives of the plan are to promote “advanced production 
(shengchan fazhan), a comfortable livelihood (shenhuo kuanyu), a civilized lifestyle (xiangfeng 
wenming), clean and tidy villages (cunrong zhengjie), and democratic administration (guanli minzhu)” 
(Schubert and Ahlers 2011: 28).  
 
8 The features of the cadre responsibility system, as well as the content of the “salaries-from-above” 
and “cadre-in-residence” policies will be discussed in section 1.3.4.  
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branch secretaries has helped to address “the democratic deficit” of grassroots Party 
organizations, at least in form if not in substance, and has served to reinforce their 
dominant position in village governance (Sun et al. 2013). 
One possible concern with these fiscal, administrative, and political reforms is 
that, by shifting power away from village committees towards county, township and 
village-level Party organizations, they may undermine the effectiveness of village 
elections and widen the “accountability gap” in village governance – a gap that may 
not be filled by relying solely on the Party’s internal mechanisms of accountability. 
To gain a better understanding of the obstacles to, and reasons for, promoting 
political decentralization reforms in Chinese rural communities, this study will 
explore two additional questions: How does the implementation of the 
intergovernmental transfer system, the cadre responsibility system, and the intra-
Party election system affect the power of village committees and, ultimately, the 
meaningfulness of village elections? And, how effective are the cadre responsibility 
system and the intra-Party election system in providing incentives to grassroots Party 
officials to invest in public goods? 
The first question is related to the impact of the above mentioned reforms on 
the political decentralization process at the village level. In the past, county, township 
and village Party officials have been “the most fervent opponents” of village 
elections and self-government (Thornton 2008: 6). The development of “grassroots 
democracy” has made it more difficult for county and township Party secretaries to 
“manage” (elected) village cadres (Huang and Chen 2010: 52), and to elicit their 
cooperation in the implementation of unpopular policies (e.g., one-child policy, land 
acquisition, etc.) – a necessary condition for career advancement under the cadre 
responsibility system (e.g., O’Brien and Li 1999). They complain that the 
“democratic election of village cadres is not a good method, because elected cadres 
do not obey orders” (Li 2001: 5). The process of grassroots democratization has also 
made it more difficult for (appointed) village Party secretaries to maintain their 
position as “the undisputed boss of the village” (Guo and Bernstein 2004: 258), as 
they lack the democratic legitimacy that (elected) village heads often have. 
By increasing their resources, authority and legitimacy, the fiscal, 
administrative and political reforms outlined above may provide county, township 
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and village-level Party committees with the means and justification to undermine the 
role of village committees in village governance even when – or especially when – 
they are democratically elected. Recent studies point in this direction (Ahlers and 
Schubert 2009; Sun et al. 2013). On the one hand, villages governed by 
democratically elected village committees appear to be less likely to receive transfers 
for infrastructure projects from county and township governments. Case study 
research shows that the political characteristics of villages - “the degree of ‘peaceful’ 
cooperation within a village between the village and party committees” and “the 
quality of communication between the cadres bureaucracies at the village, township 
and county levels” (Ahlers and Schubert 2009: 55) – are one of the criteria used by 
county and township governments to allocate grants among villages.  
On the other hand, it has been found that the implementation of the cadre 
responsibility system and of intra-Party democratic reforms may, in some cases, 
result in a shift of power away from village committees to village Party branches. In 
particular, villages are less likely to be governed by democratically elected village 
committees, where: “(1) township leaders depend more heavily in village authorities 
for fulfilment of mandatory policy goals; and (2) selection procedures for Party 
branch secretaries are more representative” (Sun et al. 2013: 3).  
In sum, the new fiscal, bureaucratic, and political institutions put in place by 
the central government to improve governance and public goods provision in rural 
areas may be used by local Party officials to reinforce the old power structure. This 
may hinder, or even reverse, the political decentralization process and thereby 
weaken the system of checks and balances in village governance. Following Zhang 
et al. (2007) and Sun et al. (2013), this study will explore: whether and how variation 
across villages in the degree of transfer dependence (i.e., government-financed 
investment)9, top-down Party control (i.e., the cadre responsibility system), and intra-
Party democracy (i.e., intra-Party elections) is associated with variation in the degree 
of political decentralization (i.e., village democratic reforms). The purpose is to shed 
                                                 
9 More specifically, we will examine two issues: (i) whether county and township Party committees 
target transfers to villages where the Party branch remains the dominant governing body; and (ii) 
whether this tends to undermine demand for and support of village democratic reforms among 
villagers. 
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light on the obstacles and limits to political decentralization in the current 
institutional context. 
Given that the balance of power between village committees and village Party 
branches appears to be increasingly tilted towards the latter, the second question that 
needs to be addressed is the extent to which township Party committees and village 
Party members are willing and able to hold village Party secretaries accountable for 
investing in community infrastructure. More specifically, how effective are the cadre 
responsibility system and Party elections as mechanisms of accountability?  
Recent studies raise doubts about their effectiveness and suggest that they may 
not be sufficient to ensure accountability in rural public goods provision. For 
instance, according to Tsai (2007b: 232-240), the cadre responsibility system has 
largely failed to create incentives for village Party secretaries to improve basic 
infrastructure. She argues that township Party officials are unwilling and unable to 
hold their subordinates accountable for meeting villagers’ demands for paved roads, 
running water infrastructure and school facilities, and points to their lack of 
“incentives”, “leverage” and “information” as the main reasons. To our knowledge, 
no previous study has examined the impact of intra-Party elections on village public 
goods provision. However, there is evidence showing that they are less 
institutionalized, and more easily manipulated by township Party officials, than 
village committee elections (He 2007; Sun et al. 2013). According to He (2007: 119), 
“party elections are still exclusive; party discipline ensures the ‘right’ candidate is 
nominated by party members; the level of competitiveness is low; and township 
leaders still hold power to control the elected party secretaries by means of party 
discipline”. To the extent that this is the case, they are unlikely to make village Party 
secretaries more accountable to village Party members for their performance. To 
compare the accountability effects of village committee elections (i.e., political 
decentralization) with those of the Party’s (top-down and bottom-up) control 
mechanisms, this study will examine: (i) whether and how differences in the degree 
of accountability of village Party officials both to higher-level Party committees 
under the cadre responsibility system (i.e., administrative centralization), and to 
village Party members through Party elections (i.e., intra-Party democratization) 
translate into differences among villages in their investment in infrastructure. In sum, 
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administrative and fiscal centralization may have a negative impact on political 
decentralization. At the same time, fiscal and administrative control may be a poor 
substitute for democratic control, especially given the shortcomings of the 
intergovernmental transfer system and cadre responsibility system. 
 
 
1.2.3 “Substitutive” Public Goods Provision by Self-Governing Organizations 
 
Recent studies indicate that, despite the reduction of the “peasant burden” that 
resulted from the implementation of the rural tax reform, it has become increasingly 
difficult for grassroots officials to collect (legal) taxes and fees in some villages (Liu 
et al. 2012: 194). At the same time, it has been found that variation in the “extractive 
capacity” of the (local) state is associated with variation in the level of participation 
in “self-governing organizations” – community-based organizations that are run by 
villagers, not officials. Villagers are less willing to pay taxes and fees in villages 
where these community-based organizations have become a “substitute” for the 
(local) state in the provision of basic public goods: the higher the level of 
participation in these organizations, the lower the extractive capacity of the (local) 
state  (Liu et al. 2012: 202).  
These findings raise some fundamental questions that this study seeks to 
address: What explains participation in self-governing organizations? What forms do 
they take? To what extent are they able to substitute for the (local) state in the 
provision of basic infrastructure? And what implications does this have for its 
legitimacy and ability to govern rural communities effectively? 
There is a growing body of literature on the impact of social organizations on 
local governance and public goods provision in rural China (Tsai 2002, 2007ab; 
2011; Hansen 2008; Kung et al. 2009; Thogersen 2009; Lu 2015; Xu and Yao 2015). 
Most of these studies examine how traditional organizations, such as temples and 
lineages, are intertwined with formal Party-state institutions; how they can reinforce 
their legitimacy and power; and how they can improve their accountability and 
performance. One of their main findings is that the presence in rural communities of 
traditional organizations that include both villagers and officials as members allows 
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the former to hold the latter accountable for public goods provision through the use 
of social sanctions.  
Of particular significance is the work of Tsai (2007ab). She proposes a 
“model of informal accountability” (Tsai 2007a: 356-357; Tsai 2007b: 86-119), 
which posits that “in political systems with weak formal institutions of 
accountability, localities with encompassing and embedding solidary groups are 
likely to have better governmental provision of public goods than localities without 
these groups, all other things being equal”10 (Tsai 2007b: 120). Based on a sample of 
more than three hundred villages from Fujian, Hebei, Jiangxi and Shanxi, her 
research finds that villages with temple and lineage groups (i.e., solidary groups), 
which are both “encompassing” (i.e., are open to everyone in the village) and 
“embedding” (i.e., incorporate local officials into the group as members) are more 
likely to have higher levels of investment in public goods, and better infrastructure. 
She argues that “encompassing and embedding solidary groups” can improve village 
public goods provision by increasing “mutual accountability between villagers and 
officials” (Tsai 2007b: 166). In communities with these groups, officials are more 
likely to feel a strong social obligation to meet villagers’ demands for public goods, 
which in turn makes villagers more willing to pay taxes and fees and to participate 
in the co-production of public goods with officials.  
Like these studies, we investigate the interaction between informal and formal 
institutions in the context of public goods provision in rural China11. However, our 
research differs from theirs in three ways. The first difference lies in the types of 
organizations studied. Self-governing organizations have two distinctive features: (i) 
they are run neither by local officials nor by their appointees but by villagers, and (ii) 
they do not incorporate local officials in their activities or decision-making processes. 
Two distinctions can be made between what we call “self-governing organizations” 
                                                 
10 Solidary groups are defined as “collections of individuals engaged in mutually oriented activities 
who share a set of ethical standards and moral obligations” (Tsai 2007a: 356; Tsai 2007b: 4). 
Examples include temples, churches and lineages. These groups are “encompassing” when they are 
“open to everyone under the local government’s jurisdiction”, and “embedding” when they 
“incorporate local officials into the groups as members” (Tsai 2007a: 356; Tsai 2007b: 13).  
 
11 Institutions are defined as “the rules of the game” or the “humanly devised constraints that shape 
human interaction” (North 1990: 3). We use a “state-societal distinction” to distinguish between 
“formal” and “informal” institutions (Helmke and Levitsky 2004: 727).  
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and what Tsai (2007ab) calls “encompassing and embedding solidary groups”. First, 
not all self-governing organizations are “solidary groups”. Our analysis is not 
confined to groups based on “shared moral obligations and ethical standards” (Tsai 
2007b: 94), but instead includes other types of community organizations, such as 
farmers’ cooperatives or cultural associations. Second, although some types of self-
governing organizations, such as Christian churches or the so-called financial 
management small groups (licai xiaozu)12, can be regarded as “solidary groups”, they 
are not both “encompassing” and “embedding”. They may be “encompassing” (i.e., 
open for participation to all villagers), but not “embedding” (i.e., open to Party and 
government officials).  
A second difference between these studies and ours is the forms of public 
goods provision examined. The presence of “encompassing and embedding solidary 
groups” in village communities has been found to have a positive impact on the 
state’s provision of infrastructure (Tsai 2007ab). By enabling villagers to use social 
sanctions against corrupt village officials, these groups can help overcome “the 
accountability problem” associated with the governmental provision of public goods 
(Tsai 2007ab). Unlike these groups, self-governing organizations lack leverage over 
local officials and, consequently, may be unable to hold them accountable for their 
investment in infrastructure. However, their presence in village communities may 
have a positive effect on the level of non-state provision of public goods. Some of 
these organizations may be able to raise voluntary contributions from villagers and 
to provide the goods and services that are under-provided by the state. They may help 
villagers overcome the “collective action problem” associated with the non-
governmental provision of public goods13, by fostering cooperation among them and 
preventing free-riding problems. 
A third difference between our research and previous studies (Tsai 2007ab; Lu 
2015; Xu and Yao 2015) is related to the direction of the causal relationship between 
community participation and (local) state performance. While the main objective of 
                                                 
12 The members of these groups are elected by and among villagers and are responsible for monitoring 
the use of village funds (Su and Yang 2005: 144). 
 
13 The literature on social capital suggests that participation in these organizations may reduce the 
free-riding problem (i) by fostering “norms of reciprocity” among their members; (ii) by generating 
“information” about their behaviour; (iii) and by imposing “social sanctions” against free-riders 
(Putnam 1993: 174). 
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these studies is to investigate how the presence of community organizations may 
(positively) affect the performance of local governments (e.g., Tsai 2007ab; Lu 2015; 
Xu and Yao 2015), we examine the interactive relationship between both variables, 
but emphasize the opposite direction of their causal relationship, that is, how the 
quality of local government affects the types of organizations villagers join and 
contribute time and money to. While these studies argue that the key to good 
governance in rural China lies in having “the right kind of organizations” i.e., those 
that bring villagers and officials together (Tsai 2007b: 247), our study asks whether 
we can have the right kind of organizations without having the “right” kind of 
government.  
The point of departure for our analysis of the emergence and impact of self-
governing organizations in Chinese rural communities is the idea that, in the context 
of public goods provision, the relationship between state and non-state actors – 
whether one of complementarity or substitution - reflects and affects state legitimacy 
and capacity (Evans 1996; Narayan 1999; Ostrom 1996; Woolcock and Narayan 
2000; Robinson and White 2001; Joshi and Moore 2004; Cammet and MacLean 
2011; McLoughlin 2011; Tsai 2011; Batley et al. 2012; Bodea and Lebas 2014).  
When state institutions are strong, non-state provision is more likely to take 
the form of co-production than self-provision14: non-state actors are more likely to 
provide public goods in collaboration with, rather than independently of, state 
agencies. This in turn may have a positive impact on the quality of state-society 
relations and, ultimately, on the level of state capacity (e.g., Evans 1996; Ostrom 
1996; Robinson and White 2001; Tsai 2011). On the other hand, where state 
institutions fail to meet demands for public goods and are perceived with distrust, 
non-state organizations may emerge to fill the gap in governance. Yet, at the same 
time, the fact that they replace the state in the provision of basic services may further 
undermine the legitimacy and performance of state institutions (e.g., Narayan 1999; 
Woolcock and Narayan 2000; Bodea and Lebas 2014).  
                                                 
14 In rural China, two main types of non-state provision of public goods can be distinguished: 
“substitutive provision” by non-state actors and “co-production” between state and non-state actors 
(Tsai 2011: 48). The main difference lies in whether non-state actors provide public goods in 
collaboration with state agencies or independently (Joshi and Moore 2004: 31; Tsai 2011: 48-49).  
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There is evidence of the growth of “autonomous” non-state organizations 
(Watson 2008) and “substitutive” public goods provision (Tsai 2011) in rural China, 
yet little understanding of the determinants and outcomes of these forms of collective 
action. Using survey data collected by the the Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy 
on more than 500 village organizations – including, old people’s associations, 
wedding and funeral councils, Buddhist temples and Christian churches, mutual aid 
groups, and others -, this study aims to shed light on these two issues. A first aim is 
to explain what determines villagers’ incentives and capacity to form their own 
organizations and to provide themselves with public goods. To this end, we examine 
whether variation across villages in the level of participation in self-governing 
organizations is explained by variation in: (i) the level of trust between villagers and 
township officials; (ii) the amount of investment in village infrastructure; and (iii) 
the quality of village committee elections. Additionally, we examine how clan 
structure and rural-urban migration processes constrain or enable the development of 
these organizations.  
A second aim is to explore the limits and possible consequences of villagers’ 
involvement in self-governing organizations and non-state provision of public goods 
in rural China. To assess the service provision role of non-state organizations, we 
examine the involvement of self-governing organizations in the construction and 
maintenance of village roads and bridges, drinking water and irrigations systems, and 
primary school buildings – the public goods that villagers care most about (Yi et al. 
2011). Additionally, to explore the effects of non-state organizations and non-state 
provision on (local) state legitimacy and capacity, we examine whether there is a 
feedback effect between participation in self-governing organizations and trust in 
township officials: participation in these organizations may not only reflect but also 
contribute to the declining legitimacy of township governments. Given the lack of 
institutionalized channels through which higher levels of political distrust can 
translate into higher levels of government accountability and performance at the 
township level (e.g., electoral accountability), an increase in political distrust is likely 
to have a negative impact on the capacity of local officials to govern effectively, 
whether through a reduction in compliance with state policies (e.g., taxation) or 
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through an increase in non-institutionalized forms of political participation (e.g., 
social protests). 
The basic hypothesis is that the emergence of self-governing organizations in 
rural areas may be more a symptom than a solution to the problems of poor local 
governance and inadequate public goods provision. As a result of recent 
recentralization reforms, township officials can exercise an unprecedented degree of 
control over village governance – how villages are governed and by whom. However, 
they are neither elected by nor accountable to villagers. In communities where the 
legitimacy of (higher-level) state actors is low, and the performance of state 
institutions poor, villagers may have strong incentives to form their own 
organizations, and to provide themselves with the goods and services that are not 
provided by the state. At the same time, the social capital and collective action 
literatures suggest that their ability to do so may depend on their community’s social 
and economic characteristics and, especially, on whether clan ties foster integration 
within the village and on whether migration networks provide access to resources 
outside the village (e.g., Woolcock 1998; Narayan 1999; Ostrom and Ahn 2001). 
Hence, self-governing organizations may be able to meet the infrastructure needs that 
are left unmet by local governments in some villages but not in others. As 
“substitutive informal institutions”, they are likely to be only a “second-best 
solution” (Helmke and Levitsky 2004) to the problem of underprovision of local 
public goods in villages where formal institutions in general, and elections in 
particular, fail to provide a mechanism for holding accountable those who actually 
govern them15. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 Helmke and Levitsky (2004: 729-730) point out that “substitutive informal institutions” tend to 
emerge where formal institutions are “weak or lack authority”. In their view, they are a ‘second best’ 
strategy for actors who lack the power to change the way formal institutions function. 
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1.3 Background 
 
1.3.1 (De-)centralization in Rural China: Power, Accountability and Participation 
 
Since the late 1980s, and especially after the enactment of the revised 
Organic Law of Village Committees in 1998, China has carried out political 
decentralization reforms at the village level with the objective of making village 
governments more accountable to villagers. The introduction of elections for village 
committees and the creation of village (representative) assemblies and village affairs 
control groups have provided new mechanisms for villagers to hold village 
committees accountable for the provision of public goods (Choate 1997; Kelliher 
1997; O’Brien and Li 2000; Pastor and Tan 2000; Alpermann 2001, 2010, 2013; 
O’Brien and Zhao 2011; Schubert and Ahlers 2012a). However, at the same time, 
there is evidence that the distribution of resources and decision-making power in 
rural China is increasingly skewed towards county, township and village-level Party 
committees (e.g., He 2007; Oi et al. 2012; Schubert and Ahlers 2012a; Sun et al. 
2013; Chen 2015). For instance, a recent study based on a sample of eighty villages 
from eight provinces shows that the position of the Party secretary in village 
governance “remains dominant in nearly all villages – even in those where elections 
are largely free and fair” (Chen 2015: 13). This suggests the existence of what, for 
lack of a better term, might be called the “accountability-power paradox” in village 
governance: villagers have the mechanisms to hold village committees accountable 
but village committees do not have the power to govern. 
In the remainder of this section, we discuss some of the possible causes and 
consequences of this paradox. We examine the political, fiscal, administrative and 
institutional aspects of (de-)centralization at the village level with two objectives. 
The first one is to outline some of the factors underlying the distribution of power 
between levels of government, and between Party and non-Party institutions at the 
village level, including the lack of a clear legal framework for village governance, 
the centralization of the fiscal and administrative systems and the introduction of 
elections for village Party branches. The second one is to discuss current trends in 
local governance, with a particular focus on issues of accountability and 
participation. Two points are made. First, recent changes in the local governance 
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system – changes aimed at increasing the resources, authority and legitimacy of Party 
organizations at various levels - may have the effect of undermining the power of 
village committees and, consequently, the ability of villagers to hold local officials 
accountable for the provision of public goods through elections and other democratic 
institutions. This may create an “accountability gap” in village governance that 
cannot be filled by other accountability mechanisms – whether fiscal (e.g., earmarked 
transfers), administrative (e.g., performance contracts) or political (e.g., intra-Party 
elections). Second, in many parts of rural China, state-society relations may be 
characterized, neither by cooperation nor by conflict, but by disengagement. This 
may weaken the incentives of villagers to participate in community organizations 
with close ties to the state, as well as in the co-production of public goods with 
officials. 
 
 
1.3.2 Village Elections 
 
The 1987, 1998, and 2010 Organic Laws of Village Committees have 
provided the legal basis for the gradual implementation of political decentralization 
reforms in Chinese villages16 (Choate 1997; Kelliher 1997; O’Brien and Li 2000; 
Pastor and Tan 2000; Alpermann 2001, 2010, 2013; O’Brien and Zhao 2011; 
Schubert and Ahlers 2012a). In the three versions of the Organic Law, village 
committees are defined as a “mass organization of self-government”, whose 
members must be directly elected by villagers every three years (without term limits), 
and whose primary functions are to “manage the public affairs and public welfare 
                                                 
16 Village committees emerged spontaneously in two Guangxi counties in the early 1980s. They were 
established by villagers in order to provide for basic community needs and to fill the vacuum of 
governance left by the gradual dismantlement of the People´s Commune system. Their members were 
elected by villagers and their role was limited to managing community affairs, such as the construction 
and maintenance of community infrastructure (Choate 1997: 5; O´Brien and Li 2000: 465-466). The 
1982 Constitution gave village committees legal recognition as “elected, mass organizations of self-
government” (Article 111) and by the end of 1984 around 700,000 brigades had been replaced by 
nearly 950,000 village committees (O’Brien and Li 2000: 467; 472). It was not until 1987, after years 
of continued debate and negotiation between advocates and opponents of village self-government, 
that the National People’s Congress passed the Organic Law of Village Committees (Trial 
Implementation). New versions of the Organic Law were passed in 1998 and 2010 (Alpermann 2010, 
2013).  
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undertakings of the village, mediate disputes among villagers, help maintain the 
public order, and convey villagers’ opinions and demands and make suggestions to 
the people’s government” (Schubert and Ahlers 2012a: 193). 
Each version of the Organic Law has provided more – and seemingly more 
effective – channels for villagers to monitor and hold village committees accountable 
(Pastor and Tan 2000; Alpermann 2010, 2013; O’Brien and Zhao 2011; Schubert and 
Ahlers 2012a): 
 
 Village elections, which were initially implemented on a trial basis 
(1987-1998), are now regularly held in the country’s more than half 
million villages and involve more than six hundred million voters. 
 
 Electoral procedures have been standardized and improved. The revised 
versions of the Organic Law include electoral rules covering each of the 
key stages of the electoral process: election management, voter 
registration, candidate nomination, campaigning, voting and vote count. 
In the 2010 Law17, new rules mandate that election committee members 
be selected at the village (representative) assembly (Art. 12), that election 
candidates be nominated by villagers (Art. 14), and that the election be 
conducted by secret ballot (Art. 15). New provisions also limit the use of 
proxy voting and roving ballot boxes (Art. 15). 
 
 A new “system of open administration of village affairs” has been 
adopted and, for the first time, village committees are required to disclose 
all expenditures once every quarter (Art. 30). 
 
 The oversight role of village (representative) assemblies, to which village 
committees report and are accountable (Art. 2), has been strengthened. 
They have been given the right to modify or cancel any “inappropriate” 
decision made by village committees (Art. 23). 
 
 The deliberative role of village (representative) assemblies has also been 
strengthened. They have been empowered to participate in decisions 
about “proposals for developing public welfare undertakings, raising 
funds, gathering labor forces and contracting construction projects in the 
village” (Art. 24). 
                                                 
17 The full text of the 2010 Organic Law can be found in Schubert and Ahlers (2012a: 185-204) and 
at www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=8445. 
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 Citizen monitoring groups – the so-called “village affairs supervisory 
committees” – have been created in each village to monitor the 
performance of village committees. Their members must be elected from 
and by villagers and must be people with “expertise in finance and 
management” (Art. 32). 
 
 A “democratic” appraisal of the performance of village committee 
members must now be conducted by village affairs control groups once 
a year. Where members of the village committee are deemed 
“incompetent” in two consecutive years, they can be removed from office 
(Art. 33). 
 
 Procedures for recalling elected officials have been simplified (Art. 16), 
making it easier for villagers to oust corrupt officials between elections. 
 
As Alpermann (2013: 160) has pointed out, the 2010 Organic Law of 
Village Committees provides the means to strengthen the accountability of elected 
village officials to village voters. However, it does not provide the means to ensure 
that villages are actually governed by democratically elected village committees. In 
the 1987, 1998 and 2010 versions of the Law, there is ambiguity regarding the 
division of power and functions between village committees, on the one hand, and 
township and village Party organizations, on the other. The most recent version of 
the Law, like the previous ones, requires village committees to “assist” township 
governments in the performance of their duties (Art. 5) and establishes village Party 
organizations as the “leading core” in village governance (Art. 4). The failure to 
establish a clear framework for village governance that effectively empowers village 
committees vis-à-vis other political actors may ultimately render village elections, 
village (representative) assemblies, and village affairs monitoring groups 
meaningless as accountability mechanisms. 
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1.3.3 Fiscal  Centralization 
 
The recentralization of the fiscal system, the growth of vertical fiscal 
imbalances, and the resulting dependence of local governments on central transfers 
are the most important changes in China’s local public finance in recent years (Zhang 
1999; Wong 2000, 2007ab, 2009; Martinez-Vazquez 2006; Lou 2008; Wong and 
Bird 2008; Bahl 2011; Man 2011).  
Since the mi-1990s the central government has implemented a series of fiscal 
reforms that have fundamentally changed how rural governments are financed. The 
introduction of the tax-sharing system (1994), the subsequent centralization of 
(enterprise and individual) income taxes (2002-03), the elimination of rural fees 
(2002-04) and agricultural taxes (2004-06) and the increase of transfers to rural 
governments under the “New Socialist Countryside” policy (2006-present) have 
eroded the revenue-raising capacity of rural governments, while increasing their 
dependence on (mostly, earmarked) transfers from the central and provincial 
governments to finance the provision of infrastructure and services (World Bank 
2007; Fock and Wong 2008; Tian 2009; Takeuchi 2014; Chen 2015). For instance, 
findings from a survey of 100 villages in five provinces show that in 1997 
(earmarked) transfers financed about 45 percent of investment in village-level 
infrastructure, while in 2008 they financed almost 75 percent (Oi et al. 2012).  
Fiscal recentralization policies have sharply reduced the amount of resources 
over which village governments have control or discretion, limiting the scope of what 
they can do and be held accountable for. These policies may have limited the 
potential of political decentralization reforms to improve rural public goods provision 
and, at the same time, may have left the problem of political accountability unsolved. 
First, by shifting resources and decision-making power away from villages and 
towards counties and townships, fiscal recentralization reforms may have 
undermined the role of village elections as mechanisms of accountability. This is for 
two interrelated reasons. The first and obvious one is that county and township 
officials, who are not elected by villagers but appointed by higher-level Party 
committees, are now responsible for financing and implementing a large and growing 
share of village infrastructure projects (e.g., Wong et al. 2013). The second reason is 
related to the possible influence of political factors on the distribution of investments 
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across villages. Like in other countries (e.g., Khemani 2007ab; Leiderer 2014), the 
intergovernmental transfer system in China leaves room for a “politically motivated” 
distribution of resources across localities: in the rural Chinese context, county and 
township Party committees may target more investment to villages that are governed 
by Party branches rather than by popularly elected village committees. In any case, 
regardless of the reason, the fact that (i) most rural infrastructure investment is 
financed by (earmarked) transfers from the central and provincial governments, (ii) 
and that transfers are allocated to villages on an ad hoc basis by counties and 
townships, implies that the positive relationship between grassroots democracy and 
public goods provision – if and where it existed - may have disappeared or been 
reversed.  
Second, while the central government’s increased reliance on earmarked 
transfers to finance rural public goods provision may have undermined the 
effectiveness of elections, earmarked transfers may be a poor substitute for elections 
as accountability mechanisms18. Existing evidence suggests that the central 
government has little control over how earmarked grants are actually distributed and 
spent by rural officials (World Bank 2007; Fock and Wong 2008; Liu M. et al. 2009; 
Takeuchi 2014), mainly due to the poor design and implementation of the 
intergovernmental transfer system, which remains “the least transparent area in 
China’s fiscal system” (Qiao and Shah 2006: 159). By 2020 the Chinese central 
government will have spent around 180 trillion yuan on the implementation of the 
“new socialist countryside” policy (Schubert and Ahlers 2011: 29), but a recent 
World Bank study reports that, as yet, “there is no centralized monitoring and 
evaluation system that allows the central government to comprehensively assess the 
overall programs; in which counties, townships and villages they are implemented; 
and their efficiency and impact” (Fock and Wong 2008: 43).  
 
 
 
                                                 
18 In their analysis of earmarked grants as a means to increase government accountability, Bird and 
Smart (2009: 18) argue that “one advantage of enforcing such controls through grant policy is that the 
built-in reporting back to the center of how grant funds are spent may make it easier to monitor how 
local governments actually do”. This is not, however, the case in China. 
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1.3.4 Administrative Centralization 
 
In recent years, various administrative reforms have been implemented to 
enhance the effectiveness of the cadre responsibility system in rural areas, which are 
seen as “a decisive turn towards more centralized administrative control of townships 
and villages” (Oi et al. 2012: 651). The cadre responsibility system is the mechanism 
by which the Party monitors and holds local officials to account19. Under this system, 
Party committees at each level of the administrative hierarchy (e.g., township Party 
committees) use annual performance contracts to assign a variety of targets to lower-
level officials (e.g., village Party secretaries and village heads) and to hold them 
accountable for fulfilling them (Whiting 2001, 2006; Edin 2003ab; Burns 2004; Tsui 
and Wang 2004; Heimer 2006; Kennedy 2007b; Tsai 2007b; Landry 2008; Gao 2009; 
Ong 2012; Birney 2014).  
To make village officials more accountable to their Party superiors under 
the cadre responsibility system, the central government has adopted the so-called 
“salaries-from-above” and “cadre-in-residence” policies (Oi et al. 2012; Smith 
2010). The first policy requires that the salaries of the top village officials be paid by 
county governments from funds transferred by the central government (Oi et al. 2012: 
657). The second policy requires that (at least) one township official works as a “sent-
down cadre” in each village (Smith 2010: 613-615). The objective of these policies 
is to reduce agency problems between village officials and county/township cadres, 
by providing the latter with new means to incentivize and monitor the performance 
of the former. Findings from a nationally representative survey of 100 villages in five 
provinces suggest that, by 2005, the “salaries-from-above” and “cadre-in-residence” 
policies had been implemented in 91 and 71 percent of China’s villages, respectively 
(Oi et al. 2012). While these administrative reforms may make village officials more 
accountable to higher-level Party cadres, it is not clear whether they can make them 
more accountable to villagers. 
                                                 
19 The cadre responsibility system is based on the nomenklatura system, which is “a list of leading 
positions over whose appointments the party exercises full control. Party committees exercise 
authority over the appointment of senior personnel, as well as promotion, dismissal and transfer one 
step down the administrative hierarchy” (Heimer 2006: 124). 
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An increase in administrative centralization may lead to a decrease in 
political decentralization20 and, at the same time, tighter bureaucratic control over 
village officials may not improve public goods provision, unless performance 
contracts with rural officials at all levels (i.e., county, township and village) include 
and prioritize performance targets related to social development and grassroots 
political reform. Existing research suggests that the degree of administrative 
centralization varies across rural jurisdictions (Sun et al. 2013; Tsai 2007b), and that 
greater reliance on the cadre responsibility system to govern rural areas creates 
negative incentives for township officials to block grassroots democratic reforms, 
while failing to create positive incentives for them to hold village officials 
accountable for providing better infrastructure and services21. This suggests that, by 
reducing the decision-making power and autonomy of village committees, 
mechanisms of top-down control may undermine the ability of villagers to use 
elections as a way of providing incentives to those who govern to meet their needs. 
At the same time, administrative institutions, like fiscal institutions, may not be 
enough on their own to enhance the accountability of rural officials and to improve 
the provision of public goods. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 For a general discussion on the possible interrelations among the fiscal, administrative and political 
dimensions of decentralization see Schneider (2003).  
 
21 Research by Sun et al. (2013: 17) has found that “Party branch secretaries are more likely to 
maintain their predominant positions in villages where township authorities are more dependent on 
village leaders for the implementation of policy measures”21. Tsai’s (2007b: 234) research, in turn, 
shows that the reason why greater bureaucratic control does not translate into better rural service 
provision is because “all performance contracts signed by officials at the township level and above 
prioritize economic development, industrialization and revenue generation, not the provision of public 
goods and services”.  
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1.3.5 Intra-Party Elections  
 
Since the early 2000s, the central government has promoted “intra-Party 
democracy” in rural communities, through the introduction of “intra-Party elections” 
and a new system of “concurrent office-holding”22 (e.g., Chan 2003, 2007; Schubert 
2003; Guo and Bernstein 2004; He 2007; O’Brien and Han 2009; Huang and Chen 
2010; Brown 2011; Alpermann 2013; Sun et al. 2013). In some villages, Party branch 
secretaries are no longer appointed by the township but elected by and among village 
Party members. In other villages, the “dual power structure” of village committee 
head and Party secretary has been replaced by a “unitary power structure”, where the 
same person serves as both village head and Party branch secretary (Sun et al. 2013).  
The implementation of these reforms is seen as part of the Party’s intention 
“to re-concentrate its power in rural areas” (Chan 2003: 192). However, little is 
known about their impact on local governance and public goods provision. To date, 
we know that villages where Party secretaries are elected by Party members are more 
likely to be governed by the Party branch rather than by the village committee (Sun 
et al. 2013). However, we do not know whether intra-Party democratic reforms are 
effective in creating incentives for them to improve the provision of public goods. 
 
 
1.3.6 Participation in Local Governance 
 
China differs from most decentralized countries in that the level of 
dissatisfaction with and distrust of government increases “as government gets closer 
to the people” (Saich 2007: 5). This is especially the case in rural areas. There is 
evidence that villagers distrust local officials (Li 2004, 2008); that they view 
grassroots governments as “useless” (Oi and Zhao 2007: 95); and that they dismiss 
village elections as mere “political shows” (Tao et al. 2011: 109). One of the most 
important consequences of the growing cleavage between villagers and local officials 
is the decline in various forms of participation. For instance, there is evidence that 
                                                 
22 In July 2002, the Central Committee and the State Council issued a circular (Document no. 14) 
which recommended the adoption of direct elections for village Party secretaries and encouraged 
merging the posts of village committee head and village Party secretary (yijiantiao) (Guo and 
Bernstein 2004; He 2007; Huang and Chen 2010; O´Brien and Han 2009). 
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grassroots governments are often unable to raise voluntary contributions from 
villagers for infrastructure projects under the so-called “one-issue-one-discussion” 
(yi shi yi yi) system23, especially in communities where confidence in grassroots 
officials has been eroded by problems of corruption (e.g. Chen 2008, 2014, 2015; 
Fock and Wong 2008; Li 2009; Tian 2009; Göbel 2010; Boyle et al. 2014). There is 
also evidence that in villages where distrust of township officials is high, and where 
democratic institutions do not provide opportunities for meaningful participation in 
village affairs, villagers neither vote in elections (Tao et al. 2011) nor attend village 
assembly meetings (Schubert and Ahlers 2012a). Recent changes in China’s 
(de-)centralization policies may have created new challenges for improving cadre-
villager relations in rural areas. According to Chen (2015: 259), “cadre-villager 
disengagement seems to be a general trend across rural China” after the 
implementation of the tax-for-fee reform and the abolition of agricultural taxes. 
 
 
1.4 Methodology and Structure of the Thesis 
 
To address the research questions discussed in section 1.2, this research relies 
on cross-sectional survey data from 115 villages collected by the Center for Chinese 
Agricultural Policy (Chinese Academy of Sciences) in the summer of 2005. To 
investigate why some village governments provide more public goods than others, 
we specify and estimate a simultaneous equations model24, in which “village 
democracy” and “village public goods provision” (i.e., village-financed investment) 
are the endogenous variables. This has two advantages. The first one is that it allows 
us to address potential problems of simultaneity and endogeneity. There may be 
reverse causality between village democracy and village-financed investment. In 
villages governed by democratically elected village committees, village heads might 
have stronger incentives to allocate a larger share of the village budget to the 
provision of public goods in order to remain in office. At the same time, villagers 
                                                 
23 According to the “one-issue-one-discussion” (yishiyiyi) system, “any fee levied must be earmarked 
for a specific project and collected with the consent of villagers” (Chen 2015: 181).  
24 The simultaneous equations models are nonrecursive unless stated otherwise. 
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might have stronger incentives to participate in village politics in order to monitor 
and influence how village funds are spent and what public goods are provided. In 
other words, village democracy may affect and be affected by village public goods 
provision, through the channels of political accountability and political participation, 
respectively. Given the possible interdependence between the fiscal behaviour of 
village leaders and the political behaviour of villagers, the use of a single-equation 
regression model and of the ordinary least squares estimation procedure would lead 
to biased and inconsistent estimates of the effects of village democracy on public 
goods provision (Wooldridge 2006; Gujarati and Porter 2010). A second advantage 
of using this model is that it allows us to include measures of the implementation of 
the cadre responsibility system and Party elections as exogenous variables in each of 
the equations and thus to examine their impact on both village democracy and 
village-financed investment. The assumption that these variables are exogenous to 
the system seems reasonable, given that decisions regarding the method for 
(s)electing village Party secretaries and the criteria for evaluating their performance 
under the cadre responsibility system are typically made by county and township 
leaders.  
Additionally, we estimate a simultaneous equations model in which “village 
democracy” and “government-financed investment” are the endogenous variables. In 
this case, we use the share of infrastructure investment financed by transfers from 
higher-level governments (i.e., government-financed investment) as the main 
dependent variable. This will allow us to explore two questions: (i) whether county 
and township Party committees target transfers to villages where the Party branch 
remains the dominant governing body; and (ii) whether this tends to undermine the 
demand for and implementation of grassroots democratic reforms. 
To investigate the interactive relationship between government performance 
and non-government provision of public goods, we develop a simultaneous equations 
model, with “political trust” and “participation in self-governing organizations” as 
the endogenous variables. In this case, the main question we seek to investigate is 
whether the fact that villagers form their own organizations to provide themselves 
with public goods reflects and contributes to the decline in satisfaction with and trust 
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in government in rural areas25. The key exogenous variables included in the model 
are a village’s clan structure and level of out-migration. Descriptive analysis of 
survey data on more than 500 community organizations is used to determine the 
nature of self-governing organizations and their degree of involvement in the 
construction and maintenance of roads, bridges, drinking water and irrigation 
systems, as well as school buildings. 
This study consists of five chapters including the introduction and conclusion. 
Chapter 2 “China’s Intergovernmental Fiscal Reforms and Rural Public Finance” 
pursues four objectives: (i) to analyze the processes of decentralization and 
recentralization that have shaped central-local fiscal relations under the fiscal 
contracting system (1980-1993) and the tax-sharing system (1994-present); (ii) to 
assess whether the intergovernmental fiscal system and interjurisdictional 
competition have provided rural governments with adequate (fiscal) resources and 
incentives to respond to local demands for public goods; (iii) to analyze China’s 
recent rural fiscal reforms, including the implementation of the tax-for-fee reform 
and the abolition of agricultural taxes; and, last, (iv) to engage with a recent strand 
of the second-generation fiscal federalism literature – “partial decentralization” 
theory – (e.g., Khemani 2005; Ahmad and Brosio 2009; Devarajan et al. 2009), and 
to raise the question of whether decentralization at the village level has become 
“partial”, a situation where “political and fiscal institutions are not able to ensure 
accountability of local elected politicians and officials” (Ahmad and Brosio 2009: 5).  
Chapter 3 “Political Institutions and the Provision of Local Public Goods” 
investigates whether inter-village differences in infrastructure spending reflect inter-
village differences in their governance systems, and in what ways. The focus of the 
analysis is on the accountability of village governments to villagers and, in particular, 
on how the distribution of power (i.e. control over fiscal resources) between levels 
of government, and between Party and non-Party institutions at the village level, 
affects the ability of rural residents to hold village officials to account for providing 
                                                 
25 There is a possibility that there is a one-way relationship between political trust and participation in 
self-governing organizations. Political trust may influence participation in self-governing 
organizations, but participation in these organizations may have no impact on the political attitudes of 
their members. For this reason, we also develop a recursive simultaneous equations model and 
estimate it using three-stage least squares. 
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public goods. The chapter examines empirically: (i) whether variation in political 
decentralization across villages explains variation in their investment in 
infrastructure (i.e., village-financed investment); (ii) whether and how variation 
across villages in the degree of transfer dependence (i.e., government-financed 
investment), top-down Party control (i.e., the cadre responsibility system), and intra-
Party democracy (i.e., intra-Party elections) is associated with variation in the degree 
of political decentralization (i.e., village democratic reforms)26; and (iii) whether and 
how variation across villages in the degree of top-down Party control, and intra-Party 
democracy is associated with variation in the level of village-financed investment in 
infrastructure. 
Chapter 4 “Social Institutions and Local Public Goods Provision” 
investigates how – and how effectively – village residents respond to problems of 
poor local governance and inadequate public goods provision. It investigates what 
determines villagers’ willingness and capacity to form their own organizations and 
provide themselves with public goods, by examining whether variation across 
villages in the level of participation in self-governing organizations is explained by 
variation in: (i) the level of trust between villagers and township officials; (ii) the 
amount of investment in village infrastructure; (iii) the quality of village elections; 
and (iv) features of the social and economic structure, namely, lineage institutions 
and rural-urban migration. Additionally, the chapter examines (i) the degree of 
involvement of self-governing organizations in the construction and maintenance of 
basic infrastructure, and (ii) the effects of these organizations on political trust and 
legitimacy.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26 The underlying question was: (i) whether the cadre responsibility system creates perverse incentives 
for township officials to obstruct village democratic reforms; (ii) whether the intergovernmental 
transfer system leaves room for county and township governments to target more resources to 
politically favoured villages, namely, those where the village Party branch remains the dominant 
governing body; and (iii) whether the implementation of intra-Party democratic reforms justifies or 
legitimizes the lack of progress in the implementation of village democratic reforms. In other words, 
the use of performance contracts, intergovernmental transfers and intra-Party elections as mechanisms 
of accountability in rural governance may subvert rather than reinforce village democratic institutions.  
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1.5 The Data Set 
 
The data set used in this study is from a survey of 115 villages conducted by 
the Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy (CCAP) of the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences in the summer of 2005 (henceforth, CCAP village survey).  Stratified 
sampling was used to select the sample villages. The country was first divided into 
six regions and one province was randomly selected from each of the regions: Jilin 
(Northeast), Hebei (North), Shaanxi (Central), Jiangsu (East), Fujian (Southeast), and 
Sichuan (Southwest). All counties in each province were then ranked into quintiles 
according to their per capita gross value of industrial output, and one county was 
randomly selected from each quintile. Within each county, two townships were 
randomly selected from among those with per capita income above and below the 
median, respectively. Finally, following the same procedure, two villages were 
randomly selected from each township, resulting in a sample of 120 villages. 
Fourteen villagers and between two and four officials were randomly selected in each 
village. Due to unexpected difficulties (e.g., bad weather) five villages had to be 
dropped from the final sample. The survey covered 378 cadres and 1,550 villagers in 
115 villages. It collected information about public goods provision; village finances; 
village democratic reforms; the relationship between villages and townships; the 
relationship between village committees and Party branches; villagers’ political 
attitudes and participation; the nature and role of community organizations; and the 
economic, social, demographic and geographic characteristics of the sample villages. 
The data were collected for the years 2000 and 200427. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27 The fiscal data were collected for the period 2000-2004. 
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1.6 Key Findings and Implications of the Study 
 
The findings of this study shed light on how the distribution of power (i.e., 
control over fiscal resources) between levels of the Party-state apparatus, and 
between Party and non-Party institutions at each level, affects patterns of 
accountability and participation in service delivery across villages. They can be 
summarized as follows. 
 
1) Villages where (i) elections are better implemented, and where (ii) popularly 
elected village committees have a say in the allocation of village funds, tend 
to invest more in infrastructure (i.e., village-financed investment). However, 
village committees are often powerless. The main challenge for increasing 
accountability in the provision of public goods in rural communities is not – 
or not only – whether voters can exercise control over elected officials (i.e., 
quality of village democratic institutions) but, more fundamentally, whether 
village committees can gain control over fiscal resources (i.e., power of 
village committees).  
 
2) County and township Party committees tend to allocate a smaller share of 
(earmarked) transfers to villages that are governed by democratically elected 
village committees, regardless of fiscal capacity or expenditure needs 
considerations (i.e., government-financed investment). At the same time, 
villages that fund a larger share of their expenditures with transfers are more 
likely to be governed by Party secretaries. While more research is needed, 
these findings suggest that the intergovernmental transfer system provides a 
mechanism for higher-level Party officials to target resources to villages 
where power remains concentrated in the hands of their subordinates, and that 
this tends to undermine the implementation of grassroots political reforms. 
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3) The cadre responsibility system and intra-Party elections appear to have 
diametrically opposed effects on local democracy and local public goods 
provision at the village level. Tighter bureaucratic control over villages is not 
positively associated with local public goods provision (i.e., village-financed 
investment), but it is negatively associated with local democracy. Village 
governments that are less autonomous from township governments are less 
likely to be run by popularly elected officials, while they are not more likely 
to invest in public goods. In contrast, the election of village Party secretaries 
by village Party members (without the interference of township officials) has 
a significant positive impact on local public goods provision and does not 
have a significant negative impact on local democracy.  
 
4) In villages where the legitimacy of (higher-level) state actors is low (i.e., trust 
in township officials), and the performance of state institutions poor (i.e., 
village-financed investment), villagers have strong incentives to form their 
own organizations, and to provide themselves with the goods and services 
that are not provided by the state. At the same time, their ability to do so 
depends on their community’s social and economic characteristics and, in 
particular, on whether clan ties foster cohesion within the village and on 
whether migration networks provide access to resources outside the village. 
 
5) The fact that villagers form their own organizations to address community 
needs represents only a “second-best solution” to the problem of under-
provision of public goods in communities where formal institutions, such as 
elections and village representative assemblies, fail to provide a mechanism 
for holding accountable those who actually govern them (e.g., township 
officials). Increasing participation in these organizations is not only a 
consequence but also a cause of the declining legitimacy of the (local) state.  
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This study’s findings have implications for the design and implementation of 
(de-)centralization policies in China. Two main conclusions can be drawn from them. 
The first one is related to the conflict between the political, fiscal, and administrative 
dimensions of (de-)centralization and the negative impact this has on the quality of 
local governance and public goods provision at the village level. Our findings suggest 
the following: (i) political decentralization has a positive impact on the performance 
of village governments in providing public goods; (ii) the processes of political 
decentralization and intra-Party democratization can complement one another in 
making village officials more (downwardly) accountable to villagers and Party 
members for the use of village funds; (iii) fiscal and administrative centralization 
have a negative impact on political decentralization and compromise its benefits, 
mainly by reducing the resources and autonomy of village committees; (iv) 
intergovernmental fiscal and administrative institutions are a poor substitute for local 
elections as accountability mechanisms, given the lack of transparency and objective 
criteria in the distribution of (earmarked) transfers among villages (i.e. government 
financed investment); and the failure of the cadre responsibility system to create 
incentives for village officials to invest in public goods (i.e., village-financed 
investment). While further research is needed, our study suggests that, by reducing 
the power of village committees, the centralization of the fiscal and administrative 
systems is leading to a reversal of political decentralization and to a widening of the 
“accountability gap” between villagers and officials. 
A second conclusion is related to how the (de-)centralized system shapes the 
interaction between state and non-state actors in local governance. In villages where 
the (local) state fails to meet demands for public services, and where township 
officials are seen as part of the problem rather than as part of the solution, community 
organizations may emerge to fill the void left by state institutions. However, the fact 
that they replace local officials in mobilizing resources from villagers and providing 
services further reduces the legitimacy of the (local) state, while increasing the 
transaction costs of governing. This finding is consistent with recent research 
showing that (i) participation in self-governing organizations is negatively associated 
with the “extractive capacity” of grassroots governments (Liu et al. 2012: 191); and 
that (ii), unlike other forms of non-state provision (e.g., co-production), 
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“substitutive” public goods provision by community organizations is negatively 
related to village officials’ ability to complete the tasks assigned by township 
officials (Tsai 2011: 61). Taken together, these findings can be interpreted as 
evidence that non-state provision by self-governing organizations negatively affects 
two key dimensions of (local) state capacity – the capacity to tax (Liu et al. 2012) 
and to elicit compliance with state policies (Tsai 2011) -, through its negative effects 
on (local) state legitimacy. 
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Chapter Two 
China’s Intergovernmental Fiscal Reforms and Rural Public Finance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
48 
 
2.1 Introduction  
     
There is growing concern that “the unsatisfactory state of the intergovernmental 
finance system is becoming an increasingly important obstacle to development” in 
China (Wong and Bird 2008: 454). Since the mid-1990s, the central government has 
implemented a series of fiscal reforms that have reduced the tax base of local 
governments, making them increasingly dependent on central transfers to finance 
their expenditures. There is evidence that the recentralization of the fiscal system has 
created new challenges to improve government accountability and service delivery, 
especially in rural areas (e.g., World Bank 2007; Fock and Wong 2008; Wong and 
Bird 2008). And yet the literature on Chinese federalism (e.g., Montinola et al. 1995; 
Zhuravskaya 2000; Jin et al. 2005; Weingast 2009)  – arguably the most influential 
strand of literature examining the impact of fiscal institutions on governance and 
development in reform-era China – does not provide insights into the nature and 
impact of these reforms.  
Against this background, this chapter pursues four main objectives. First, it 
provides an overview of the evolution of central-local fiscal relations during the 
reform period. It contrasts the processes of decentralization and recentralization that 
have shaped central-local fiscal relations under the fiscal contracting system (1980-
1993) and the tax-sharing system (1994-present), while highlighting the growth of 
vertical fiscal imbalances, and the resulting dependence of local governments on 
transfers, as one of the most important changes in local public finance in recent years. 
An analysis of the vertical structure of government under the fiscal contracting 
system and the tax-sharing system shows that, from an expenditure perspective, little 
has changed: China remains one of the most decentralized countries in the world, 
with local governments accounting for more than 70 percent of total government 
expenditures (i.e., expenditure decentralization). However, from a revenue 
perspective, much has changed with the introduction of the tax-sharing system: 
China’s reliance on central-local transfers to finance decentralization is today 
considerably greater than in the past and greater than that of other countries, both 
developed and developing. Transfers absorb around 60 percent of central revenues 
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and finance 40-50 percent of local expenditures28 (i.e., revenue centralization) (Wong 
2010, 2011; Bahl 2011; Whiting 2011).  
In addition to identifying changing trends in local public finance, the chapter 
also identifies persistent weaknesses in the intergovernmental fiscal system, 
including: the lack of clear expenditure and revenue assignments at the subnational 
level, which has resulted in higher levels of local government “pushing down” 
expenditures and “grabbing” revenues (Wong 2009); the lack of transparency of the 
intergovernmental transfer system and its limited effectiveness in both closing 
vertical fiscal gaps and reducing horizontal fiscal disparities (World Bank 2002; 
Dollar and Hofman 2008; Whiting 2011); and the lack of formal revenue autonomy 
of local governments, which contrasts with their extensive reliance on various forms 
of informal taxation and indirect borrowing (Martinez-Vazquez et al. 2006ab; Fock 
and Wong 2008; Man 2011). These and other problems indicate that, despite 
successive rounds of reform, China’s intergovernmental fiscal system still remains 
“a work in progress” (Wong and Bird 2008). 
A second objective of this chapter is to assess the impact of fiscal institutions – 
the intergovernmental fiscal system and interjurisdictional competition – on rural 
service provision, through their effects on the fiscal resources and incentives of rural 
governments. During the reform period, counties, townships and villages have 
assumed the main responsibility for providing basic infrastructure, health, education 
and social welfare to rural residents (World Bank 2002; Tsai 2007b; Wong and Bird 
2008; Fock and Wong 2008; Saich 2008). However, existing studies (e.g., Saich 
2008) show that, both under the fiscal contracting system and the tax-sharing system, 
grassroots governments have lacked adequate resources to meet demands for public 
services. The emergence of large horizontal and vertical fiscal imbalances has made 
it difficult for them to finance their provision. Under the fiscal contracting system 
(1980-1993), the critical factors affecting the availability of resources for service 
delivery in rural communities were: (i) the uneven distribution of tax bases across 
rural areas, resulting from the uneven development of township and village 
enterprises, concentrated in coastal provinces and peri-urban areas; and (ii) the 
limited ability of the central government to use the transfer system for redistributive 
                                                 
28 Tax rebates are not included. 
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purposes, due to the decline in government revenues (West and Wong 1995; Wong 
1997, 2009, 2010). Under the tax-sharing system (1994-present), two additional 
factors affecting the availability of resources for rural service provision are: (i) the 
large mismatch between expenditure and revenue assignments at the county, 
township and village levels; and (ii) the limited effectiveness of the 
intergovernmental transfer system in channelling resources to rural governments 
(World Bank 2002; Martinez-Vazquez 2006; Oi and Zhao 2007; Chen 2008; Dollar 
and Hofman 2008; Fock and Wong 2008; Martinez-Vazquez et al. 2008ab; Tian 
2009; Wong 2009, 2010). According to Wong (2009: 942-943), after four decades of 
reforms, the intergovernmental fiscal system remains “broken” in the sense that it 
“lacks mechanisms for ensuring that they [local governments] have adequate 
financial resources”. However, unlike in the early reform years, the main cause is not 
the lack of resources at the central level, but rather the lack of a transfer system that 
effectively redistributes fiscal resources among regions and levels of government. 
The availability of fiscal resources is a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for local governments to meet local demands for services – incentives also matter. 
Existing studies suggest that interjurisdictional competition has not provided 
villagers with an effective mechanism to hold local governments accountable for 
their provision of services. This is for three reasons. First, the hukou system has 
restricted rural-urban migration (e.g., Tsui and Wang 2004). Second, to the extent 
that local governments have competed with one another for (mobile) production 
factors, they have competed for capital, not (unskilled) labour (e.g. Montinola et al. 
1995). And third, the recent abolition of agricultural taxes has further weakened the 
“exit” option as a mechanism to hold grassroots officials accountable for the 
provision of public goods, especially in agricultural villages (Takeuchi 2014). 
A consensus emerging from the research and policy literatures is that improving 
public services in rural China will, at a minimum, require a fundamental and 
comprehensive reform of the intergovernmental fiscal system which, among other 
things, increases own revenues for local governments (e.g., Martinez-Vazquez et al. 
2006ab; OECD 2006; Dollar and Hofman 2008; Fock and Wong 2008; Shah and 
Shen 2008). However, in its attempt to improve the financing and delivery of rural 
services, the central government has taken a very different approach: it has eliminated 
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rural fees (2002-2004) (e.g., Yep 2004), abolished the agricultural tax (2004-2006) 
(e.g., Kennedy 2007a) and increased transfers to rural governments under the “New 
Socialist Countryside” policy (2006-present) (e.g., World Bank 2007). A third 
objective of this chapter is to analyze China’s recent rural tax reforms and to discuss 
their potential implications for local governance and public goods provision. 
Although more research is needed, the available empirical evidence raises questions 
about the effectiveness of these reforms. Case study evidence of the widespread use 
of guanxi or connections to obtain transfers from higher levels (Liu M. et al. 2009; 
Schubert and Ahlers 2011; Takeuchi 2014), the growing reliance on illegal land sales 
as a source of revenues (Takeuchi 2014), the rising levels of local government debt 
(Bird et al. 2011; Ong 2012), the systematic diversion of (central and local) funds 
intended for service delivery (World Bank 2007; Liu M. et al. 2009), the increasing 
over-staffing of local government agencies and the persistent under-provision of 
local public goods and services (Fock and Wong 2008) provides a glimpse of the 
challenges that lie ahead for “building a new socialist countryside” under the current 
fiscal system.  
The last objective of this chapter is twofold, and relates to the theoretical 
implications of China’s move towards a centralized fiscal system. The chapter first 
seeks to question the way in which “market-preserving federalism” theory is being 
applied to the comparative analysis of China’s fiscal federal system. The shift from 
the fiscal contracting system to the tax-sharing system has brought about a 
fundamental change in the conditions underlying the so-called “federalism, Chinese 
style” (Montinola et al. 1995; Zhuravskaya 2000; Jin et al. 2005; Weingast 2009) and 
in the main mechanisms by which fiscal institutions are believed to create incentives 
for the efficient provision of local public goods, namely, a high degree of both 
expenditure and revenue decentralization and the resulting fiscal competition among 
local governments for mobile production factors. Recent works on Chinese 
federalism still characterize China as a “market-preserving federal” system (e.g., 
Weingast 2009: 282) and view the introduction of the tax-sharing system as a “shift 
toward a formal fiscal federalism” (Montinola et al. (1995: 72), rather than as a 
departure from it. These works, however, fail to account for the central government’s 
centralization of the fiscal system, the growing mismatch between expenditure and 
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revenue assignments (i.e. vertical imbalance), the increasing dependence of local 
governments on central transfers, and the implications that all this may have for the 
incentive structure facing local officials and for their tax effort and spending 
behaviour. To the extent that China’s decentralized system conformed to the ideal of 
a “market-preserving federal” system under the fiscal contracting system – 
something that has been called into question (e.g., Cai and Treisman 2004; Tsai 2004; 
Ong 2012) –, there are grounds to argue that this is no longer the case given that, 
under the tax-sharing system, China fails to satisfy most, if not virtually all, of the 
market-preserving federalism conditions. The chapter argues that, while the “market-
preserving federalism” literature still provides a useful theoretical framework for 
examining how fiscal institutions affect the incentives and policy choices of local 
governments in China, it might be best used to examine the consequences of China’s 
divergence from, rather than convergence with, “market-preserving” federal systems. 
A second theoretical implication of China’s shift to a centralized fiscal system, 
the chapter argues, is the need to go beyond the “market-preserving federalism” 
framework, in order to gain a better understanding of the ways in which the growing 
mismatch between expenditure and revenue decentralization observed in the country 
might negatively affect local governance and rural development – ways other than 
by reducing the fiscal incentives of local governments to expand their tax bases. 
Against this background, this chapter draws attention to a growing strand of the 
second-generation fiscal federalism literature – “partial decentralization” theory – 
(e.g., Khemani 2005; Ahmad and Brosio 2009; Devarajan et al. 2009), which 
provides a new perspective on the interaction between taxation and governance in 
decentralized systems, complementing that provided by the market-preserving 
federalism literature29. Empirical evidence shows that the degree and form of (fiscal) 
decentralization does not only affect state-business relations or the extent to which 
local governments “foster and preserve” markets (Weingast 2009), but also affects 
state-society relations and, more specifically, the extent to which local governments 
are democratically accountable to their citizens and, consequently, the extent to 
which citizens trust their local government (e.g., De Mello 2004). The issues of 
                                                 
29 For an overview of the relationship between taxation and governance at the national level, see 
Bräutigam (2008). 
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political accountability and legitimacy have, in turn, important implications for the 
incentives and ability of local governments to provide public goods and to collect 
taxes, respectively (e.g., Smoke 2011). By examining how recent fiscal reforms have 
changed the way in which Chinese local governments are financed and by drawing 
on the recent literature on “partial decentralization”, this chapter raises questions 
about the impact of these reforms on two critical dimensions of state-society relations 
that crucially affect (and are affected by) public goods provision: political 
accountability and legitimacy – questions that will be examined in chapters 3 and 4.  
 The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 examines the evolution of 
intergovernmental fiscal institutions under the fiscal contracting system and the tax-
sharing system and critically assesses whether they have provided rural governments 
with adequate fiscal resources to meet local demands for public services. Section 2.3 
engages with debates about whether China’s political economy can be described as 
a “market-preserving” federal system (Weingast 2009: 282) and discusses whether 
interjurisdictional competititon has created fiscal incentives for local governments to 
meet villagers’ demands for services. Section 2.4 analyzes the rationale, nature and 
effects of the recent reform of the rural taxation system, in particular, the tax-for-fee 
reform and the abolition of agricultural taxes. Section 2.5 provides a brief overview 
of the literature on “partial decentralization” and raises questions that will be 
explored in subsequent chapters. Finally, section 2.6 provides a summary and 
concludes. 
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2.2 The Re-Centralization of Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations 
  
The key to China’s public finance system lies in its intergovernmental finance 
system (Wong and Bird 2008: 429). The analysis of China’s intergovernmental fiscal 
relations under the fiscal contracting system (1980-1993) and the tax-sharing system 
(1994-present) reveals opposite trends of decentralization and recentralization (e.g., 
Ahmad et al. 2002; Dabla-Norris 2005). Table 2.1 shows the evolution of the main 
elements of the intergovernmental fiscal system during the reform period – 
expenditure and revenue assignments and intergovernmental transfers -. Sections 
2.2.1 and 2.2.2 examine the main changes and weaknesses in the system and their 
implications for rural service provision. 
 
Table 2.1: China’s Intergovernmental Fiscal System  
 
 
 
Fiscal Contracting System  
 
Tax-Sharing System  
 
Main 
objective 
 
o Increase the tax effort of local 
governments and put them on a 
self-financing basis. 
 
 
o Strengthen the fiscal capacity of the 
state and recentralize tax revenues. 
 
 
Expenditure 
assignments 
between 
central and 
local 
governments 
 
 
 
o The pre-reform division of 
expenditure responsibilities 
between the central and local 
governments remained 
unchanged. The lack of clarity in 
expenditure assignments 
facilitated the imposition of 
unfunded mandates. 
 
o The Budget Law (1994) has 
delineated the division of 
expenditure responsibilities between 
the central and local governments in 
broad terms. The lack of a formal 
assignment of expenditure 
responsibilities remains a problem. 
Expenditures have remained 
decentralized. 
 
Revenue 
assignments 
between 
central and 
local 
governments 
 
o Under the fiscal contracting 
system, revenues were divided 
into “central fixed revenues”, 
“local fixed revenues” and 
“shared revenues”. Local fixed 
revenues and shared revenues 
were divided between the central 
and provincial governments 
according to revenue-sharing 
contracts, which varied across 
provinces and throughout time. 
Revenues were decentralized. 
 
o Under the tax-sharing system, taxes 
are assigned to the central 
government (“central taxes”), local 
governments (“local taxes”) or 
shared between the central and local 
governments (“shared taxes”) and 
revenues from shared taxes are 
divided between central and local 
governments according to 
established formulas. Revenues have 
been re-centralized. 
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Table 2.1 (continued): China’s Intergovernmental Fiscal System 
 
 
Central-
provincial 
transfers 
 
o There were four main types of 
central-provincial subsidies.  
 
(1) “Fixed subsidies” or “quota 
subsidies” were designed to help 
poor provinces to finance local 
expenditures and were governed 
by revenue-sharing contracts. The 
three other components of 
central-provincial transfers were 
used to implement central 
policies and to compensate 
provincial governments for 
central policy changes and they 
were not governed by fiscal 
contracts; 
 
(2) “earmarked grants” provided by 
the central government for 
specific purposes;  
 
(3) “compensatory payments” to 
local governments for the transfer 
of local enterprises to central 
ownership;  
  
(4)  “final account subsidies” made 
by the central government to 
cover provincial budget deficits. 
 
o There are three main types of 
transfers: (1) tax-rebates; (2) 
general-purpose transfers; and (3) 
specific-purpose transfers. Tax-
rebates provide provincial 
governments with 30% of the 
increase in the VAT, 
consumption tax and income tax 
collection in the province. 
General purpose-transfers include 
“equalization transfers” which are 
rules-based transfer designed to 
reduce horizontal fiscal 
disparities, as well as “pre-tax 
sharing system grants” which 
refer to the “fixed subsidies” 
received by poor provinces under 
the fiscal contracting system and 
which are also a component of 
the new system. Specific-purpose 
transfers can be divided into: (a) 
fiscal capacity transfers, such as 
“transfers for ethnic minority 
areas”, “transfers for wage 
adjustments”, “transfers for the 
tax-for-fee reform”, which are 
targeted to less developed regions 
or aimed at supporting or 
compensating local governments 
for an increase in expenditure or 
loss of revenue as a result of 
policy reforms; and (b) 
earmarked transfers, which are 
allocated for specific purposes on 
an ad hoc basis. 
 
Subnational 
borrowing 
 
o No formal authority to borrow. 
 
o No formal authority to borrow. 
 
Fiscal 
authority 
 
o No formal authority to determine 
taxes, tax bases or tax rates. 
 
o No formal authority to determine 
taxes, tax bases or tax rates. 
 
Tax 
administrati-
on  
 
o Local finance bureaux were 
responsible for collecting most 
taxes. 
 
 
o Central tax agencies collect 
“central” and “shared” taxes. 
Local tax agencies only collect 
“local” taxes. 
 
Main trends 
 
o Budgetary decline; 
decentralization of revenues and 
expenditures; local fiscal self-
reliance; large horizontal 
imbalances. 
 
o End of budgetary decline; 
recentralization of revenues; high 
transfer dependence; large 
vertical and horizontal 
imbalances. 
 
Sources: Wong (1991, 1997, 2000, 2007ab, 2009, 2010); Montinola et al. (1995); Wong et al. (1995); Zhang (1999); Dabla-
Norris (2005); Jin et al. (2005); Shah and Shen (2006); Wong and Bird (2008); Martinez-Vazquez and Qiao (2011); Huang 
and Chen (2012).  
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2.2.1 The Fiscal Contracting System  
 
The introduction of the fiscal contracting system in the 1980s led to the 
decentralization of both expenditure responsibilities and fiscal resources to local 
governments (Shirk 1993; World Bank 2002; Qian 2003; Tsai 2004; Wong and Bird 
2008). Under this system, the central government signed revenue-sharing contracts 
with each province, which specified the amount of locally collected revenues to be 
remitted to the central government annually and allowed the provinces to retain the 
rest. At the same time, provincial governments were required to meet their 
expenditure responsibilities from their own revenues and were given budgetary 
autonomy to carry them out. The adoption of the fiscal contracting system represented 
a departure from the pre-reform system of “unified revenue collection and unified 
spending”, under which all revenues belonged to, and were budgeted by, the central 
government (Shirk 1993; World Bank 2002; Qian 2003; Tsai 2004; Wong and Bird 
2008). Under the new system, “localities became independent fiscal entities that had 
both responsibility for local expenditures and the unprecedented right to use the 
revenue that they retained” (Oi 1992: 103). 
An analysis of intergovernmental fiscal relations under the fiscal contracting 
system (1980-1993) reveals several weaknesses in their design and implementation 
and explains why it became “unstable, non-transparent and inequitable” (Agarwala 
1992: v). First, and most fundamentally, the intergovernmental fiscal reforms of the 
1980s were narrow in focus and scope. Greater emphasis was given to providing 
incentives to local governments for revenue mobilization, than to promoting 
transparency or equity (e.g., Bahl and Wallich 1992). At the same time, the reform 
was limited to central-provincial revenue sharing arrangements, while little attention 
was paid to other dimensions of central-provincial relations, and even less to 
provincial-local fiscal relations (Bahl and Wallich 1992; Wong et al. 1995; Wong 
2007a).  
Second, fiscal contracts governing central-provincial revenue sharing were ad 
hoc and subject to continued renegotiation by the central government – often to 
increase its share of budget revenues. This element of bargaining and uncertainty in 
central-provincial revenue-sharing arrangements undermined the stability, 
predictability and transparency of the intergovernmental fiscal system (Wong et al. 
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1995; Tsai 2004; Tsui and Wang 2004). It also created perverse incentives for 
provincial officials to reduce the amount of revenues shared with the central 
authorities and, more specifically, to shift resources “from the budget to off-budget” 
(Wong 1998: 200)30. The growth of off-budget finance at the local level compounded 
the problem of “budgetary decline” (Zhang 1999), caused by the falling profitability 
of state-owned enterprises, and created a problem of “fiscal dualism” (Wong 1998), 
resulting from the co-existence of a formal and informal system of public finance. By 
1993, the size of the budget had declined from 35 percent of GDP to less than 15 
percent, while off-budget funds equalled almost 60 percent of the size of the budget 
(Wong 1998).  
Third, the central government failed to establish a clear division of expenditure 
responsibilities and actually shifted fiscal burdens to provincial governments31. The 
proliferation of unfunded mandates from the central government - ranging from 
education to birth control – reduced the spending autonomy of the provinces and 
created strong fiscal pressures for those with weaker fiscal capacities (Wong et al. 
1995; Wong 1997; Nyberg and Rozelle 1999; Tsui and Wang 2004; Dabla-Norris 
2005; Martinez-Vazquez 2006). Between 1980 and 1993, the central government 
share of total government expenditures dropped from 54 to 28 percent, reflecting a de 
facto decentralization of expenditure responsibilities to local governments (Zhang 
1999; Wong 2000). 
 Fourth, the ability and willingness of the central government to assist poor 
provinces and rural areas through fiscal transfers weakened during this period, as it 
failed to establish an intergovernmental transfer system with the capacity to reduce 
                                                 
30As a result of the “credibility problems” of the central government (Wong et al. 1995), the fiscal 
contracting system contributed to the very process of budgetary decline it was meant to reverse. The 
new system actually strengthened the incentives of local governments to increase off-budget revenues, 
which were retained by local governments in their entirety, at the expense of budget revenues, which 
were subject to sharing with the central government according to the terms of their fiscal contract. For 
instance, a common practice during these years was for local governments to exempt local enterprises 
from tax payments (i.e. budget revenues) and to impose various fees and levies on their after-tax 
profits (i.e., off-budget revenues) (Wong 1991, 1998, 2000, 2007a, 2009; Arora and Norregaard 1997; 
Tsai 2004; Dabla-Norris 2005; Lou 2008; Wong and Bird 2008).  
 
31 In practice, local governments at the provincial level and below maintained their pre-reform roles. 
Like in the pre-reform period, they were responsible for the delivery of basic public services, including 
education, health and social welfare. The difference with respect to the pre-reform period is that, under 
the fiscal contracting system, local governments did not only provide these services, but also financed 
them (Wong et al. 1995; Wong 1997, 2000, 2007ab, 2009). 
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fiscal disparities across regions and sectors. Under the fiscal contracting system, 
central-provincial transfers fell from more than 4 percent of GDP in 1986 to 1 percent 
in 1993, mirroring the decline in (central) government revenues (Wong 2009). 
Among the three types of central-provincial transfers, only the so-called “fixed 
subsidies” or “quota subsidies” were aimed at equalization (see Table 2.1), and they 
represented a declining share of the total, falling from 42 percent in 1980 to 17 
percent in 199332 (Wong et al. 1995; Wong 1997). 
Last, the central government did not establish how fiscal decentralization 
reforms were to be implemented at the subprovincial level, leaving this to the 
discretion of provincial governments. Fiscal relationships among different levels of 
local government (i.e., provinces, prefectures/municipalities, counties, townships and 
villages) ended up replicating those between the centre and the provinces. Also at the 
subprovincial level, the vertical distribution of revenues was negotiated between 
adjacent levels of government and formalized in fiscal contracts; expenditure 
responsibilities were de facto devolved to lower levels; and transfers played an 
equally limited role in redistributing resources from richer to poorer jurisdictions 
(e.g., Wong 1997).   
One of the main implications of the introduction of the fiscal contracting system 
for local public finance was that local governments were forced to become “fiscally 
self-reliant” and to generate sufficient revenues to meet their expenditure needs (Park 
et al. 1996). As pointed out by Zhang (1999: 121), “reforms up to 1993 transformed 
a province-collecting, centre-spending fiscal regime into an essentially self-financing 
regime for both the centre and the provinces”. By 1993, local governments accounted 
for more than 70 percent of total budgetary revenues and expenditures. This trend 
towards “local self-reliance” in public finance (Park et al. 1996) represented a 
fundamental change with respect to the pre-reform era and had important 
implications for rural service provision (Knight and Song 1993; West and Wong 
1995; Wong et al. 1995; Park et al. 1996; Wong 1997; Nyberg and Rozelle 1999).  
The main one is that, in many parts of rural China, grassroots governments 
lacked adequate resources to meet their service delivery responsibilities (e.g., Park et 
                                                 
32 In contrast, earmarked grants – most of which were absorbed by price subsidies for grain, oil and 
cotton, which were targeted at the better-off, urban population – increased from 51 to 66 percent of 
total central transfers during the same period (Wong et al. 1995; Wong 1997). 
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al. 1996). The de facto devolution of expenditure responsibilities to local 
governments and the decline in redistributive transfers forced them to rely on their 
own revenues to provide basic public services (e.g., Wong 2009). While rural 
enterprise development was “the single most important determinant of a local 
community´s spending capacity”33 (Byrd and Gelb 2001: 371), only a relative 
minority of rural communities had successful township and village enterprises. The 
geographically uneven distribution of rural industry – concentrated in coastal 
provinces and peri-urban areas – resulted in an uneven spatial distribution of fiscal 
capacities and public services across counties, townships and villages (Knight and 
Song 1993; West and Wong 1995; Zhang and Kanbur 2005). 
To summarize, under the fiscal contracting system (1980-1993), the critical 
factors affecting the availability of resources for rural service delivery were: (i) the 
uneven distribution of tax bases across rural areas, resulting from the uneven 
development of township and village enterprises; and (ii) the limited ability of the 
central government to use the transfer system for redistributive purposes. Against a 
background of “budgetary decline” (Zhang 1999) and the resulting “collapse of 
redistribution” (Wong 2009), horizontal disparities in fiscal capacity among counties, 
townships and villages emerged as the main challenge for the central government to 
ensure access to basic infrastructure and services for rural residents, particularly in 
poor agricultural regions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
33 The main reason is that the Chinese fiscal system has traditionally relied on industry and commerce 
to generate tax revenues, and that grassroots governments have also relied on rural enterprises to 
generate non-tax revenues, such as the profits remitted by collective enterprises or the rental payments 
and fees collected from private businesses (e.g., Wong 1997; Nyberg and Rozelle 1999).  
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2.2.2 The Tax-Sharing System Reform 
 
In 1994 the central government carried out important reforms in the fiscal 
arena, including a reform of tax policy, tax administration and intergovernmental 
finance (e.g., Dabla-Norris 2005; Wong and Bird 2008). The 1994 fiscal reform 
represented a turning point in central-local fiscal relations - an opportunity to address 
the problems created, or left unresolved, by the decentralization reforms of the 1980s. 
Its main aim was to reverse the declining trend in the so-called “two ratios” – 
revenue/GDP and central/total revenue (Ahmad et al. 2002; Wang 1997; Dabla-
Norris 2005; Wong and Bird 2008). In addition to strengthening and recentralizing 
the fiscal system, the reform was also intended to enhance its transparency and 
redistributive role (World Bank 2002).  
To achieve these goals, the central government replaced what was “a 
negotiated system of general revenue sharing” (i.e., the “fiscal contracting system”) 
with what became “a mix of tax assignments and tax sharing” (i.e., the “tax-sharing 
system”) (Wong and Bird 2008: 434). It established that, under the new tax-sharing 
system, taxes would be divided into three categories: taxes assigned to the central 
and local governments (i.e., “central taxes” and “local taxes”); and taxes shared 
between them according to established formulas (i.e., “shared taxes”) (see Table 2.2). 
The central government also reformed the tax administration system. It created a 
national tax bureau that would be responsible for collecting “central” and “shared” 
taxes, while local tax bureaus would only be responsible for collecting “local” taxes 
(Wong and Bird 2008: 436).  
By defining the new value-added tax (VAT) - the biggest tax - as a “shared 
tax” and claiming 75 percent of its proceeds, the central government centralized 
revenues, securing more than 50 percent of the total for itself. And by creating a 
national tax administration, it centralized tax collection and eliminated opportunities 
for local governments to divert resources from the formal to the informal fiscal 
system (Wong and Bird 2008: 434-436). In essence, the 1994 reform changed the 
way taxes were collected, and the way revenues were shared between central and 
local governments, strengthening central control over the fiscal system. 
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Table 2.2: Revenue Assignments: Central, Local and Shared Taxes  
 
 
Central Shared Local 
Tariffs 
VAT 
(75% central-25% local) 
Business tax (except 
financial institutions 
and railroads) 
Consumption taxes 
Stamp tax 
(97% central-3% local) 
Contract tax 
Income taxes of centrally-
owned SOEs 
Corporate and individual 
income taxes 
(60% central – 40% local) 
Urban land use tax 
Import-related 
consumption taxes and 
value-added taxes 
Resource taxes 
(offshore oil-central; 
remainder-local) 
Urban maintenance and 
development tax 
(except financial 
institutions and 
railroads) 
Taxes on financial 
institutions and railroads 
 
Fixed asset investment 
adjustment tax 
Profits from centrally-
controlled SOEs 
 
Profits from locally 
controlled SOEs 
  Housing property tax 
  Agricultural taxes 
  
Tax on use of arable 
land 
  
Tax on land value 
increase 
 
Source: Whiting (2011: 129). 
 
 
  
The reform was successful in achieving its main objective – namely, increasing 
the fiscal capacity of the (central) government (World Bank 2002; Martinez-Vazquez 
2006; Wong and Bird 2008). Between 1993 and 2008, budget revenues increased 
from about 12 to 20 percent of GDP, while the central government’s share increased 
from 22 to 53 percent of the total (Man 2011: 5). However, the reform objectives of 
increasing transparency in central-local relations and of reducing fiscal disparities 
across and within provinces have not been fully achieved (World Bank 2002; Tsai 
2004). The main reason is that the reform failed to address some of the weaknesses 
of the previous intergovernmental fiscal system.  
A major weakness of the current system is the lack of clear and appropriate 
expenditure and revenue assignments among levels of government, particularly at the 
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subprovincial level. As in the 1980s, the intergovernmental fiscal reform was 
narrowly focused on the revenue side of central-provincial fiscal relations. Little 
attention was paid to other elements of and actors in the intergovernmental finance 
system (e.g., Martinez-Vazquez 2006; Martinez-Vazquez et al 2006a, 2008a; Qiao 
and Shah 2006; Wong 2007a; Dollar and Hofman 2008; Man 2011; Whiting 2011). 
Although the 1994 Budget Law clarified the division of functions between the central 
and local governments (see Table 2.3), it did not specify how “local” expenditure 
responsibilities were to be divided among local governments. Similarly, although the 
tax-sharing system reform established a clear distinction between “central”, “local”, 
and “shared” taxes, it did not provide rules for how to distribute revenues from “local 
taxes” and “shared taxes” among local governments. Once more, the vertical 
distribution of responsibilities and revenues at the subnational level was left up to the 
discretion of the provinces. 
 
Table 2.3: Expenditure Responsibilities of Central and Local Governments 
 
Central Government Subnational Governments 
1. National defense 1. Local government administration 
2. Diplomacy and foreign affairs 2. Local public services 
3. Military police 3. Locally financed basic infrastructure 
and technical renovations 
4. Key construction projects 4. Support to agriculture 
5. Central government 
administration 
5. Urban maintenance and construction 
6. Public services at the central level 6. Price subsidies 
7. Debt service payments 7. Other expenditures 
 
Source: Fock and Wong (2008: 10-11) 
 
 
The fact that the tax-sharing system reform reduced “local revenues” without 
adjusting “local expenditures”, and that it did not provide explicit rules about how 
local governments should divide “local revenues” and “local expenditures” among 
themselves had unintended negative effects on the local public finance system34. The 
                                                 
34 Recent fiscal reforms have not addressed these problems. On the revenue side, the reform of the 
tax-sharing system in 2002-03 contributed to make matters worse for local governments, as it further 
reduced local revenues. With this reform, the central government increased its revenues: it shifted 
taxes from the “local” to the “shared” category and increased the central share of “shared taxes” 
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interplay of these factors – the fiscal pressure on local governments to deliver more 
with less, and the power of higher levels within the local administrative hierarchy to 
shape their fiscal relations with lower levels - gave way to (informal) processes of 
revenue (re-)centralization and expenditure decentralization at the subnational level. 
All local governments – from the provincial to the township level – sought to balance 
their budgets at the expense of lower-level governments (World Bank 2002; Dabla-
Norris 2005; Wong 2007a; Chen 2008; Wong and Bird 2008; Saich 2008; Tian 
2009). This is well explained by Chen (2008: 334), who describes how the tax-
sharing system reform transformed the distribution of resources and responsibilities 
at the local level into “a thinly disguised political battle between different 
administrative layers”. And, in this battle, “each layer of local government vied to 
replicate the self-serving policy of the center, leading to an upward flow of tax 
revenues and a top-down imposition of expenditure burdens”.  
As a result of these trends, a high vertical fiscal imbalance emerged at the 
lowest levels of the administrative hierarchy (i.e. counties, townships and villages) 
(e.g., World Bank 2002). According to Wong and Bird (2008: 12), “the most critical 
fiscal issues in China today essentially arise from the mismatch of expenditures and 
revenues between levels of government resulting from the 1994 reform and the 
resulting distortions as China´s various layers of government struggled to find their 
fiscal feet in this fundamentally distorted structure”.  
A second major weakness of the current intergovernmental fiscal system is 
related to the limited ability of intergovernmental transfers to address vertical and 
horizontal fiscal imbalances (e.g., Martinez-Vazquez 2006; Wong 2007ab, 2009, 
2010). Tables 2.4 and 2.5 provide a complete list and description of the main 
components of the transfer system, including tax rebates, general-purpose transfers, 
and specific-purpose transfers. Figure 2.1 shows the interaction between the main 
actors in the intergovernmental fiscal arena, and how central government transfers to 
rural areas must pass through intermediate-level governments (i.e., provinces and 
                                                 
(Martinez-Vazquez et al. 2006a; Qiao and Shah 2006; Wong and Bird 2008; Whiting 2011). On the 
expenditure side, although the “Suggestions on Sub-provincial Fiscal Relations” issued by the 
Ministry of Finance in 2002 have provided some general guidelines for the assignment of expenditures 
to sub-provincial governments, they are mere “suggestions” and, as such, have not constrained the 
discretionary power of provincial governments in this respect (Qiao and Shah 2006; Martinez-
Vazquez et al. 2008a; Martinez-Vazquez and Qiao 2011). 
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prefectures/municipalities), before reaching rural governments (i.e., counties, 
townships and villages). 
 
Table 2.4: Classification of Intergovernmental Transfers 
 
I. Tax rebates 
1. Tax rebates for consumption taxes and VAT 
2. Tax rebates for (corporate and individual) income taxes 
II. General-purpose transfers 
1. Equalization transfers 
2. Pre-tax sharing system grants 
III. Specific-purpose transfers 
1. Earmarked transfers 
a) Education 
b) Science and Technology 
c) Social Security and Employment 
d) Healthcare 
e) Environment protection 
f) Agriculture, forestry and water conservation 
2. Fiscal capacity transfers 
a) Transfers for minority regions 
b) Transfers for increasing wages of civil servants 
c) Transfers for rural tax reform 
d) Transfers for rural compulsory education 
e) Transfers of resource exhaustion to the cities 
f) Other transfers 
 
Source: Huang and Chen (2012: 550) 
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Table 2.5: Central-Provincial Transfers: Vertical and Horizontal Shares 
 
 
Transfer type Vertical share Horizontal share 
VAT and excise tax 
rebate (1994) 
The base for the rebate for 
each province was fixed in 
1994, to allow 
maintenance of its 
previous level of 
expenditure. Thereafter, 
the rebate grows by 30 % 
of the growth of revenues 
from these taxes collected 
in the provinces. 
Derivation basis 
Income tax rebate 
(2002) 
The amount was fixed in 
2002 for each province, to 
allow it to maintain the 
previous level of 
expenditures.  
Derivation basis 
General transfer 
(formerly, 
transitional transfer) 
(1995) 
No fixed share until 2002. 
Since 2002 the vertical 
share has included the 
incremental revenues 
accruing to the central 
government from income 
taxes over the 2001 level.  
Needs-based formula 
Original system 
(quota) subsidy 
(1980s) 
No fixed share Distributed only to poor and ethnic 
minority provinces. Amounts were fixed 
in nominal terms in 1987. 
Wage increase 
subsidy (1999) 
No fixed share Subsidy given to the poorer inland 
provinces, to offset the costs of civil 
service wage increases. 
Minority region 
subsidy (2000) 
No fixed share until 2002. 
Since 2002, the vertical 
share has included 80% of 
the incremental VAT 
collected in the provinces. 
For the 14 provinces and regions with 
large concentrations of ethnic minority 
populations. Funding comes from (1) 
central budget appropriation, and (2) 
80% of the incremental VAT collected in 
the provinces. Half of the second 
component is returned to the collecting 
provinces and regions by derivation. The 
other half is pooled with central 
appropriations and distributed according 
to a needs-based formula. 
Rural fee reform 
subsidy (2001), 
subsidies for 
agricultural tax 
reduction and 
adjusting 
responsibilities 
(2003) 
No fixed share All provinces are divided into 4 groups 
to receive compensation for revenue 
losses under the rural tax-for-fee reform 
and the abolition of agricultural taxes, at 
rates of 100% (central and western grain-
producing provinces), 80% (non-grain-
producing provinces in central and 
western provinces), 50% (major grain-
producing provinces in the coastal 
region), and 0% (the rest of provinces).  
*Earmarked 
transfers (1994) 
No fixed share They are allocated on an ad hoc basis 
and are earmarked for specific purposes. 
 
Sources: Bahl (2011: 261); *Huang and Chen (2012: 539). 
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Figure 2.1: Transmission of Central Transfers to Rural Areas 
 
 
Step 1: Central Government         Provinces 
Step 2: Provinces         Prefectures/Municipalities 
 
Step 3: Prefectures/Municipalities         Counties 
Step 4: Counties         Townships 
Step 5: Townships         Villages 
 
Source: Adapted from Fock and Wong (2008: 8). 
 
The poor performance of China’s transfer system is result of its poor design and 
implementation. One of its shortcomings is the lack of predictability and stability of 
central transfers. Using the taxonomy of transfers developed by Bahl and Linn 
(1994), Tables 2.5 and 2.6 classify central-local transfers along two dimensions: the 
method of determining their size (i.e., vertical dimension) and distribution among 
local governments (i.e., horizontal dimension). With respect to the first of these 
dimensions, most central transfers – around 75 percent of the total - are discretionary 
(i.e., no fixed share), in the sense that the total amount of funds to be transferred to 
local governments is not determined as a fixed share of central government revenues. 
The main exceptions are “tax rebates”, “general transfers” and “minority region 
subsidies”, which account for less than one-fourth of the total (Wong 2011). As 
regards the second dimension, about 50 percent of central transfers, including 
“earmarked transfers” and “original system subsidies”, are allocated among local 
governments on an ad hoc basis (Huang and Chen 2012). The fact that the vertical 
and horizontal dimensions of the intergovernmental transfer system – the size of the 
total grant pool and its distribution among local governments – are largely 
determined in a discretionary or ad hoc way creates uncertainty for local 
governments and compromises their ability to budget effectively. 
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Table 2.6: China’s Central-Provincial Transfer System 
 
Method of 
Allocating the 
Divisible Pool 
Among Eligible 
Units 
Method of Determining the Total Divisible Pool 
 Specified Share of 
National or State 
Government Tax 
Ad Hoc Decision 
Reimbursement of 
Approved 
Expenditures 
Derivation Tax rebates   
Formula 
Minority region 
subsidy; 
General transfer 
 
Wage increase 
subsidy 
Total or partial 
reimbursement of 
costs 
 
Rural fee reform 
subsidy 
 
Ad hoc  
Original system 
(quota) subsidy 
Earmarked transfers 
 
Source: Adapted from Bahl (2011: 260) 
 
Another shortcoming of the intergovernmental transfer system is its weak 
equalization potential. An analysis of the evolution of its main components – tax 
rebates, general purpose transfers and specific purpose transfers - reveals the 
regressive character of the system and the predominance of disequalizing transfers 
since it was introduced. As shown in Table 2.7, during the 1990s central transfers 
were dominated by tax rebates, which in 1999 represented about 53 percent of the 
total. Their regressivity lies in that they transfer 30 percent of the annual growth in 
VAT, consumption and income tax revenues to provincial governments on a 
derivation basis (e.g., Shah and Shen 2006; Wong and Bird 2008). Since the early 
2000s, specific-purpose transfers, in general, and earmarked grants, in particular, 
have become the largest component of the transfer system. They represented about 
43 percent of central transfers and 63 percent of specific-purpose transfers in 2009 
(Huang and Chen 2012). They are disequalizing in that they often require matching 
funds from local governments (Yep 2004; Dabla-Norris 2005; Shih and Qi 2007; Liu 
M. et al. 2009; Huang and Chen 2012). The table also shows that, if equalization 
transfers – the “general transfer” and the “original system subsidy” – have not 
reversed the trend of growing regional fiscal disparities in China, is because they 
have been underfunded (Ahmal et al. 2002; Martinez-Vazquez 2006; Chen 2008; 
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Dollar and Hofman 2008; Shah and Shen 2008; Whiting 2011). As can be seen in the 
table below, before 2003 they only accounted for 4-6 percent of central transfers and 
in 2009 they amounted to approximately 14 percent of the total. 
 
Table 2.7: Types of Central-Provincial Transfers, 1995-2009 (%) 
 
  1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 
Tax 
Rebates 
73.72 75.31 53.12 37.75 42.50 33.79 23.79 15.47 
General 
purpose 
transfers 
5.36 6.08 4.73 4.25 6.30 11.24 15.22 14.48 
Specific 
purpose 
transfers 
20.92 18.61 42.15 58.00 51.20 54.98 61.00 70.05 
 
Note: General purpose transfers include the “general transfer” and “original system subsidy”. Specific purpose 
transfers are divided into “earmarked transfers” and “fiscal capacity transfers”. The latter category includes the 
“wage increase subsidy”, “rural fee reform subsidy” and “minority region subsidy”.  
Source: Calculated from Huang and Chen (2012). 
 
Another problem in the design of the intergovernmental transfer system is that 
it undermines the autonomy of local governments and the transparency of their 
finances (e.g., World Bank 2002). This is largely due to the design of “earmarked 
transfers”, which have become one of the main components of the transfer system. 
The reason why they constrain the allocative authority of local governments lies in 
their input-based conditionality and matching provisions (Shah 2006): local 
governments have no autonomy to decide how to spend the transferred funds (input-
conditionality) and they have less flexibility in the use of their own revenues 
(matching requirements). The reason why they have made the intergovernmental 
transfer system less transparent is because they are allocated to local governments on 
an ad-hoc, negotiated basis (Ahmad et al. 2004; Dabla-Norris 2005; Qiao and Shah 
2006; Fock and Wong 2008).  
Another shortcoming of the intergovernmental transfer system has to do with 
its failure to promote fiscal efficiency and tax effort at the local levels. Some types 
of transfers create incentives for local governments to engage in bureaucratic 
expansion and rent-seeking. First, the use of “fiscal capacity transfers” to finance 
civil service wages has aggravated the problem of overstaffing of local government 
agencies (e.g., Shih and Qi 2007; Fock and Wong 2008; Guo 2008), especially in 
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poor regions, where adding staff is seen as “the only mechanism for getting more 
transfers from higher levels” (Martinez-Vazquez 2006: 127). Second, the non-
transparent allocation of earmarked transfers encourages rural governments to lobby 
central government agencies to obtain funds (Liu and Tao 2007; Liu M. et al. 2009; 
Huang and Chen 2012). According to Liu M. et al. (2009: 988), “running for 
programmes (pao xiangmu) has become a common method of competing for 
earmarked funds” among county governments, whose liaison offices in Beijing spend 
more than 20 billion yuan annually to build and maintain connections with central 
government officials.  
Last but not least, the ineffective functioning of the intergovernmental transfer 
system makes it vulnerable to “leakages” and “policy distortions” (Wong 2010: 24). 
The fact that the transfer system is structured in a “hierarchical” way implies that the 
central government depends on intermediate-level governments both to channel 
funds to grassroots governments and to monitor their use (Martinez-Vazquez 2006; 
World Bank 2007; Fock and Wong 2008). However, the central government seems 
to lack the capacity to ensure, first, that transfers reach rural governments, and, 
second, that they are used for their intended purpose (World Bank 2002, 2007; 
Martinez-Vazquez 2006; Fock and Wong 2008; Wong 2009, 2010, 2011).  
 Given the shortcomings of the tax-sharing system, what implications did the 
1994 fiscal reforms have for rural governance? The reform did not put an end to the 
problem of under-provision of public services in rural areas (e.g., Wong 2007ab). 
Actually, it triggered a fiscal crisis at the county, township and village levels (e.g., 
Wong 2007a; Chen 2008, 2015; Fock and Wong 2008). Practices of “coercive 
taxation” became one of the main sources of social unrest in the rural areas of inland 
provinces, where “predatory state agents imposed heavy financial burdens on the 
peasants” (Bernstein and Lü 2000: 742). In coastal provinces, where land sales 
became an important and lucrative source of revenues for local governments, it was 
“government coercive land expropriation” (Guo 2001: 422) that generated protests 
from farmers. The response of the central government to the rapid increase in rural 
protests and to the resulting deterioration in cadre-villager relations (e.g., Bernstein 
and Lü 2003; Yep and Fong 2009) was to eliminate rural fees (2002-2004) (e.g., Yep 
2004), abolish the agricultural tax (2004-2006) (e.g., Kennedy 2007a), and to 
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increase transfers to rural governments under the “New Socialist Countryside” policy 
(2006-present) (e.g., World Bank 2007).  
Twenty years after the implementation of the tax-sharing system reform, China 
has one of the largest vertical fiscal imbalances in the world, which exceeds that of 
other developing and transitional economies (Fock and Wong 2008; Man 2011; 
Whiting 2011; Wong 2010, 2011). In 2010, local government revenues amounted to 
about 49 percent of total government revenues, while local government expenditures 
represented around 82 percent of the total (China Statistical Yearbook 2011). At the 
same time, China still lacks a transfer system that effectively redistributes fiscal 
resources among regions and levels of government: one of the main challenges to 
improve local service delivery is, in the words of Wong (2009: 951), “how to channel 
resources effectively to where they are needed (…)”. In the absence of an effective 
intergovernmental transfer system, the growth of vertical fiscal imbalances at the 
local level constitutes one of the most important obstacles to improve the level and 
quality of public services in rural communities. 
 
 
 
2.3 Interjurisdictional Competition  
 
In first- and second- generation theories of fiscal federalism interjurisdictional 
competition is viewed as an important institutional mechanism, first, for allowing 
individuals and firms to sort themselves into jurisdictions whose revenue and 
expenditure patterns best suit their preferences (e.g., Tiebout 1956); and, second, for 
aligning the interests of local governments with those of taxpayers and preventing 
problems of “state predation” and “soft budget constraints” (e.g., Qian and Weingast 
1997) (see Box 2.1). 
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Box 2.1: Fiscal Federalism Theories 
 
First- and second- generation theories of fiscal federalism stress the potential of 
decentralization to improve the quality of governance and public goods provision, 
although partly for different reasons (Lockwood 2006, 2009; Oates 2005). From the 
perspective of traditional theories of fiscal federalism, the reason why 
decentralization is often preferable to centralization is that localities differ in their 
preferences for public goods35 (Tiebout 1956; Oates 1999, 2005). The decentralized 
provision of local public goods has two main advantages (Tiebout 1956; Oates 1999, 
2005). First, local governments have better information than the central government 
about local preferences and needs. Second, under decentralization, households and 
firms can sort themselves into those jurisdictions whose fiscal packages (i.e., tax rates 
and public goods) best suit their preferences. Hence, decentralization can improve 
allocative efficiency in the provision of local public goods. 
 
New theories of fiscal federalism suggest that decentralization may be preferable to 
centralization even when localities do not differ in their public goods preferences 
(e.g., Seabright 1996; Weingast 2009). Unlike first-generation fiscal federalism, this 
literature does not assume that the government is benevolent and seeks to maximize 
social welfare, but rather assumes that “public officials have goals induced by 
political institutions that often diverge from maximizing citizen welfare” (Weingast 
2009: 279). From this perspective, decentralization is seen as a way of providing 
public officials with fiscal and political incentives to serve the interests of citizens. 
By increasing government accountability, decentralization can improve productive 
efficiency in the provision of local public goods.  
 
Within the second-generation fiscal federalism literature, two main strands can be 
distinguished. One strand stresses the role of fiscal institutions – the 
intergovernmental fiscal system and interjurisdictional competition - in aligning the 
interests of government officials with citizens under decentralization (e.g., Weingast 
1995, 2009, 2014; Qian and Weingast 1997; Rodden 2003). From this perspective, 
the two main channels through which decentralization can increase government 
accountability are: (i) by giving local governments the right and responsibility to 
generate a significant portion of their revenues (i.e., local revenue generation); and 
(ii) by placing local governments in competition with each other to attract mobile 
production factors (i.e., interjurisdictional competition).  
A second strand of this new literature draws attention to political institutions and 
compares their performance in centralized and decentralized systems. It argues that 
decentralization can increase the ability of citizens to hold government to account 
through elections and other forms of participation (e.g., Belleflamme and Hindriks 
2005; Barankay and Lockwood 2007; Besley and Case 1995; Khemani 2001; 
Seabright 1996; Persson and Tabellini 2000; Tommasi and Weinschelbaum 2007). 
                                                 
35 Oates´ Decentralization Theorem states that “in the absence of cost-savings from the centralized 
provision of a good and of interjurisdictional external effects, the level of welfare will always be as 
high (and typically higher) if Pareto-efficient levels of consumption are provided in each jurisdiction 
than if any single, uniform level of consumption is maintained across all jurisdictions” (Oates 2011: 
54).  
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This is due to the information and incentives available to political actors in 
decentralized systems, but not in centralized systems. Under decentralization, voters 
are likely to be better informed about government performance as a result of: (i) the 
greater “proximity” between citizens and government (Khemani 2001); (ii) reduced 
“collective action problems” among voters in monitoring government (Tommasi and 
Weinschelbaum 2007); and (iii) “yardstick competition” among local governments 
(Belleflamme and Hindriks 2005; Besley and Case 1995). At the same time, locally 
elected officials are likely to have stronger incentives to respond to citizens’ needs 
and demands, given that the link between government performance and election 
outcomes is stronger under decentralization (Seabright 1996). In sum, from the 
perspective of second generation fiscal federalism, the main rationale for 
decentralization is one of redistributing power both within the state and between state 
and society, so as to create the institutional checks and balances required to improve 
governance and public goods provision. 
 
 
The market-preserving federalism literature highlights that, under 
decentralization, taxpayers can hold local governments accountable for their tax and 
spending decisions, by threatening to “exit” to another jurisdiction and, ultimately, 
by “voting with their feet” (Weingast 1995, 2009; Qian and Weingast 1997; Qian 
and Roland 1998; Qian 2003). It is thus assumed that factors of production (i.e., 
labour and capital) can freely move across jurisdictions; that local governments 
compete with one another both for capital and labour; and that intergovernmental 
competition for mobile factors is efficiency- and welfare-enhancing (e.g., Barhdan 
2002; Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006b).  
To what extent is this the case in developing countries in general and China in 
particular? Has interjurisdictional competition provided Chinese rural governments 
with fiscal incentives to respond to citizen demands for public goods and services? 
There is disagreement about the nature and effects of interjurisdictional competition 
in China and, in particular, about its role in making local governments more 
accountable. On one side of the debate, an influential strand of the literature contends 
that post-reform China is a market-preserving federal system and as such is largely 
characterized by the existence of36: (i) a hierarchy of governments with a clearly 
defined scope of authority (the “hierarchy” condition); (ii) local governments with 
authority over the local economy (the “subnational autonomy” condition); (iii) a 
common market with free movement of products and factors (the “common market” 
                                                 
36 The list of market-preserving federalism conditions is based on and draws heavily upon Montinola 
et al. (1995: 55) and Weingast (2009: 281). 
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condition); (iv) hard budget constraints at the central and local levels (the “hard 
budget constraints” condition); and (v) institutionalized constraints on the power of 
the central government to reduce local government autonomy (the “institutionalized 
authority” condition) (Montinola et al. 1995; Weingast 1995, 2009; Qian and 
Weingast 1997; Jin et al. 2005).  
According to this body of literature, one of the main mechanisms by which 
market-preserving federal systems promote government accountability and 
economic growth is by placing local governments in competition with one another 
for investment and, in the view of scholars such as Gabriella Montinola, Yingyi Qian 
and Barry Weingast (1995), China is a case in point. They argue that fiscal 
competition has provided local governments with incentives to adopt “pro-market 
policies” and to provide “market-enhancing public goods” during the reform period 
(Weingast 2009). It has created incentives for them to support the development of 
the private sector and to undertake management and ownership reforms in the state 
and collective sectors (Montinola et al. 1995; Weingast 1995; Qian and Weingast 
1997; Qian and Roland 1998; Cao et al. 1999; Qian 2003; Jin et al. 2005). It has also 
hardened their budget constraints, while increasing the share of their budgets 
allocated to infrastructure and other public goods (Qian and Roland 1998). For these 
reasons, they argue, local governments have been “the great engine of economic 
growth” in China during the past four decades (Weingast 2009: 282). 
On the other side of the debate, a growing number of studies argue that it should 
not be assumed that reform-era China represents a clear-cut example of “market-
preserving federalism”, nor that interjurisdictional competition reduces “corruption, 
predation, and rent-seeking” (Weingast 2009: 282) at the local level. This is for two 
reasons. The first one is that China’s governance structure simply cannot be 
characterized as a market-preserving federal system (Tsai 2004; Tsui and Wang 
2004; Ong 2012). An analysis of the evolution of central-local relations during the 
reform period shows that, under the fiscal contracting system (1980-1993) and the 
tax-sharing system (1994-present), China’s institutional structure has failed to satisfy 
an increasing number of the market-preserving federalism conditions, despite claims 
to the contrary (e.g., Weingast 2009). According to scholars such as Kellee Tsai 
(2004) and Lynette Ong (2012), amongst others (e.g., Tsui and Wang 2004), under 
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the fiscal contracting system, the fiscal autonomy of local governments was 
constrained by the proliferation of central policy mandates (the “subnational 
autonomy” condition) (Tsui and Wang 2004); the central government was unable or 
unwilling to remove barriers to the mobility of goods, services and factors of 
production across jurisdictions (the “common market” condition) (Tsai 2004; Tsui 
and Wang 2004); local governments had easy access to loans from local credit 
institutions and faced soft budget constraints (the “hard budget constraints” 
condition) (Tsai 2004; Ong 2012); and the decentralization process was subject to 
the discretionary control of the central government, as manifested for instance by the 
continual renegotiation of revenue-sharing contracts between the centre and the 
provinces (the “institutionalized authority” condition) (Tsai 2004; Tsui and Wang 
2004).  
Although the focus of these studies is on central-local relations during the early 
reform years, their argument – that China cannot be characterized as a market-
preserving federal system – seems even more valid today. First, the absence of a 
constitutional or legal basis for decentralization in China (e.g., Smoke 2005) has 
allowed the central government to re-centralize the fiscal system, mainly through the 
tax-sharing system reform (e.g., Oi et al. 2012) (the “institutionalized authority” 
condition). Second, and relatedly, the growing dependence of local governments on 
transfers from the central government, most of which are earmarked for specific 
purposes (e.g., World Bank 2007), has reduced their fiscal autonomy (the 
“subnational autonomy” condition), while softening their budget constraints (the 
“hard budget constraint” condition) (e.g., Liu and Tao 2007). And, third, these 
changes have gone hand in hand with the continued presence of restrictions to labour 
mobility within the country (the “common market” condition) (e.g., Chan and 
Buckingham 2008). Hence, after more than four decades of reforms, there are more 
reasons to question the depiction of China’s decentralized system as a market-
preserving federal system, and they are to be found mainly within the fiscal system 
itself. 
A second and related reason why interjurisdictional competition has failed to 
make local governments more accountable in China is related to the inefficient forms 
that it has taken and the unintended consequences that it has had. If China is not a 
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market-preserving federal system, it follows that it cannot generate efficient 
interjurisdictional competition. Chinese federalism should not be characterized as 
“market-preserving”, but rather as “market-thwarting” (Tsai 2004), “state-corroding” 
(Cai and Treisman 2004) or even “predatory” (Shih et al. 2004). Under the fiscal 
contracting system, local governments responded to competition from other 
jurisdictions for mobile capital, by closing their economies (e.g, Tsai 2004), and by 
colluding with local businesses to evade central taxes and regulations (e.g., Cai and 
Treisman 2004). As a result, interjurisdictional competition “thwarted” market forces 
(Tsai 2004), while “corroding” the capacity of the central government (Cai and 
Treisman 2004) to prevent and mitigate the potential negative effects of 
decentralization – both the anticipated (e.g., inter-territorial inequalities) and 
unanticipated ones (e.g., local protectionism) (Rodden and Rose-Ackerman 1997).  
China’s WTO accession and the centralization of its fiscal system and 
regulatory bureaucracies (e.g., Mertha 2005) put an end to the problems of local 
protectionism and weak central state capacity but new problems have arisen. Under 
the tax-sharing system, a new type of “predatory fiscal federalism” (Shih et al. 2004; 
Shen et al. 2012) has emerged - one in which higher levels of government maximize 
their budgets by centralizing revenues and decentralizing expenditures (Chen 2008), 
leaving grassroots governments with “no choice but either to predate on local 
residents, enterprises and financial institutions or simply not to provide the primary 
public services” (Shen et al. 2012: 29). In recent years, interjurisdictional competition 
has also been increasingly associated with fiscally strapped local governments either 
“running” to Beijing for transfers (e.g., Liu M. et al. 2009), or “racing to the bottom” 
in taxes (e.g., Yao and Zhang 2008)37. None of this is what one would expect to see 
in a market-preserving federal system.  
                                                 
37 Under the tax-sharing system, there has been increased competition among local governments for 
central transfers, especially in inland regions. Rather than promoting local business development, local 
governments seem to focus their efforts on lobbying central government officials in order to obtain 
more (earmarked) transfers (Liu and Tao 2007; Shih and Qi 2007; Liu M. et al. 2009). Unlike in inland 
regions, in coastal provinces, competition among revenue-starved governments to attract domestic 
and foreign capital has become intense. The problem is that such competition is taking the form of a 
“race to the bottom” (Yao and Zhang 2008), as local governments compete by offering preferential 
tax treatment to investors, mainly through tax refunds, which results in tax revenue losses of between 
20 and 30 percent annually (Choi 2009: 167-176). Unlike in the past, this form of “informal tax 
competition” (Choi 2009) is not reducing the revenues of the central government, but those of local 
governments.  
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We can draw two main conclusions from this discussion that are directly 
relevant to our research. First, these studies suggest that, at best, even when and 
where interjurisdictional competition has been “market-preserving”, it has only made 
local governments more responsive to the needs of capital, but not of (rural) labour38. 
An important reason is the existence of the hukou system, which has restricted rural-
urban migration. Under this system, rural-urban migrants with an agricultural hukou 
status – that is, the majority of them – have been often required to pay rural taxes and 
fees, while being denied access to urban public services (e.g., Tsui and Wang 2004). 
A related and more fundamental reason is that, to the extent that local governments 
have competed with one another for (mobile) production factors, they have competed 
for capital, not (unskilled) labour (e.g. Montinola et al. 1995)39. This may explain the 
finding that “growth-oriented local governments favour the interests of capital at the 
expense of the interests of the general workforce and local residents” (Wang et al. 
2009: 146). A third possible reason is related to the recent abolition of agricultural 
taxes, which has further weakened the “exit” option as a mechanism to hold 
grassroots officials accountable for the provision of public goods in agricultural 
villages (Takeuchi 2014). In sum, interjurisdictional competition in China has not 
provided local officials with strong fiscal incentives to respond to villagers’ needs 
and demands. 
A second conclusion or implication is that the “market-preserving federalism” 
framework might be best used for examining the consequences of China’s divergence 
from, rather than convergence with, market-preserving federal systems. The 
centralization of the Chinese fiscal system (on the revenue side) has brought about a 
fundamental change in the conditions underlying the so-called “federalism, Chinese 
style” (e.g., Montinola et al. 1995) and in the mechanisms by which fiscal institutions 
are believed to increase government accountability, namely, a high degree of both 
                                                 
38 At best, the positive effects of interjurisdictional competition have been limited to enhancing the 
productive efficiency, but not the allocative efficiency, of public expenditures in rich regions: 
interjurisdictional competition for capital may lead to lower taxation and lower administrative 
expenditures in these regions, but also to lower spending on public social services such as healthcare 
(Zhang 2006; Zhang and Chen 2007).  
 
39 Indeed, even scholars who view China as a market-preserving federal system, acknowledge that 
local governments in inland provinces are actually competing to “export labour” to coastal provinces 
and to attract remittances from rural-urban migrants (Montinola et al. 1995: 76). 
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expenditure and revenue decentralization and the resulting competition among local 
governments to attract mobile production factors. Today, there are compelling 
reasons to call into question the description of China’s governance system as a 
“market-preserving federal system” and to ask what implications this has for “local 
state corporatism” (Oi 1992, 1995, 1999) and the developmental role of local 
governments. 
 
 
2.4 Rural Fiscal Reforms 
 
Since the early 2000s, the Chinese central government has increased its efforts 
to promote rural development with the objective of addressing the main problems 
related to “agriculture”, “farmers” and “rural society” (sannong wenti) (Fock and 
Wong 2008). Between 2002 and 2006, the central authorities enacted the “tax-for-
fee” reform and abolished the agricultural tax (Yep 2004; Kennedy 2007a; World 
Bank 2007; Fock and Wong 2008; Göbel 2010). In 2006, the central government set 
the goal of building a “New Socialist Countryside” and called for “extending public 
finance and service delivery into the rural areas” (Fock and Wong 2008: 7). During 
these years, the main focus of its rural reform policies has gradually shifted from one 
of reducing tax burdens for farmers to one of increasing fiscal transfers to rural 
governments and improving rural service provision (World Bank 2007; Fock and 
Wong 2008; Li L.C. 2008).  
Introduced in 2002 and heralded as the “third rural revolution” (Göbel 2010), 
the tax-for-fee reform consisted of: (i) the elimination of all major fees levied by 
township and village governments and; (ii) an increase in the agricultural tax rate and 
the introduction of an agricultural tax supplement (Chen 2008, 2015). This reform 
was intended not only to eliminate the “peasant burden” problem, but also to “bring 
township and village finance more fully into the budget” (Fock and Wong 2008: 45).  
The central government determined that any revenue losses resulting from the 
implementation of the reform were to be offset by increased central transfers and by 
reduced local spending. As part of the reform, it created a new transfer program in 
2001 (i.e., “grants for rural tax reform”) with the objective of reducing the revenue 
gap of townships and villages (Fock and Wong 2008: 48), and required grassroots 
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governments to adopt complementary administrative and participatory reforms to 
increase the (productive and allocative) efficiency of their spending (see Box 2.2) 
(Fock and Wong 2008; Li L.C. 2008, 2009; Tian 2009; Göbel 2010).  
 
Box 2.2: The Tax-for-Fee Reform 
 
 
Main components of the fiscal reform:  
 Abolishing all major township and village fees 
 Abolishing the slaughter tax 
 Gradually abolishing labour corvées 
 Increasing the agricultural tax rate to 7% 
 Standardizing the special products tax 
 Introducing an agricultural tax supplement equivalent to up to 20% of 
the value of the new agricultural tax 
 
Other measures: 
 Merging townships and villages to reduce the number of territorial units 
 Reducing the number of offices and employees in rural governments 
 Regulating strictly the recruitment, evaluation, remuneration and 
promotion of local government employees 
 Outsourcing public services 
 Separating government and business 
 Creating a supervisory team for burden reduction 
 Implementing the “yi shi yi yi” system requiring the democratic 
approval of village-level public projects directly financed by villagers 
 
Source: Adapted from Göbel (2010: 88-89) 
 
Township and village governments were encouraged to merge, downsize and, 
in some cases, to convert state-run public service units into non-state market entities, 
in order to reduce their current expenditures (Fock and Wong 2008; Li L.C. 2008; 
Tian 2009; Göbel 2010). As for their capital expenditures, village governments were 
required to implement the so-called “one undertaking, one decision” (yi shi yi yi) 
policy and empower villagers to decide, by majority vote, on the number and type of 
village investment projects to be undertaken in their communities, as well as on the 
amount of money that each household should contribute (Chen 2008; Fock and Wong 
2008; Li 2009; Göbel 2010; Yi et al. 2011).  
The tax-for-fee reform achieved its main objective and reduced the “peasant 
burden” (Bernstein and Lü 2003) which, only one year after its introduction, had 
fallen by around 45 percent nationwide (Yep 2004; Kennedy 2007a; Oi and Zhao 
2007; Chen 2008; Tian 2009; Göbel 2010). However, the reform had a negative 
impact on township and village finances and on rural service provision (Yep 2004; 
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Kennedy 2007a; Oi and Zhao 2007; Göbel 2010; Alm and Liu 2013)40. One of the 
reasons was that fiscal transfers from the central and provincial governments were 
not sufficient to compensate grassroots governments for their loss of revenue (Fock 
and Wong 2008). The other reason was that the New Public Management-style 
reforms on which the success of the tax-for-fee reform partly depended – the 
reduction of government personnel and, to a less extent, the adoption of some form 
of participatory budgeting in village communities (i.e., “yishi yiyi” system) (e.g., Li 
2009) – were not effectively implemented. Neither were rural governments willing 
to cut on administrative costs; nor were villagers willing to contribute to the funding 
of public projects (e.g., Oi and Zhao 2007; Chen 2008). As a result, the 
implementation of the “tax-for-fee” reform further reduced the resources available to 
township and village governments for infrastructure and service provision.  
In late 2003, when there were concerns about the gradual “hollowing out” of 
grassroots governments and it became imperative to find solutions to the rural fiscal 
crisis, the central government was faced with a critical decision: whether to 
decentralize or further re-centralize the fiscal system and, more specifically, whether 
to grant (formal) revenue-raising power to local governments or, instead, rely more 
on the use of transfers to fill their fiscal gap (Oi et al. 2012: 654). Taking the second 
option, the central government called for the elimination of the new agricultural tax 
and, once more, committed itself to increasing fiscal transfers to county, township 
and village governments, so as to fully compensate them for their loss of revenue (Li 
2006; Fock and Wong 2008; Göbel 2010).  
In a sense, the abolition of agricultural taxes brought more of the same: it 
reduced taxes for farmers but it also aggravated the problem of underprovision of 
public goods and the crisis of local governance in rural areas (Li L.C. 2008). Once 
more, central transfers failed to reach rural governments and to fill the revenue gap 
created by the abolition of these taxes (Oi and Zhao 2007; Chen 2008; Fock and 
Wong 2008; Göbel 2010).  
From another perspective, the elimination of agricultural taxes and the 
aggravation of the rural fiscal crisis brought about a turning point in rural 
                                                 
40 Anhui Province, for instance, recorded a decrease of 1.84 billion yuan in revenue for villages and 
townships after the first year of its implementation, representing a 30-40 percent drop for each village 
and township on average (Yep 2004). 
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development policies. It represented the end of a failed “third rural revolution” (2000-
2006) and the first step towards “building a new socialist countryside” (2006-
present). The focus of rural fiscal reforms shifted to increasing government spending 
on rural public services and infrastructure (Kennedy 2007a; Li L.C. 2008; Göbel 
2010). Promulgated in 2006, the “New Socialist Countryside” policy represents a 
new commitment on the part of the central government to “extract less, put more 
back in, and enliven the rural sector” (World Bank 2007: 1). Between 2003 and 2009, 
central government funding for “agriculture”, “villages” and “farmers” (e.g., the so-
called “three rurals”) increased from 214.4 to 725.3 billion yuan (Lin and Wong 
2012: 23). During these years, the central government has increased investment in 
rural infrastructure; implemented a new rural cooperative medical scheme, a free 
rural compulsory education program, and a minimum living allowance scheme; as 
well as introduced subsidies for grain production, amongst others initiatives (see 
Table 2.8) (World Bank 2007; Fock and Wong 2008; Ahlers and Schubert 2009; Lin 
and Wong 2012; Schubert and Ahlers 2012b; Unger 2012).  
 
Table 2.8: “Building a New Socialist Country”: Major Programs 
Program Year Objective Content 
Rural minimum living 
stipend 
2005 Provide income 
support for the poor. 
All households with incomes 
below local stipulated minimum 
can apply for top-up.  
New rural cooperative 
medical scheme 
2005 Provide insurance for 
rural families to reduce 
financial risks caused 
by illness. 
Designed mainly for inpatient 
services; risk-pooling is at the 
county level. Minimum funding 
was initially set at Rmb 30 
annually per participant, and 
ratcheted up to Rmb 100 by 2009. 
Central government pays 40%; 
local governments pay 40%; and 
participants pay 20%.  
Free rural compulsory 
education 
2006 Eliminate out-of-
pocket costs of basic 
education and boost 
rural school spending. 
Government provides funding to 
replace school revenues 
previously collected from 
miscellaneous fees, and provides 
subsidy to boarding students from 
poor families. 
Source: Wong (2010: 21) 
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Although more research is needed, the available empirical evidence suggests 
that these reforms have aggravated the problems associated with a high vertical fiscal 
imbalance and transfer dependency at the grassroots level. On the revenue side, the 
local fiscal gap has not been closed by central transfers and, although rural 
governments no longer rely on the imposition of illegal fees and levies on farmers, 
they rely more heavily on land and assets sales, as well as on debt, to finance their 
expenditures – practices that are economically, socially and environmentally 
unsustainable (Fock and Wong 2008; Bird et al. 2011; Whiting 2011; Liu 2012; 
Takeuchi 2013, 2014). On the expenditure side, there are still problems of 
overspending and misallocation of resources, the latter being manifested by an 
increase in patronage spending (e.g., public jobs) at the expense of public goods 
spending (e.g., infrastructure) (Liu and Tao 2007; Fock and Wong 2008; Liu M. et 
al. 2009).  While these problems are not entirely new, recent econometric evidence 
suggests that they have been compounded by the increasing importance of central 
transfers in local public finance (Guo 2008; Duan and Zhan 2011; Jia et al. 2014). 
 
 
2.5 Making Decentralization Partial? 
 
The expansion of the transfer system under the “New Socialist Countryside” 
programme constitutes the culmination of a process of fiscal recentralization which 
began with the introduction and adjustment of the tax-sharing system (1994; 2002-
03), and continued with the implementation of the tax-for-fee reform (2002-04) and 
the abolition of agricultural taxes (2004-2006). These reforms have gradually eroded 
the revenue base of local governments, especially of those at the bottom of the 
administrative hierarchy (e.g., Fock and Wong 2008). Since the mid-1990s, the 
central government has fully or partially recentralized the most lucrative taxes, 
including the consumption tax (100% central), the value added tax (75% central-25% 
local), as well as (enterprise and individual) income taxes (50% central-50% local in 
2002; 60% central-40% local since 2003). At the same time, it has eliminated various 
local taxes and fees, most notably the agricultural tax (2004-06) and township and 
village fees (i.e., jiti tiliu and tongchou fei) (2002-04) (Martinez-Vazquez et al. 
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2006a; Qiao and Shah 2006; World Bank 2007; Chen 2008; Fock and Wong 2008; 
Wong and Bird 2008; Whiting 2011). 
The implementation of these fiscal reforms has created a large vertical 
imbalance between the central and local governments (see Tables 2.9 and 2.10). As 
can be seen in Table 2.9, while the local share of total revenues has declined since 
the mid-1990s, local governments have accounted for a larger share of total 
government expenditures. The resulting gap must be filled by transfers. Generally 
speaking, the existence of a vertical imbalance in favour of the central government 
is not only unavoidable, but also desirable, to the extent that it provides the central 
government with the necessary fiscal resources to reduce local fiscal disparities, and 
to finance the provision of public goods with positive externalities that would 
otherwise be under-provided by local governments (e.g., Dabla-Norris 2005; Bahl 
2011). However, the Chinese case does not conform to international best practice. 
China has a larger vertical imbalance than most other countries (see Table 2.11) and 
it has become an “outlier” in terms of transfer dependency (Fock and Wong 2008; 
Bahl 2011). In recent years transfers (excluding tax rebates) have absorbed more than 
60 percent of central revenues and financed around 40 percent of local expenditures 
(Wong 2010, 2011; Whiting 2011) (see Table 2.12). At the same time, the 
intergovernmental transfer system has failed to ensure revenue adequacy at the local 
level and equalization across jurisdictions (World Bank 2002; Dollar and Hofman 
2008; Whiting 2011).  
 
Table 2.9: Local Share of Revenues and Expenditures (1980-2010) 
Year 
 
Government Revenues Government Expenditures 
Total (100 
mln yuan) 
Central 
Share 
Local 
Share  
Total (100 
mln yuan) 
Central 
Share 
Local     
Share  
1980 1159.93 24.52 75.48 1228.83 54.26 45.74 
1985 2004.82 38.39 61.61 2004.25 39.68 60.32 
1990 2937.10 33.79 66.21 3083.59 32.57 67.43 
1995 6242.20 52.17 47.83 6823.72 29.24 70.76 
2000 13395.23 52.20 47.80 15886.50 34.70 65.30 
2005 31649.29 52.29 47.71 33930.28 25.86 74.14 
2010 83101.51 51.10 48.90 89874.16 17.80 82.20 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, various years. 
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Table 2.10: Vertical Imbalance of Rural Governments 
(percent) 1992 
1
9
9
4
 T
ax
-s
h
ar
in
g
 s
y
st
em
 r
ef
o
rm
 
1998 2000 2002 2004 
County and township 
share of total 
expenditures 
30.9 28.2 26.2 28.6 31.3 
County and township 
share of total revenues 
30.1 20.3 19.7 17.1 17.2 
Vertical imbalance for 
counties and townships 
-0.8 -7.9 -6.5 -11.5 -14.1 
 
Source: Adapted from World Bank (2007: 23). 
 
Table 2.11: Local Share of Revenues and Expenditures in various Countries 
Item Developing 
Countries 
OECD 
Countries 
Transition 
Economies 
China 
Local share of 
government tax 
revenue 
9 19 17 40 
Local share of 
government 
expenditure 
14 32 26 73 
 
Source: Dollar and Hofman (2008: 40) 
 
Table 2.12: Central Transfers to Local Governments (2012) 
Item Tax Rebates and 
Transfers 
Transfers 
(excluding tax 
rebates) as percent 
of central 
government 
revenues 
Transfers 
(excluding tax 
rebates) as 
percent of local 
government 
expenditures 
 
Trillion 
Yuan 
 
Shares 
Tax Rebates 0.512077 11.3% - - 
General Transfer 
Payments 
2.147118 47.3% 36.5% 19.7% 
Special Transfer 
Payments 
1.879152 41.4% 31.9% 17.2% 
Total 4.538347 100% 68.4% 36.9% 
 
Source: Budget Report, 2012. Available from: http://english.gov.cn/official/2012-
03/16/content_2093602.htm [Accessed 24 June 2014]. 
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This implies that the recentralization of tax revenues and the increase in 
central transfers to local governments has not resulted in a reduction of horizontal 
fiscal disparities (e.g., Dollar and Hofman 2008), while the growth of vertical fiscal 
imbalances may have created new challenges for the accountability of local 
governments.  
What challenges? A recent strand of the second-generation fiscal federalism 
literature argues that the accountability benefits of decentralization are often not 
achieved because decentralization is “partial” (Khemani 2005, 2007a; Ahmad et al. 
2006; Ahmad and Brosio 2009; Bardhan 2009; Devarajan et al. 2009; Lockwood 
2009; Weingast 2009, 2014). “Partial decentralization” is described as “a state of the 
(decentralized) world where political and fiscal institutions are not able to ensure 
accountability of local elected politicians and officials” (Ahmad and Brosio 2009: 5). 
While this may be due to various factors, it typically occurs when “local governments 
lack control over tax instruments at the margin, so that they remain dependent on 
central government grants and revenue shares and correspondingly are less 
accountable to their electorates” (Ahmad and Brosio 2009: 5). Empirical evidence 
from Asia, Africa and Latin America suggests that what generally makes 
decentralization “partial” is that political decentralization is not accompanied by 
fiscal decentralization: democratically elected local governments are created but they 
are denied control over fiscal resources - whether de jure or de facto (see Table 2.13) 
(e.g., Díaz-Cayeros et al. 2003; Olowu 2003; Smoke 2003; Khemani 2005; 
Devarajan et al. 2009; Weingast 2009, 2014). At the same time, the lack of fiscal 
decentralization undermines the meaningfulness and effectiveness of political 
decentralization: citizens are provided with new arenas for political participation, but 
with little reason or motivation to engage in local politics in order to improve how 
public funds are spent and what services are provided in their communities. 
Essentially, the reluctance of the central government to devolve fiscal authority to 
(elected) local governments ends up reducing their political accountability to citizens 
and, as a result, worsens problems of corruption and misallocation of resources at the 
local level. 
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Table 2.13: Forms of Decentralization and Public Service Delivery 
Degree of 
decentralization 
Political Features Fiscal Features Administrative 
Features 
 
Deconcentration 
(minimal change) 
 No elected local 
government.  
 
 Local leadership 
vested in local 
officials appointed 
by and 
accountable to the 
central 
government. 
 
 
 
 Local government is 
a service delivery 
arm of the central 
government and has 
little or no 
discretion over how 
or where services 
are provided. 
 
 
 Funds come from 
the center. 
 
 No independent 
revenue sources. 
 
 Provider staff 
working at local level 
of center, and 
accountable to the 
center, usually 
through their 
ministries; weak 
local capacity is 
compensated for by 
central employees. 
 
 
 
Delegation 
(intermediate 
change) 
 
 Local government 
may be led by 
locally elected 
politicians, but it 
is still 
accountable, fully 
or partially, to the 
center.  
 
 
 
 Spending priorities 
are set centrally, as 
well as program 
norms and 
standards; local 
government has 
some management 
authority over 
allocation of 
resources to meet 
local circumstances.  
 
 Funding is provided 
by the center 
through transfers.  
 
 No independent 
revenue sources. 
 
 
 Providers could be 
employees of central 
or local government, 
but pay and 
employment 
conditions are 
typically set by the 
center.   
 Local government 
has some authority 
over hiring and 
location of staff, but 
less likely to have 
authority over firing.  
 
 
 
Devolution 
(substantial 
change) 
 
 Local government 
is led by locally 
elected politicians 
expected to be 
accountable to the 
local electorate.  
 
 
 
 Subject to meeting 
nationally set 
minimum standards, 
local government 
can set spending 
priorities and 
determine how best 
to meet service 
obligations. 
 
 Funding can come 
from local revenues 
and revenue-sharing 
arrangements and 
transfers from the 
center.  
 
 
 Providers are 
employees of local 
government. 
 
 Local government 
has full discretion 
over salary levels, 
staffing numbers and 
allocation, and 
authority to fire and 
hire.  
 
 
Source: Evans and Manning (2004: 22) 
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The empirical literature describes two main instances of “partial 
decentralization”, in which the fiscal dependence of local governments on the central 
government undermines the role of local elections in making them more accountable 
to their constituents, although for different reasons and through different channels. 
The first and main reason has to do with how a centralized and poorly designed fiscal 
system may weaken the accountability relationship between voters and local 
officials, through its (negative) effects on political participation. There are three 
main channels through which the “fiscal powerlessness” (Khemani 2005) of local 
governments may undermine the willingness and ability of citizens to monitor their 
performance and to hold them accountable in elections. First, when local 
governments are financed by central transfers, rather than from local sources, citizens 
may lack incentives to monitor how public money is spent (Faguet 2008). Second, 
under partial decentralization, they may also lack information about the expenditure 
responsibilities of local governments and about the amount of funds available for 
service provision in their localities (Khemani 2005; Gadenne 2012; Joanis 2014). 
Third, when decentralization is partial, citizens may have low expectations of the role 
of local governments in providing local public goods and assign this responsibility 
to the central government (e.g., Devarajan et al. 2009). All this, in turn, may reduce 
the accountability of local officials to voters and create perverse incentives for them 
to engage in corruption and patronage spending, while blaming the central 
government for reduced public goods spending (Khemani 2005; Bardhan 2009).  
Consistent with this, evidence from rural India (Devarajan et al. 2009) and 
Nigeria (Khemani 2005) suggests that, the less autonomy local governments have to 
raise their revenues and to allocate their budgets, the less likely they are to be – and 
to be perceived as being – effective, accountable and trustworthy. The unintended 
consequences of making decentralization partial are well described by Smoke (2003: 
10): 
Poorly articulated roles and resource deficiencies can cripple local 
governments and undermine incentives for local officials and elected 
representatives to perform effectively. Similarly, if local people participate 
in public decision-making and see no concrete result because local officials 
have inadequate power and resources to deliver services, they may become 
disillusioned and cynical about local government.  
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A second instance of “partial decentralization” is what Weingast (2009: 
288) calls the “tragic brilliance” of one-party dominant regimes – or “how insecure 
governments use centralized fiscal control to undermine elections”. In this case, a 
centralized fiscal system weakens the accountability relationship between local 
governments and citizens, through its (negative) effects on political competition 
(Díaz-Cayeros et al. 2003; Weingast 2009, 2014). 
In one-party dominant regimes where local governments are heavily 
dependent on discretionary transfers from the central government - such as, Mexico 
under the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party) 
(1930s-1990s) – the fiscal system provides a mechanism for the party in control of 
the central government to distribute transfers across localities selectively according 
to their political characteristics – whether they are governed by its own members or 
by the opposition. This has two consequences. First, it undermines the ability of 
opposition parties to govern effectively, as they systematically receive less transfers. 
Second, it undermines the incentives of citizens to vote for the opposition – 
regardless of how corrupt the dominant party is (Díaz-Cayeros et al. 2003; Weingast 
2009, 2014). 
In this case, the problem with “partial decentralization” is not that fiscal 
institutions create or exacerbate “political market imperfections”, such as 
information asymmetries between voters and officials (e.g., Ahmad et al. 2006), but 
rather that they make the “political market” much less contestable. In this case, local 
elections are not an imperfect mechanism of political accountability in the hands of 
voters, but rather an effective mechanism of political control in the hands of the 
national ruling party. This is explained by Weingast (2014: 20) as follows:  
 
The tragic brilliance mechanism reveals a political motivation for why 
regimes in developing countries centralize policy and taxation authority in 
comparison with developed ones. Wholly apart from administrative 
efficiencies and fiscal equity, centralization affords insecure political 
regimes with political leverage over lower governments and citizens. By 
making the delivery of basic local public goods and services depend on 
whom citizens vote for, the incumbent regime at once restricts citizens 
ability to throw the rascals out, to exercise fiscal autonomy, and to 
influence public policies. 
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To summarize, the partial decentralization literature shows how the power 
relationship between the central and local governments affects the accountability 
relationship between local governments and citizens: when the central government 
does not devolve (fiscal) decision-making power to local governments, citizens are 
less able and willing to hold them accountable for the quality of the services provided 
in their localities. Under partial decentralization, central-local fiscal relations distort 
(local) state-society relations in various ways. In some cases, the (fiscal) 
powerlessness of local government results in high levels of political disengagement 
and an “accountability gap” between citizens and local officials. In others, the (fiscal) 
dependence of local governments on the central government gives way to what Fox 
(2000: 8) calls “reverse vertical accountability” – a situation in which “accountability 
flows more from society upwards than from the state downwards” (Khemani 2005, 
2007a; Ahmad et al. 2006; Ahmad and Brosio 2009; Bardhan 2009; Devarajan et al. 
2009; Lockwood 2009; Weingast 2009, 2014). 
In China, village governments have become increasingly dependent on fiscal 
transfers from higher-level governments, particularly in agricultural regions. 
Changes in the way village governments are financed and in the autonomy with 
which they allocate public funds may fundamentally change the relationships of 
power and accountability between village governments, higher-level governments 
and villagers, and not necessarily in ways that improve village governance and public 
goods provision. The literature on partial decentralization suggests various channels 
through which the centralization of the fiscal system may have negatively affected 
the accountability role of village elections and the positive relationship between 
village democracy and public goods provision. First, fiscal reforms have sharply 
reduced the amount of resources over which village governments have control or 
discretion, limiting the scope of what they can do and be held accountable for. This 
raises the question of whether villagers still view and use elections as an 
accountability mechanism and whether there is a positive relationship between the 
degree of village democratization and the level of village-financed investment. 
Second, and relatedly, fiscal reforms have made village governments heavily reliant 
on (earmarked) transfers from higher-level governments to provide public goods. If 
county and township Party committees use the fiscal system for political purposes 
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and target more investment to villages that are governed by Party branches rather 
than by popularly elected village committees, there may be a negative relationship 
between the degree of village democratization and the amount of government-
financed investment. These questions will be examined in the next chapter. 
 
 
2.6. Summary 
 
Is China one of the most decentralized countries in the world, or one of the most 
centralized? In fact, as noted by Bahl (2011: 247), it is both. This chapter has 
provided an overview of the processes of (expenditure) decentralization and 
(revenue) centralization that have shaped intergovernmental fiscal relations under the 
fiscal contracting system (1980-1993) and the tax-sharing system (1994-present), 
highlighting the growth of vertical fiscal imbalances at the local level, and the 
resulting dependence of local governments on central transfers, as one of the most 
important changes in local public finance in recent years. Both under the fiscal 
contracting system (1980-1993) and the tax-sharing system (1994-present), local 
governments have accounted for more than 70 percent of total government 
expenditures (i.e., high degree of expenditure decentralization). However, the 
introduction of the tax-sharing system (1994) led to a “drastic” recentralization of 
revenues (Wong 2009), increasing the central share from around 20 to 60 percent of 
the total (Fock and Wong 2008). The recentralization of (enterprise and individual) 
income taxes (2002-03), the elimination of rural fees (2000-04) and agricultural taxes 
(2004-06), and the implementation of the “New Socialist Countryside” program to 
improve rural services (2006 – present) have further eroded the revenue base of local 
governments, while increasing their reliance on transfers to finance the provision of 
services, especially in rural areas (e.g., Tian 2009). Today, transfers absorb around 
60 percent of central revenues and finance between 40 and 50 percent of local 
expenditures (i.e., high degree of revenue centralization) (Wong 2010, 2011; Whiting 
2011). In the comparative federalism literature, China emerges less as an example of 
“market-preserving federalism” (e.g., Weingast 2009) than as an “outlier” in terms 
of vertical imbalance and transfer dependency (e.g., Bahl 2011; Fock and Wong 
2008). At the same time, the intergovernmental transfer system still scores very 
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poorly in terms of efficiency, equity and transparency (e.g., Qiao and Shah 2006; 
Wong 2007ab, 2010, 2011). 
Previous studies show that fiscal institutions – the intergovernmental fiscal 
system and interjurisdictional competition – have largely failed to provide grassroots 
governments with either sufficient fiscal resources, or adequate fiscal incentives, to 
meet the needs of rural residents for public services (e.g., West and Wong 1995; 
World Bank 2002; Duckett 2007; Murphy 2007; Tsai 2007ab; Wong 2007ab, 2009, 
2010, 2011; Fock and Wong 2008; Saich 2008). They also suggest that rural tax 
reforms may have aggravated these problems (e.g., Takeuchi 2014; Chen 2015). A 
question that has yet to be fully answered is whether and in what ways the (fiscal) 
dependence of villages on higher-level governments makes village officials less 
(politically) accountable to villagers for the provision of public goods.  
Studies looking at the political aspects of fiscal decentralization warn against 
the risk of reducing local fiscal autonomy as a way to prevent local corruption, 
because it might actually reduce local political accountability, by making 
decentralization “partial” (e.g., Ahmad and Brosio 2009; Devarajan et al. 2009; 
Bardhan 2009). When local governments are heavily dependent on transfers from the 
central government, there tend to be higher levels of government corruption and 
lower levels of political trust and participation at the local level (Fisman and Gatti 
2002; De Mello 2004; Khemani 2005; Fan et al. 2009). One of the main reasons is 
that citizens are less able and willing to hold local governments accountable for how 
they use transfer revenues than tax revenues (Faguet 2008; Gadenne 2012). Thus, the 
less autonomy local governments have to raise their revenues and to allocate their 
budgets, the less likely they are to be – and to be perceived as being - accountable 
and trustworthy (e.g., Smoke 2003; Khemani 2005; Devarajan et al. 2009). At the 
same time, the less accountable and trustworthy local governments are – or are 
perceived to be -, the greater the challenges that they will face to elicit compliance 
and participation from citizens in the areas of tax collection and service provision 
(e.g., Fjeldstad and Semboja 2001; Smoke 2011). In sum, central-local (fiscal) 
relations may affect local state-society relations in ways that undermine the 
(political) incentives of local officials and local citizens to work together for the 
public good.  
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According to Oates (1999: 1143), fiscal reform efforts in the developing 
world should focus on “restructuring systems of intergovernmental grants, in some 
instances to reduce the extent of financing that they provide to local governments, 
and, more generally, to remove the perverse incentives that they often embody for 
fiscal behaviour on the part of recipients”.                                                                                                                             
He further argues that “the case for establishing adequate and effective tax systems 
at decentralized levels of government is one of the critical issues of fiscal federalism 
in the developing world”. China is no exception. Like in other developing countries, 
where the Tiebout model (Tiebout 1956) has not provided solutions to the problem 
of poor rural service provision, in China interjurisdictional competition has not 
allowed rural residents to use the “exit” option (i.e., migration) to either prevent 
predatory taxation and/or to have their demands for public services met. The question 
now is whether the recentralization of the intergovernmental fiscal system has also 
left them without the option to exercise “voice” in the governance of their 
communities. This is examined in the next chapter. 
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3.1 Introduction 
 
 What are the potential and limits of local democratic reforms as a means to 
improve government accountability and public goods provision in a non-democratic 
regime like China? There is little consensus in the empirical literature on whether 
village committee elections provide an effective mechanism for village residents to 
hold grassroots officials accountable for the quality of the public goods and services 
provided in their communities (Zhang et al. 2004; Luo et al. 2007, 2010; Tsai 2007ab; 
Wang and Yao 2007; Sato 2008; Kung et al. 2009; Martinez-Bravo et al. 2011; Meng 
and Zhang 2011; Mu and Zhang 2014; Lu 2015). A possible limitation of existing 
studies, however, is that, in their analysis of the relationship between grassroots 
political reforms and public goods provision, they do not examine whether changes 
in “the access to power” resulting from the introduction of village elections have been 
matched by changes in the “exercise of power” (O’Brien and Han 2009) or, in other 
words, whether democratically elected village committees have been given the power 
to govern. An often implicit assumption is that decisions about investment in village 
infrastructure are made at the village level, and are made by village committees. 
There are, however, reasons to think that the balance of power (i.e., control 
over fiscal resources) is increasingly tilted towards Party organizations at the county, 
township and village levels. For instance, some studies show that, in poorer 
communities, village officials “routinely” go to the county to “lobby for additional 
public investments for their villages” (Mu and Zhang 2014: 19) and that, in the 
implementation of public projects funded by higher-level governments, they merely 
“execute orders or guidelines passed down from above” (Ahlers and Schubert 2009: 
57). Others indicate that, in richer villages, Party organizations are still the “locus of 
power” and have full control over village finances (Oi and Rozelle 2000; Zhang et 
al. 2004; Sun et al. 2013). To the extent that villages rely on their own funds to invest 
in basic infrastructure, it is often village Party secretaries, not village committee 
heads, the ones who decide whether and in what to invest. This suggests that, 
regardless of whether village-level public projects are funded by village or higher-
level governments, village committees often have no say in the provision of public 
goods. To the extent that this is the case, an analysis of the determinants of 
government performance at the village level that focuses on the accountability 
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relations between village committees and voters without simultaneously examining 
the power relations between village committees and other state and party actors risks 
missing the forest for the trees. Likewise, since village committees are likely to be 
relegated to a subordinate position vis-à-vis township and village Party 
organizations, an exclusive focus on the incentive effects of village committee 
elections does not address the issue of how the Party’s accountability mechanisms 
(e.g., cadre responsibility system and intra-Party elections) shape the incentives of 
township and village Party officials (i.e., the most likely power-holders) to 
implement democratic reforms and to invest in public goods in village communities. 
The overall goal of this chapter is to examine the institutional determinants 
of government spending on public goods at the village level. We pursue two 
interrelated objectives. The first one is to assess the impact of village democracy on 
village public goods provision, and the second one to examine the effects of the cadre 
responsibility system and intra-Party elections on village democratization and village 
public goods provision. By “village democracy” we mean a governance system in 
which village committees are elected in (reasonably) free and fair elections, and have 
the power to (co-)manage local affairs (with village Party branches). We use the term 
“village public goods provision” to refer to (capital and current) spending on 
infrastructure by village governments. In rural China, village infrastructure projects 
(e.g., roads, bridges, irrigation, drainage, drinking water, and schools) are typically 
financed either by village governments from current revenues, savings or debt, or by 
higher-level governments through grants. Our analysis focuses on explaining inter-
village differences in the level of infrastructure investment made by village 
governments (i.e., village-financed investment). The question of what explains 
differences among villages in the amount of infrastructure investment received from 
higher-level governments will also be explored (i.e., government-financed 
investment).  
Our main goal is to find out whether and under which conditions village 
committee elections matter for government accountability and public goods 
provision. We argue that this might depend on: (i) who finances village public 
projects – higher-level governments or the village – and (ii) who controls village 
finances – the Party branch and/or the village committee. If elections do not provide 
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citizens with a means to influence and monitor how public funds are used in their 
communities, either because fiscal resources have been centralized and the spending 
autonomy of village governments reduced and/or because, despite the introduction 
of elections, political power still lies outside popularly elected institutions, they are 
unlikely to improve local governance and public goods provision. In the context of 
rural China, we argue that, to the extent that public spending decisions are made 
either by county and township governments (i.e., village infrastructure projects 
funded by higher-level governments) or by village Party branches (i.e., village 
infrastructure projects funded by the village), village elections are unlikely to 
enhance the accountability of public spending.  
Given the dominant role of township and village Party officials in village 
governance, in this chapter we also explore the impact of the cadre responsibility 
system and village Party branch elections on village public goods provision and 
village democracy. These political institutions represent key mechanisms of 
(bureaucratic and democratic) accountability within the Party – between the top 
officials at the village level (i.e., the village committee head and village Party 
secretary) and the Party committee at the township level, in the case of the cadre 
responsibility system; and between the village Party secretary and village Party 
members, in the case of Party branch elections (Whiting 2001; 2006; Edin 2003ab; 
Tsui and Wang 2004; Tsai 2007b; Ong 2012; Sun et al. 2013).  
The cadre responsibility system lies at the core of China’s governing system. 
Unlike in a rule of law system, in China’s “rule of mandates” system, higher-level 
officials hold lower-level officials accountable, not for the implementation of the 
country’s laws and policies, but for the implementation of a subset of “mandates”, 
that is, a subset of “directives that are hierarchically ranked against each other” 
(Birney 2014: 55). They do so through the use of performance contracts, which 
include a list of targets ranked according to their importance (i.e., “priority targets 
with veto power”, “hard targets” and “soft targets”), and provide various incentives 
to lower-level officials for their fulfilment (Birney 2014: 55).  
Existing studies on the cadre responsibility system show that it has largely 
failed to create (career and financial) incentives for township and village officials to 
improve the quality of village elections (Kennedy 2007b; Sun et al. 2013; Birney 
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2014) and public goods provision (Tsai 2007b). They argue that county and township 
officials have been unwilling and unable to hold lower-level officials accountable for 
their performance in these policy areas (Kennedy 2007b; Tsai 2007b; Birney 2014), 
and point to three reasons (Tsai 2007b: 232-240). First, although performance 
contracts generally include targets related to social development and political 
decentralization, these tend to be categorized as “soft targets” (Kennedy 2007b; Tsai 
2007b), whose fulfilment is neither sufficient nor even necessary for grassroots 
cadres to advance in their careers. Second, higher-level governments have little 
(fiscal and political) leverage over village governments, mainly as a result of the 
small share of transfers in village budgets, and the lack of promotion opportunities 
for village cadres within the local Party-state (Tsai 2007b). And, third, higher-level 
officials often lack accurate and reliable information about the performance of their 
subordinates at lower levels of the administrative hierarchy (Birney 2014; Tsai 
2007b). 
The picture of the cadre responsibility system that emerges from these studies 
is thus a bleak one. At best, this mechanism of top-down control, is “selectively 
effective” (Edin 2003a), in that it induces local officials to implement what their 
Party superiors consider to be high-priority policies (i.e., “priority targets with veto 
power” and “hard targets”) but to ignore the rest (i.e., “soft targets”) (O’Brien and Li 
1999; Whiting 2001; 2006; Edin 2003ab; Kennedy 2007b; Birney 2014). At worst, it 
is unable to solve agency problems between the different levels of the Party-state and 
to make grassroots officials (e.g., village committee head and village Party secretary) 
accountable to higher-level Party leaders (e.g., township Party secretary) (Bernstein 
and Lü 2003; Tsai 2007b). This picture, however, may have changed, at least in part, 
as a result of the recentralization of the fiscal and administrative systems in recent 
years. Of particular significance is the adoption of the “salaries-from-above” and 
“cadre-in-residence” policies (Smith 2010; Oi et al. 2012), which are likely to have 
enhanced the leverage of higher-level officials over village cadres, while reducing 
the degree of information asymmetry between them. According to the “salaries-from-
above” policy, the salaries of the main officials at the village level are to be paid by 
county or township governments from funds transferred by the central government, 
and not by villagers through fees. Under the cadre-in-residence policy, townships are, 
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in turn, required to assign a township official to each of their villages, so as to ensure 
that they have more and better information about the performance of village cadres 
(Oi et al. 2012: 656). These policies may mitigate agency problems between village 
officials and township cadres. However, the question is whether they will not 
exacerbate agency problems between village officials and villagers. This may partly 
depend on whether higher-level officials and villagers have the same priorities or not. 
In this chapter, we explore the impact of the cadre responsibility system on village 
public goods provision and village democracy. Based on the literature, it is 
hypothesized that, while the cadre responsibility system may or may not positively 
affect the provision of local public goods, it is unlikely to exert a positive effect on 
the implementation of village democratic reforms. 
 Unlike in the case of the cadre responsibility system, there is very little 
research on the impact of intra-Party democratic reforms on rural governance. 
Another objective of this chapter is to provide a preliminary assessment of both the 
effects of intra-Party democracy on village public goods provision, and its interaction 
with village-level democracy. In recent years, the central government has encouraged 
the introduction of elections for village Party branches (i.e., “two-ballot system”), as 
well as the merger of the positions of village committee head and Party branch 
secretary (i.e., yijiantiao system) (Guo and Bernstein 2004; He 2007; O’Brien and 
Han 2009; Huang and Chen 2010; Chan 2007; Sun et al. 2013). Case study evidence 
suggests that intra-Party democratic reforms may improve public goods provision in 
village communities, either (i) by making Party leaders (downwardly) accountable to 
Party members for the management of village funds (e.g., intra-Party elections) (Li 
1999) or (ii) by reducing the number of village cadres and the level of village 
administrative costs (e.g., concurrent office-holding) (Guo and Bernstein 2004). 
However, on the other hand, they may undermine village democracy in the longer 
term by (i) reinforcing the balance of power in favour of village Party organizations 
and against village committees (Sun et al. 2013) (e.g., intra-Party elections) or by (ii) 
blurring the boundaries between government and Party institutions and eliminating 
the new system of checks and balances created by the Organic Law of Village 
Committees (e.g., concurrent office-holding) (He 2007; Schubert and Ahlers 2012a). 
Since intra-Party democratic reforms may affect village governance and public goods 
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provision through different channels, we examine the effects of “intra-Party 
elections” and “concurrent-office holding” separately, paying particular attention to 
whether township Party committees interfere in the election of village Party 
secretaries. This would weaken their electoral accountability to village Party 
members (in the case of intra-Party elections) or all villagers (in the case of 
concurrent office-holding). The underlying intuition is that the way in which intra-
Party democratic reforms are carried out may affect their outcomes and, more 
specifically, the likelihood that they complement, rather than subvert, local 
democratic reforms and improve public goods provision. 
 The chapter is structured as follows. In section 3.2 we analyze the distribution 
of resources and authority among levels of governments, and between non-Party and 
Party institutions at the grassroots level. We do so by examining (i) who invests in 
village-level infrastructure (i.e., the village or higher levels of government), and (ii) 
who manages village-level funds (i.e., the village committee or the Party branch). 
Section 3.3 undertakes a review of the relevant literature and develops hypotheses 
regarding: (i) the effects of village committee elections, the cadre responsibility 
system and intra-Party elections on village public goods provision (i.e., village-
financed investment); and (ii) the interaction among these political institutions. In 
Sections 3.4 and 3.5 we develop and estimate a two-equation simultaneous equation 
system, in which “village democracy” and “village public goods provision” (i.e., 
village-financed investment) are the endogenous variables (i.e., main model). 
Additionally, and for comparison purposes, we develop and estimate a two-equation 
simultaneous equation system, in which “village democracy” and “government-
financed investment” are the endogenous variables (i.e., additional model). Section 
3.6 summarizes our findings and concludes. 
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3.2 Power, Accountability and State Provision of Infrastructure 
  
In the 11th and 12th Five-Year Plans (2006-2010 and 2011-2015), the central 
government has expressed its commitment to “strengthen rural infrastructure and 
public services” (Zhang et al. 2013: 87-88)41. To reach this goal, it has adopted a 
more centralized approach to governing rural areas, one that relies primarily on: (i) 
using (mostly, earmarked) grants to finance rural governments (e.g., Fock and Wong 
2008); strengthening the (upward) accountability of township and county 
governments to the provincial and central governments (e.g., Heberer and Trappel 
2013); (ii) limiting the autonomy and decision-making power of village officials 
(e.g., Oi et al. 2012); (iii) reinforcing the dominant role of the Party in managing 
village affairs (e.g., Alpermann 2013); and promoting democracy, not in villages, but 
especially within rural grassroots Party organizations (“intra-Party democracy”) 
(e.g., Brown 2011).  
While there is wide agreement about the main challenges to further improve 
the provision of rural infrastructure - the weak fiscal capacity and political 
accountability of rural governments - (e.g., World Bank 2007), it is not entirely clear 
that these reforms are moving in the right direction. Questions have been raised about 
whether relying on earmarked grants and top-down control can improve the quality 
of governance and public goods provision in rural communities (e.g., Wong 2010; 
Bird et al. 2011; Oi et al. 2012), especially without undertaking a fundamental reform 
of the fiscal and administrative systems (World Bank 2007; Fock and Wong 2008). 
For instance, Richard Bird and colleagues argue that “the development of more 
responsive and sustainable local fiscal management in China will inevitably require 
both the devolution of more decision-making power over public finance to local 
governments and the development of local governments that are more openly and 
directly responsible to the local people whom they are supposed to serve” (Bird et al. 
2011: 242).  
A main concern with the new government’s approach to improving rural 
public goods provision is that, under the new (de-)centralized system, village 
                                                 
41Between 2006 and 2012, it invested more than 6 trillion yuan in rural infrastructure and, partly thanks 
to this investment, 95 percent of the country’s villages have now access to paved roads, running water, 
and electricity (Anderlini 2012).  
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committees have less control over fiscal resources, and villagers have less control 
over how they are spent. And yet, village committees are the only political 
institutions that can be held democratically accountable for their spending decisions, 
while villagers are the ones with first-hand information on the infrastructure needed 
and provided in their communities. By shifting resources and authority away from 
village committees towards higher-level governments and grassroots Party 
organizations, these new central policies may render village committee elections 
useless as a mechanism of control and thereby widen the “accountability gap” at the 
grassroots level. A fundamental question is, therefore, who makes decisions about 
infrastructure investment in village communities? And what implications may this 
have for accountability in infrastructure delivery? 
An analysis of the distribution of power among different levels of the Party-
state, and between the Party and the state, warns us against assuming that village 
committees and those they represent have a voice in local investment decisions. One 
reason has to do with the vertical distribution of power between levels of government 
and the degree of fiscal autonomy of villages. Recent fiscal reforms have limited the 
discretionary authority of villages to determine the level and composition of their 
expenditures, by restricting their revenue-raising capacity, while making them 
heavily dependent on specific-purpose transfers from higher-level governments – 
transfers that are distributed across villages on an ad hoc basis, rather than according 
to objective criteria (Fock and Wong 2008; Ahlers and Schubert 2009; Tan 2010; 
Bird et al. 2011; Oi et al. 2012; Boyle et al 2014). This has affected how villages and 
higher-level governments interact, reducing the autonomy of villages in the financing 
and provision of infrastructure42. 
The introduction of the tax-sharing system (1994), the implementation of the 
tax-for-fee reform (2002-04), and the abolition of agricultural taxes (2004-06) have 
limited the capacity of villages to finance public projects from their own resources 
(Bird et al. 2011; Oi et al. 2012). Research by Bird et al. (2011), amongst others (e.g.,  
                                                 
42 Since the early 1980s, village governments had been responsible for financing and providing small-
scale infrastructure in their communities, such as roads and bridges, irrigation and drinking water 
systems, or schools and clinics (Tsai 2007b: 31-35). The revenue used to build and repair village-level 
infrastructure used to come from various tax and non-tax sources (e.g., agricultural taxes, village fees 
or tiliu, and profits from village enterprises) (Tsai 2007b; Boyle et al. 2014; Mu and Zhang 2014). 
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Luo et al. 2007, 2010; Zhang et al. 2007; Yi et al. 2011; Boyle et al. 2014), shows a 
dramatic change in the sources of investment in village infrastructure – including, 
roads and bridges, irrigation and drinking water systems, or schools and clinics -, 
especially after the implementation of the tax-for-fee reform (2002-04). As can be 
seen in Table 3.1, between 2000 and 2004, the share of village-level public 
investment financed by higher-level governments almost tripled, increasing from 21 
to 59 percent (Bird et al. 2011). The picture emerging from our data also reveals the 
increased dependence of villages on (earmarked) transfers to finance their capital 
expenditures since 200243. Table 3.2 shows that, in 2003-04, more than 50 percent of 
total infrastructure investment in our sample villages came from higher-level 
governments. More recent survey research has found that the share of village-level 
investment funded by (earmarked) transfers continued to increase after the abolition 
of agricultural taxes, reaching around 75 percent in 2008 (Oi et al. 2012). This share 
is even higher in poor villages, where investments made by higher-level governments 
have replaced, rather than complemented, their own investments (Bird et al. 2011; 
Oi et al. 2012). 
 
Table 3.1: Proportion of investment in village public projects financed by higher-level 
governments before and after the tax-for-fee reform 
Public goods investment 
per capita 
2000 2004 
Mean 
Percent from 
higher levels 
Mean 
Percent 
from 
higher 
levels 
Roads and bridges 15.1 23.4 123.6 64.8 
Schools 8.9 23.8 7.3 30.9 
Irrigation 10.2 42.3 20.4 50.5 
Drinking water 4.3 4.6 17.6 42.7 
Clinic 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 
Otherb 9.8 1.2 21.6 61.3 
Total investment 48.4 21.3 191.3 59.2 
 
Source: Bird et al. (2011: 235) 
Notes: bOther includes electricity, village office building construction, green for grain projects, and investments 
in communications, etc. 
 
                                                 
43 This reflects the impact of the tax-for-fee reform, which eliminated village fees (e.g., tiliu) and 
capped the amount of voluntary contributions from villagers for village public projects (i.e., the “yi 
shi yi yi” system) (e.g., Luo et al. 2007; Yi et al. 2011; Boyle et al. 2014). 
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Table 3.2: Variation in sources of funding for village public projects  
Province Total value of investment 
from higher levels (yuan) 
Share of investment from 
higher levels (%) 
 Mean SD Mean SD 
Jiangsu 328.70 280.51 62.90 31.67 
Sichuan 344.84 321.99 54.05 28.03 
Shaanxi 71.65 104.97 55.80 46.50 
Jilin 118.75 149.08 50.50 40.47 
Hebei 59.90 115.78 36.99 44.87 
Fujian 260.59 294.59 61.29 35.54 
Sample 201.15 255.96 54.29 37.28 
 
Source: CCAP Village Survey (2005) 
 
Changes in the way village-level infrastructure is financed have been 
accompanied by changes in the way projects are carried out.  Villages have little, if 
any, say over the selection, design and implementation of infrastructure projects 
funded by higher-level governments (Ahlers and Schubert 2009; Tan 2010; Bird et 
al. 2011; Oi et al. 2012; Schubert and Ahlers 2012b)44.  
Another reason why village committees may have no control over fiscal 
resources has to do with the horizontal distribution of power between state and party 
institutions at the grassroots level. As discussed in section 1.3, the 2010 Organic Law 
of Village Committees, like the 1987 and 1998 versions of the Law, does not 
establish a clear division of powers between village committees and village Party 
branches. At the same time it underlines the “leading role” of Party organizations in 
local governance. One of the implications is that, even when local spending decisions 
are made at the village level, they are often made by Party branches. Table 3.3 shows 
the distribution of power between village committees and village Party organizations 
in our sample villages. In a majority of them, the decision-making power over how 
                                                 
44 In some cases, villages do not even have a say over the management of the services provided by 
that infrastructure. For instance, in villages where most investment in irrigation infrastructure comes 
from the county and township governments, county and township-level water resource bureaus have 
taken on the responsibility of managing village irrigation systems (e.g., setting and collection of 
irrigation fees; signing of canal management contracts; etc.) (Boyle et al. 2014). 
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to spend their own revenues was concentrated in the hands of village Party leaders, 
who cannot be held electorally accountable by village residents. This finding is in 
line with those of previous studies (Zhang et al. 2004; Sun et al. 2013) and suggests 
that, despite almost three decades of “village self-government”, the nature of the local 
power structure has changed little: perhaps unsurprisingly, it is still completely 
dominated by the Party in most villages.  
 
Table 3.3: Distribution of power over the allocation of village funds  
% Villages by Province (1) Village Party branch 
(secretary), the only 
decision-making body 
(person). Village leader 
cannot be held electorally 
accountable by villagers 
(2) Village committee 
(head), granted decision-
making power. Village 
leader can be held 
electorally accountable by 
villagers45 
Fujian 45% 55% 
Hebei 42% 58% 
Jiangsu 53% 47% 
Jilin  67% 33% 
Shaanxi 56% 44% 
Sichuan 65% 35% 
Sample 55% 45% 
 
Source: CCAP Village Survey (2005) 
 
Previous studies on the relationship between village committee elections and 
public goods provision have not simultaneously examined how changes in the 
intergovernmental fiscal arena and the lack of change in the local political arena have 
jointly affected the ability of village elections to generate accountability in the post-
tax-for-fee reform period. They generally fail to capture either the recentralization of 
the fiscal system (e.g., Zhang et al. 2004; Tsai 2007b; Wang and Yao 2007; Shen and 
Yao 2008) or the continued leadership of Party organizations in rural communities 
(e.g., Luo et al. 2007, 2010; Sato 2008; Meng and Zhang 2011). However, the effects 
of village democracy on the provision of village infrastructure may crucially depend 
on whether village committees have control over the allocation of resources and, in 
                                                 
45 Around sixteen percent of the sample villages have merged the positions of village Party secretary 
and village committee head. As will be explained in detail in section 3.4.1, we establish a distinction 
between villages with a unitary power structure, in which (1) the village leader was chosen through 
competitive village elections with an open nomination process (i.e, the “haixuan” or sea-election 
method), and those in which (2) the posts of village committee head and Party secretary have been 
merged but the village leader is not directly nominated and elected by all villagers.  
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particular, on: (i) who funds village public goods projects – whether higher-level 
governments and/or villages themselves – and (ii) who manages village funds – 
whether the Party branch and/or the village committee. If village committees lack 
resources and power - either as a result of their fiscal dependence on (earmarked) 
transfers from higher-level governments or their political subordination to village 
Party branches –, villagers will have neither the means nor the incentive to use village 
elections as an accountability mechanism. Consistent with this, it has been found that 
inter-village variation in voter turnout is partly explained by (i) the level of own 
revenues of villages (Su et al. 2011); and (ii) the type of power-sharing arrangements 
between the (elected) village committee head and the (unelected) village Party 
secretary (Zhong and Chen 2002): the greater the fiscal autonomy and political power 
of (elected) village committees, the higher the turnout. In sum, in a majority of rural 
communities elected village committees have little control over resources and, 
therefore, little power to govern, which in turn might have negative implications for 
the functioning of village democratic institutions. 
Although more research is needed, the available evidence suggests that 
shifting the responsibility for funding village infrastructure projects to higher-level 
governments and/or to village Party branches does not necessarily increase the 
(productive and allocative) efficiency of village-level capital expenditures - whether 
funded from above or by the village. A first issue is the accountability of grant-
financed expenditures. Existing studies show that, under the new intergovernmental 
transfer system, the central government has limited control over how earmarked 
grants are actually allocated and spent by rural officials, and so do villagers (World 
Bank 2007; Fock and Wong 2008; Liu M. et al. 2009). It seems that the lack of 
transparency of a system dominated by a “multitude of ad hoc earmarked grants” 
(Dollar and Hofman 2008) has increased opportunities for corruption and collusion 
among local officials at the county, township and village levels, while leaving 
villagers in the dark (Ahlers and Schubert 2009). This lack of accountability in the 
distribution and use of grant funds might explain: (i) why villages with political 
connections to higher-level governments (i.e., guanxi) receive more transfers for 
infrastructure projects (Zhang et al. 2007; Luo et al. 2007, 2010; Boyle et al. 2014) 
but tend to have poorer quality infrastructure than other villages (Liu C. et al 2009); 
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as well as (ii) why inter-village variation in the proportion of village households 
satisfied with infrastructure provision is largely explained by inter-village variation 
in the sources of public investment (i.e., higher-level governments or villages 
themselves): the higher the share of investment financed by higher-level 
governments through grants, the lower the level of satisfaction among villagers with 
the infrastructure provided (Bird et al. 2011). A second issue that deserves attention 
is the accountability of self-financed expenditures. In this regard, it has been found 
that the concentration of power in the hands of appointed village Party secretaries is 
associated with a less efficient use of village funds and with a poorer provision of 
village infrastructure. In communities where elected village committees have no 
decision-making power, a smaller share of the budget goes to infrastructure 
construction and maintenance (Zhang et al. 2004), while their roads, drinking water 
systems and irrigation networks are of significantly lower quality than those of other 
villages (Liu C. et al. 2009).  
Three basic conclusions can be drawn from this discussion. First, making 
rural governments more accountable to villagers for the provision of local public 
goods remains a crucial issue. Second, village elections seem a necessary component 
of the accountability framework for rural service provision that the central 
government is attempting to build. Third, the main obstacle to electoral 
accountability is not – or not only - whether villagers have control over village 
committees, but more fundamentally whether village committees have control over 
fiscal resources.  
 
 
 
3.3 Hypotheses Development 
 
3.3.1 Village Democracy  
 
In China, political decentralization reforms have only been implemented at 
the village level, and have been implemented unevenly across villages. Inter-village 
variation in the degree of political decentralization is mainly associated with inter-
village variation in the procedural and substantive dimensions of grassroots 
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democracy: (i) the quality of village committee elections, and (ii) the autonomy and 
authority of village committees to govern (O’Brien and Zhao 2011).  
To date, research on the development of village democracy has been mainly 
focused on the first of these dimensions. There is a large body of literature examining 
the determinants and effects of “high-quality elections” (Lu 2012). These studies 
suggest that the quality of elections has improved more on paper than in practice; that 
it is undermined by old and new forms of electoral manipulation and corruption; and 
that it varies widely across stages of the electoral process, as well as villages (Tsai 
2007b: 203-209; O’Brien and Han 2009: 363-367; Kennedy 2010b; Su et al. 2011; 
Lu 2012: 487-488). For instance, a nationally representative survey of more than 350 
villages in 27 provinces has found that only 16 percent of villages conducted their 
last election in full accordance with the Organic Law of Village Committees (Lu 
2012). Another survey of more than 300 villages in Shanxi, Hebei, Jiangxi and Fujian 
suggests that pre-election and election procedures vary in the degree to which they 
are effectively implemented. Some of the rules and procedures mandated by the 
Organic Law - such as “multiple candidates” (98 % of villages), “campaign 
speeches” (54%) “secret ballot booths” (77%), “public vote count” (87%) or 
“immediate announcement of election results” (99%) - are implemented in most 
villages. And yet others are largely ignored: fifty-nine percent of villages reported 
that in their last election there was interference from the township government, the 
village Party branch or the incumbent village committee in the formation of the 
village election committee and the selection of candidates (“pre-election 
procedures”); sixty percent that they did not regulate proxy voting (“regulated proxy 
voting”); and seventy percent that they used mobile ballot boxes (“fixed ballot 
boxes”) (Tsai 2007b: 203-209). While “old” challenges to improving the quality of 
village elections, such as township interference in candidate nomination, have yet to 
be addressed, “new” problems associated with the use of proxy voting and mobile 
ballot boxes, such as vote-buying and voter intimidation, have arisen (e.g., O’Brien 
and Han 2009; Kennedy 2010b). Although these problems are relatively common, 
elections are not everywhere equally corruptible or corrupt: villages vary widely in 
their electoral institutions and practices. As Kennedy (2010a: 169) has pointed out, 
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“the quality of grassroots political reform varies throughout rural China from fair 
elections to electoral manipulation”.  
What explains inter-village variation in election quality? The literature 
suggests that the explanation lies in the economic, political and social contexts in 
which village committee elections are embedded, and in the ways in which they 
shape electoral competition and participation. One strand of the literature examines 
the economic determinants of election quality (e.g., Lawrence 1994; O´Brien 1994; 
Choate 1997; Epstein 1997; Shi 1999; Oi and Rozelle 2000; Hu 2005; He 2007; 
Zweig and Fung 2007). Among these studies, there is agreement that the level and 
pattern of local economic development matters, but there is less agreement as to 
which villages are more likely to have better electoral institutions and practices: rich 
(e.g., Hu 2005; He 2007; O´Brien 1994), middle-income (e.g. Epstein 1997; Shi 
1999; Zweig and Fung 2007; Schubert and Ahlers 2012a), or poor villages (e.g., 
Choate 1997; Lawrence 1994); those with an agriculture-dependent (e.g., Oi and 
Rozelle 2000) or diversified economy (e.g., He 2007); those with a tradition of (local) 
state (e.g., O’Brien 1994) or private entrepreneurship (e.g., Oi and Rozelle 2000); 
those with more (e.g., Hu 2005) or less (out-)migration (e.g., Oi and Rozelle 2000; 
Lu 2012).   
For instance, according to Kevin O’Brien (1994: 48), elections are more 
likely to be better implemented in rich villages with a large number of collective 
enterprises, where “cadres have a large public sector to administer and to profit from 
(as well as a reduced concern with electoral removal and humiliation) and peasants 
have an interest in ensuring that public funds are not misused or squandered”. In 
contrast, Jean Oi and Scott Rozelle (2000: 529) argue that the incidence of contested 
elections is likely to be higher in poorer, agricultural villages with little out-
migration, where “villagers have an incentive to participate in politics and leaders do 
not have an incentive to limit such activities”, as they do not fear the loss of control 
over revenue-generation activities (e.g., collective enterprises). Tianjian Shi (1999: 
439-440), in turn, argues that middle-income communities, where village committees 
derive most of their revenues from local taxes and fees, are more likely to have 
competitive elections. This is because in villages where local officials need to “ask 
for money” from villagers, the latter are more likely to “ask for the right to 
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participate” in village governance. Despite their differences, what these studies have 
in common is that they examine how economic factors shape what Kennedy (2010a) 
calls the “supply” and “demand” for grassroots democratic reforms. By examining 
the economic interests of the main political actors at the village level, they show: (i) 
how the dependence of village residents on village resources for their income (e.g., 
land and village-owned enterprises) affects their incentives to participate in village 
politics, as a means of influencing the way in which such resources are distributed 
and managed; and (ii) how the access of village leaders to non-tax incomes (e.g., 
enterprise profits, land rentals, etc.) affects both their incentives to open up the local 
political arena to participation, and their ability to “buy off” village residents. 
A second strand of the literature argues that the main obstacles for improving 
election quality lie in the local political arena. “Village electoral democracy” is 
constrained by two interrelated problems: the manipulation of village elections by 
Party officials and the declining political participation of villagers (e.g., Kelliher 
1997; Alpermann 2001; Ogden 2002; Zhong and Chen 2002; He 2007; Tan and Xin 
2007; O´Brien and Han 2009; Kennedy 2010a; Landry et al. 2010; Tao et al. 2011; 
Schubert and Ahlers 2012a). With the introduction of elections for village 
committees, township and village Party officials have seen their power reduced and 
their legitimacy contested. It has made it more difficult for township leaders to elicit 
the necessary cooperation from village officials to implement unpopular tasks, whose 
fulfilment is nonetheless critically important for a good performance evaluation from 
county leaders under the target responsibility system (e.g., O’Brien and Li 1999; 
Huang and Chen 2010). It has also made it more difficult for village Party secretaries 
to maintain their position as “the undisputed boss of the village” (yibashou) (Guo and 
Bernstein 2004). They thus have a strong incentive to interfere in elections and 
influence their outcomes, so long as this does not lead to violent protests from 
villagers that draw attention from higher-level governments (Louie 2001; He 2007; 
Kennedy 2007b; Huang and Chen 2010; Tao et al. 2011). Research conducted by 
Kennedy (2007b: 63) shows that in villages where village committee elections are 
rigged “the village committees have relatively weak authority to govern, and 
villagers have few mechanisms to monitor or influence cadre behavior”. In these 
villages, there are also low levels of political trust and voter turnout: in the view of 
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villagers, the costs of participating in elections - whether as voters or candidates - 
outweigh the potential benefits (Zhong and Chen 2002; Landry et al 2010; Tao et al. 
2011).  
A third line of research examines the ways in which features of the social 
structure and context affect the quality of elections. Much of this literature focuses 
on the (re-)emergence of traditional and new social groups – in particular, clan 
organizations and private entrepreneurs -, and on the possible risk that village 
democracy is undermined by problems of clientelism and elite capture (e.g., Dickson 
2008; Levy 2003, 2007; Hu 2008; Yao 2012; Wang 2014). The re-emergence of clans 
in rural areas after decades of repression under Mao has provided a basis for “identity 
politics” (Brown 2011; Su et al. 2011; Mu and Zhang 2014), manifested in practices 
of clan-based voting and patronage which distort patterns of electoral participation 
and competition. In this regard, it has been found that in villages where a few clans 
vie for power, voter turnout is higher, but clan-based voting is prevalent (Su et al. 
2011). For instance, there is evidence that “one needs to belong to a big lineage in 
order to be elected”, and that “no matter how incompetent a candidate is (…) close 
members of his lineage will vote for him” (Hu 2008: 624). It has also been found 
that, in order to gain electoral support, both incumbents and their challengers often 
build clientelistic ties with fellow clan members, by offering – or promising to offer 
- “small favors” with public funds (Hu 2008: 624)46. Regardless of their apparent 
quality, elections in these communities are unlikely to deliver better governance 
because “lineage votes” (jiazu piao) (Hu 2008) serve neither to select capable leaders 
nor to discipline corrupt ones, but to signal loyalty to the clan group and to secure 
access to publicly provided private goods.  
The development of the rural private sector and the emergence of private 
entrepreneurs also seems to have created more challenges than opportunities for 
village democracy (Levy 2003, 2007; He 2007; Huang and Chen 2010; Yao 2012). 
While the introduction of elections has provided a means by which “a new, more 
economically based rural elite” can challenge “the older political elite” (Levy 2007: 
21), the question is whether this is to the benefit of ordinary villagers. Some studies 
                                                 
46 This may explain the finding that villager satisfaction with elections in multi-surname villages tends 
to be lower than in single-surname villages (Kennedy 2002). 
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argue that private entrepreneurs’ entry into the electoral arena and power structure is 
key to increasing political competition and bringing about political change (e.g., Oi 
and Rozelle 2000; He 2007). Put succinctly, “no new rich, no true competition, 
therefore no village democracy” (He 2007: 165). However, others show that private 
entrepreneurs’ entry into village politics has in fact been associated with growing 
problems of vote-buying and corruption (e.g., Levy 2003, 2007; Kennedy 2010b; 
Yao 2012). In much the same way as clan-based voting, vote-buying distorts electoral 
competition and participation, undermining the ability of village elections to deliver 
what villagers demand, that is, “financially clean and public-minded” leaders (Yao 
2012). Underlying these issues is the broader question of social inequality and the 
ways in which it weakens the accountability role of elections: Who sells her/his vote? 
Who does not vote? Whose interests are not represented? (e.g., poorer villagers, 
minority clan members, migrant workers, women, etc.). The problem in this case is 
that, in villages where part of the population does not - or cannot - use the vote to 
select better leaders and to hold them accountable for their performance47, elections 
merely provide a mechanism for replacing the old local elite with a new one, but not 
for constraining in any meaningful way how this new elite exercises power. In some 
communities, villagers complain that “elections only produce many more greedy 
cadres, and each new generation is worse than the previous one” (Hu 2008: 624). 
What are the implications of inter-village variation in election quality for 
local public finances and public goods provision? The existing literature does not 
provide a conclusive answer to this question. Some studies offer evidence that the 
introduction of direct elections for village committees is positively associated with 
both lower taxation and higher public goods spending (e.g., Bernstein and Lü 2003; 
Zhang et al. 2004; Luo et al. 2007, 2010; Sato 2008; Shen and Yao 2008; Kung et al. 
2009). In villages where leaders are directly elected by villagers, tax collection is 
characterized by “greater fairness and less abuse” (Bernstein and Lü 2003: 224). 
Furthermore, villagers pay less taxes, but do not receive less or lower-quality services 
                                                 
47 For instance, survey research on village elections in Henan and Shandong reveals that, in 15 percent 
of the surveyed villages, around one-third of the villagers were de facto disenfranchised from voting 
in village committee elections, with some of the reasons being: “only the men vote”, “only party 
members vote”, “only one member of each household can vote” or “I was never informed that there 
was an election” (Birney 2014: 59). 
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(Zhang et al. 2004). Indeed, elected village officials invest more on roads, schools, 
medical care, drinking water and irrigation systems (Luo et al 2007, 2010; Shen and 
Yao 2008; Kung et al. 2009) and provide better infrastructure (Liu C. et al. 2009). 
The reason is that, along with the change from appointed to elected villages heads, 
there has been a shift in taxation from households to collective enterprises (Zhang et 
al. 2004), as well as a reduction in corruption (e.g., embezzlement of village funds) 
and wasteful spending (e.g., “entertainment” expenses, such as “wining and dining”) 
(Bernstein and Lü 2003). One possible interpretation of these findings is that, as a 
result of elections, the fiscal relationship between grassroots governments and 
villagers has gradually moved towards the “contractual” end of the continuum 
between “coercive” and “contractual” taxation (Moore 2008: 37), where there is an 
“exchange” of taxes for services between them. 
In contrast to these studies, others call into question the usefulness of 
elections to improve government accountability - no matter how (well) they are 
implemented (Tsai 2007ab; Meng and Zhang 2011; Mu and Zhang 2014).  They 
suggest that differences among villages in the quality of their “pre-election 
institutions” (Tsai 2007b) (i.e., the determination of the members of the village 
election committee and the election candidates) are not associated with differences 
in the composition of their spending (Tsai 2007ab; Meng and Zhang 2011), or not in 
the way one would expect (Wang and Yao 2007). For instance, findings by Wang 
and Yao (2007) show that in villages with government-controlled elections, where 
candidates are nominated by local officials, a larger share of the budget goes to the 
provision of basic infrastructure (e.g., roads, irrigation, school and clinic projects) 
and social welfare (e.g., transfers to households), as compared to villages with 
competitive elections, where candidates are nominated by villagers. Inter-village 
variation in the quality of “election institutions” does not seem to matter either. 
Research conducted by Tsai (2007b: 187-227) shows that villages that conduct their 
elections in (greater) accordance with the established rules and procedures – 
including, “contested elections”, “public vote count”, “secret ballot booths”, 
“campaign speeches”, “regulated proxy voting”, “fixed ballot boxes”, and 
“immediate announcement of election results” - do not invest more in public projects, 
nor do they provide their constituents with better drinking water, roads or schools. 
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These studies argue that “democratic institutions are neither necessary nor sufficient 
for governmental accountability and responsible provision of public goods” (Tsai 
2007b:203). 
What explains this lack of consensus in the empirical literature? A possible 
reason has to do with the challenge of assessing and measuring local democracy, 
especially in an authoritarian regime. In fact, it has been pointed out that one of the 
main limitations of recent research on (political) decentralization in developing 
countries is that it has been dominated by “a concern with the substantive dimension 
of democracy rather than the process dimension of democracy” (Packel 2008: 1). 
This does not hold, however, for the literature on (political) decentralization in China. 
Indeed, we find the opposite problem: existing studies on the relationship between 
local democracy and public goods provision have focused on the “process” 
dimension of democracy – the freedom and fairness of village committee elections -
, rather than on its “substantive” dimension – the autonomy and authority of village 
committees to govern. Despite these differences, and irrespective of their regional 
focus, there is a similar imperative among studies on decentralized governance to 
adopt a broader definition of local democracy that encompasses its main dimensions. 
In the case of China, this is more challenging and yet more important, given the 
Party’s traditional monopoly over the allocation of political power at each level of 
the administrative hierarchy (Landry 2008). The adoption of a two-dimensional 
definition of “village democracy” (i.e., “process” and “substantive” democracy), 
while still minimalist, may help us find an answer to the puzzle of why existing 
studies on village committee elections have come to such different conclusions about 
their effects, and to the question of why villages with better elections fail to deliver 
better governance. Our main hypothesis is that, in villages where elections are better 
implemented, and where village committees have decision-making power over the 
allocation of village funds, there will be higher levels of investment in public goods 
(i.e., village-financed investment).  
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3.3.2 Intra-Party Democracy 
 
 In recent years the Chinese Communist Party has begun to promote “intra-
Party democracy” at the grassroots level, through the introduction of a new system 
of “intra-party elections” and “concurrent office-holding” in the villages (Li 1999; 
Schubert 2003; Guo and Bernstein 2004; Chan 2007; He 2007; Alpermann 2010, 
2013; Sun et al. 2013). These reforms are best understood in the context of the 
continuing competition for “power” and “legitimacy” between (elected) village 
committees and (appointed) village Party branches (O’Brien and Han 2009). 
Traditionally, these two governing bodies have derived their authority from different 
sources and exercised it in different ways. Unlike popularly elected village heads, 
village Party secretaries are typically appointed by township Party committees and, 
consequently, tend to be more responsive to the demands of their Party superiors than 
to the needs of villagers (Guo and Bernstein 2004; Bernstein 2006; He 2007; Tan and 
Xin 2007; Huang and Chen 2010).  
The gradual institutionalization of village committee elections has created 
challenges for village Party branches, and by extension for townships, to maintain 
their dominant role in village governance. The main reason lies in their lack of 
democratic legitimacy. By creating an “electoral connection” (Manion 1996) 
between villagers and village heads, the regular holding of democratic elections has 
provided the latter with the incentive and justification, not only to resist township 
interference in village affairs, but also to compete with (appointed) Party secretaries 
for village leadership (Schubert 2003; Guo and Bernstein 2004; He 2007; Alpermann 
2010, 2013; Sun et al. 2013). In villages with well-run elections, village committees 
enjoy more popular support than Party branches (Guo and Bernstein 2004: 258), and 
a majority of villagers consider that they should have a greater say in the management 
of village affairs because, unlike Party organizations, they represent them (Tan and 
Xin 2007: 592-593). In these villages, there are growing conflicts between village 
committees, on the one hand, and village and township Party organizations, on the 
other (Li 1999; Schubert 2003; Guo and Bernstein 2004; Bernstein 2006; He 2007; 
Tan and Xin 2007; Landry 2008; Huang and Chen 2010).  
More “intra-party democracy” has been the response given to the 
unanticipated, and unwelcome, effects of “village democracy” and, in particular, to 
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what Schubert (2003) calls the “horizontalisation of power relations” among 
community, state and party actors. In his view, “the Party is trying to secure its 
monopoly power by gradually introducing more transparency and democratic 
procedures to intra-party decision-making concerning the recruitment of local office-
holders” (Schubert 2003: 5). The introduction of elections for village Party branches 
and the merger of Party branches and village committees can be seen as a step in this 
direction. In an increasing number of villages, Party branch secretaries are no longer 
appointed by the township, but elected by and among the village Party members, 
through the two-ballot system – a two-stage electoral process in which villagers first 
nominate the candidates for the Party secretary position, and Party members then 
elect their leader from among the nominated candidates. Likewise, in some 
provinces, such as Guangdong, it is increasingly common that the positions of village 
Party secretary and village head are held by the same person. Either the incumbent 
Party secretary is required to run in village committee elections, or the newly elected 
village head is first recruited into the Party, and subsequently promoted to the 
position of village Party secretary (Guo and Bernstein 2004; Chan 2007; He 2007; 
O’Brien and Han 2009; Huang and Chen 2010; Sun et al. 2013).  
What these reforms – intra-Party elections and concurrent office-holding - 
have in common is their objective of making village Party secretaries democratically 
accountable, either to Party members (intra-Party elections) or to all villagers 
(concurrent office-holding) (Schubert 2003; Guo and Bernstein 2004; Chan 2007; He 
2007; Sun et al. 2013). However, they differ in terms of: (i) the type of institutional 
change they involve – the introduction of new (democratic) mechanisms of 
accountability within the Party (intra-Party elections) or, alternatively, the merger of 
Party and non-Party institutions at the grassroots level (concurrent office-holding) –
; and (ii) the type of power structure they create – a dual or a single village power 
structure.  
The implementation of intra-Party democratic reforms might affect the 
provision of local public goods and the development of local democracy in different 
ways and through different channels. As previously pointed out, there is case study 
evidence showing that they may help to improve public goods provision by (i) 
increasing Party accountability (e.g., intra-Party elections) (Li 1999) or by (ii) 
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reducing administrative expenses in village budgets (e.g., concurrent office-holding) 
(Guo and Bernstein 2004). At the same time, there are also concerns that they may 
undermine village democracy by (i) reinforcing the power of village Party branches 
(e.g., intra-Party elections) (Sun et al. 2013) or by (ii) eliminating village committees 
as a separate and relatively independent political institution (e.g., concurrent office-
holding) (He 2007; O’Brien and Han 2009; Schubert and Ahlers 2012a). The main 
underlying question is whether intra-Party democratic reforms have the potential of 
opening Party institutions to popular participation (Chan 1998), or, rather, the 
objective of subjecting government institutions (and those they represent) to greater 
Party control (O’Brien and Han 2009). This might depend on the type of reform 
implemented and the way it is implemented. 
In this respect, some studies argue that the introduction of elections for village 
Party branches may be more likely to improve public goods provision and less likely 
to undermine village democracy than concurrent office-holding (“yijiantiao” or “two 
posts on one shoulder”), mainly because it does not lead to a concentration of power 
in one person’s hands (Li 1999; Schubert and Ahlers 2012a; Sun et al. 2013). Other 
studies (Guo and Bernstein 2004), however, argue that, by requiring village Party 
secretaries to run in elections – whether intra-Party elections or village committee 
elections in the case of concurrent office-holding – both types of reforms are equally 
likely to give community members the opportunity to hold village Party secretaries 
accountable48 for their performance, as long as elections are free and fair. Hence, 
irrespective of the form that intra-Party democratic reforms take, the key issue is 
whether they are implemented in a way that makes village Party secretaries 
(electorally) accountable and, in particular, whether they prevent township Party 
committees from interfering in the (s)election of village Party secretaries (Guo and 
Bernstein 2004).  In line with this latter view, our basic hypothesis is that any of these 
reforms is more likely to improve the provision of public goods, and less likely to 
undermine village-level democracy, if village Party secretaries are elected either by 
village Party members or by all villagers (i.e., intra-Party or popular election), 
                                                 
48 Research conducted by Guo and Bernstein (2004: 272) on the adoption of the yijiantiao model in 
Guangdong province found that, “when elections were free and fair, the requirement that a Party 
secretary had to win the electoral competition for village committee office probably did serve as an 
incentive for him/her to be more responsive to the interests of the constituents”.  
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without undue interference from township officials in the candidate nomination 
process, a stage of the electoral process which is particularly vulnerable to 
manipulation.  
 
 
3.3.3 Bureaucratic Control  
 
Defined as “a system of targets and incentives that control local cadres and 
influence which policies and laws they implement” (Birney 2014: 56), the cadre 
responsibility system is a central component of China’s political system. It has 
provided the Party with a means to monitor and influence the behaviour of local 
officials and, ultimately, to maintain (political) control over the process of 
(economic) decentralization (Whiting 2001, 2006; Edin 2003ab; Tsui and Wang 
2004; Heimer 2006; Kennedy 2007b; Tsai 2007b; Landry 2008; Gao 2009; Ong 
2012; Birney 2014). There is agreement in the literature, however, that its 
implementation has resulted in neither better service provision (Tsai 2007), nor more 
democratic governance in rural areas (Kennedy 2007b; Sun et al. 2013; Birney 2014). 
This has been attributed to two main causes: the relatively low priority of these issues 
on the central policy agenda and the ineffectiveness of the cadre responsibility system 
as a mechanism of political accountability (Kennedy 2007b; Tsai 2007b; Birney 
2014). 
The first possible reason why the cadre responsibility system has not had a 
positive impact on the functioning of village democratic institutions and the 
provision of village public goods has to do with what grassroots cadres are held 
accountable for by higher-level governments. Under this system, Party committees 
at each level of the administrative hierarchy (e.g., county Party committee) use 
performance contracts to assign tasks and objectives to the top officials at the next 
lower level (e.g., township head and township Party secretary) and to establish a 
direct link between their subordinates’ performance, on the one hand, and their salary 
and promotion, on the other. Yet not all targets and tasks are equally important or 
given the same priority: they are hierarchically ranked according to their importance 
from “priority targets with veto power” and “hard targets” to “soft targets” (Ong 
2012: 465).  
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One of the main shortcomings of the cadre responsibility system is that it 
provides lower-level officials with both the incentive and the opportunity to ignore 
or even hinder the implementation of low-priority policies (i.e., “soft targets”). This 
is for three reasons. First, under the cadre responsibility system, what “makes or 
breaks” a career within the local Party-state is the fulfilment of the high-priority tasks 
included in performance contracts (i.e., “priority” and “hard” targets) (Ong 2012: 
465). Second, while local officials are required and expected to implement high-
priority policies (i.e., “priority” and “hard” targets), they are allowed to “adjust” the 
implementation of low-priority tasks (i.e., “soft” targets) to that end (Birney 2014: 
55). And, third, high- and low-priority policies often compete for government 
resources and/or have conflicting goals (Whiting 2006; Birney 2014).  
One of the consequences is that the cadre responsibility system has failed to 
create incentives for township and village officials to improve the quality of service 
provision (Tsai 2007b) and local democracy (O’Brien and Li 1999; Kennedy 2007b; 
Sun et al. 2013; Birney 2014). Under the cadre responsibility system, lower-level 
officials can safely ignore demands from higher-level officials to invest more in 
public goods or to interfere less in village politics. This is because performance 
contracts with higher-level officials do not prioritize and, in some cases, do not even 
include goals related to the delivery of public goods or the promotion of grassroots 
democracy (O’Brien and Li 1999; Whiting 2001, 2006; Edin 2003ab; Kennedy 
2007b; Tsai 2007b; Birney 2014). For instance, research conducted by Ong (2012) 
in Zhejiang, Shandong and Hebei provinces (see Table 3.4) shows how township 
officials are required by county Party leaders to focus their efforts and resources on 
implementing the one-child policy (“priority target”), preserving social stability 
(“priority target”), generating fiscal revenues (“hard target”), or promoting rural 
industry (“hard target”), rather than on improving education and healthcare provision 
or implementing the Organic Law of Village Committees. 
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Table 3.4: Cadre-Evaluation Criteria in Three Townships  
 
 Township A Township B Township D 
Province Zhejiang Shandong Hebei 
Basic economic indicators 
Income per capita 
(Yuan) 
7079 5000 2800 
GDP ratio 
Primary (%) 
Secondary (%) 
Tertiary (%) 
21.4 
50.6 
28.0 
35.0 
48.0 
17.0 
40.5 
18.0 
41.5 
Cadre-evaluation criteria 
Priority targets 
with veto power 
 Population 
control 
 Social stability 
 Petition cases 
 Population 
control 
 Workplace safety 
 Population 
control 
 Social stability 
 Petition cases 
Hard targets 
 Fiscal revenue 
 Industrial 
production 
 Amount of 
investment 
attracted 
 Number of large 
industrial 
enterprises 
 Number of 
industrial parks 
 Fiscal revenue 
 Industrial 
production 
 Amount of 
investment 
attracted 
 
 Fiscal revenue 
 Industrial 
production 
 Farmers’ 
income 
 
Soft targets 
 Farmers’ income 
 Education and 
healthcare 
provision 
 Grassroots 
organization 
development 
 Cultural and 
social 
development 
 Size of private 
economy 
 Farmers’ income 
 Education and 
healthcare 
provision 
 Social stability 
 Petition cases 
 Grassroots 
organization 
development 
 Cultural and 
social 
development 
 Amount of 
investment 
attracted 
 Agricultural 
development 
 Forestry 
conservation 
 Cultural and 
social 
development 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Ong (2012: 466). 
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Another of the consequences of the implementation of the cadre responsibility 
system is that it actually creates perverse incentives for lower-level officials to under-
invest in local public goods and to thwart local democratic reforms (i.e., low-priority 
policies), albeit for different reasons. A first problem is that performance contracts 
or, rather, the way in which they are used allows and encourages the diversion of 
fiscal and human resources away from rural service provision in various ways. One 
way is by focusing local officials’ attention on “revenue generation” and “short-term 
economic growth” (Whiting 2006: 7). Years ago, there was little to discourage 
grassroots cadres from investing in the development of collective enterprises (Tsai 
2007b: 46). And now there is little to discourage them from investing in the 
development of industrial parks and development zones (Whiting 2011), despite 
questions then and now about the effectiveness and sustainability of these local 
development strategies, especially in poor regions (e.g., Park et al. 1996; Liu et al. 
2008). Another way in which the cadre responsibility system diverts resources away 
from service provision is by requiring village officials to spend much of their budget 
and time on completing unpopular “state tasks”, such as implementing the one-child 
policy, instead of carrying out “community tasks”, such as providing public services 
or mediating disputes among village residents (O’Brien and Li 1999; Tsui and Wang 
2004; Tan and Xin 2007; Kung et al. 2009; Smith 2010). For instance, in their survey 
of more than 1,000 villagers in a dozen villages of Anhui province, Tan and Xin 
(2007: 589-590) found that a majority of them believe that village cadres prioritize 
carrying out the tasks handed down by the township government, rather than 
providing public services to their communities. In sum, whether by inducing local 
governments to behave as revenue maximizers (e.g., Whiting 2006) or as service 
providers for county and township leaders (e.g., Smith 2010), the use of performance 
contracts to hold grassroots cadres accountable for implementing high-priority 
policies has reduced the resources available for meeting service demands from 
villagers, while increasing spending on revenue-generating activities and 
administrative costs.  
 A second problem related to the perverse incentives embedded in the cadre 
responsibility system is not that low- and high-priority policies compete for 
resources, but rather that they have competing or conflicting objectives (Gao 2009; 
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Whiting 2011; Birney 2014). The goals of low-priority policies, such as the 
implementation of village democratic reforms, may either conflict with the goals of 
policies designated as high priority or with the strategies used to implement them. 
For instance, there is a clear conflict between the goal of promoting village 
democracy and the growing reliance of grassroots governments on illegal land grabs 
to generate tax and non-tax revenues (e.g., Birney 2014). More fundamentally, by 
removing the power of township officials to appoint and dismiss village officials (i.e., 
village committee head and members), village democratic reforms have weakened 
their authority over their former “subordinates” – the very same authority that they 
need to elicit their cooperation in meeting the high-priority targets set by county 
leaders in their performance contracts, especially when achieving such targets 
requires or justifies going against the interests of villagers (e.g., implementation of 
the one-child policy, expropriation of land, etc.)  (e.g., Guo and Bernstein 2004; 
Martinez-Bravo et al. 2011; Sun et al. 2013).  
To sum up, one argument about why the use of performance contracts by 
higher-level Party officials has not had a positive impact on village governance and 
rural service provision is because these are not seen as high-priority policy areas by 
the central government. And, at the same time, under the cadre responsibility system, 
lower-level officials have an incentive to avoid the implementation of policies that 
fall in this category. From this perspective, one of the main limitations of China’s 
“rule of mandates system” is that it creates “a precise but narrow space of 
accountability” (Birney 2014: 56): under the cadre responsibility system, local 
officials can be held accountable for enforcing policies that rank high on the central 
government agenda - nothing more, nothing less.  
A different argument for why the cadre responsibility system has failed to 
make grassroots officials accountable for the provision of local services and the 
implementation of local democratic reforms is that the centre is unable to elicit 
compliance from its local agents on these and other issues (e.g., Bernstein and Lü 
2003; Chen 2007; Tsai 2007b). Some studies argue that, during much of the reform 
period, there has been a problem of “inadequate state capacity” (Bernstein and Lu 
2003: 84) that has mainly resulted from a “vertical deconcentration of power”. The 
incentive and monitoring mechanisms intended to reduce agency problems between 
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different levels of the Party-state have been weakened by the process of fiscal and 
administrative decentralization that has taken place since the early 1980s (Bernstein 
and Lü 2003; Chen 2007; Tsai 2007b).  
First, by requiring each level of the Party-state to finance its own 
expenditures, including their cadres’ salaries, fiscal decentralization reforms have 
eliminated the possibility of using intergovernmental transfers, not only as a 
mechanism of fiscal redistribution, but also as a mechanism of political control (Tsai 
2007b: 232-234). Second, administrative decentralization reforms have weakened 
the bureaucratic monitoring system. The cadre responsibility system does not provide 
the central government with an effective mechanism to obtain reliable and accurate 
information about what goes on at the grassroots level (Wedeman 2001; Tsai 2007b). 
Information about the activities and performance of village and township 
governments is subject to distortion: first, because they report on themselves; second, 
because this information is not directly reported to the central government, but 
instead passes from one level of government to the next before it reaches Beijing; 
and, third, because higher-level officials have incentives to turn a blind eye to 
misreporting by lower-level officials, in so far as it helps them meet their own 
performance targets, at least on paper if not in practice (Tsai 2007b: 238-243)49. 
Hence, from this perspective, local governance problems have their origin in a weak 
central government that lacks the monitoring and incentive mechanisms required to 
hold rural governments to account. 
This second argument – that the ineffectiveness of the cadre responsibility 
system is indicative more of a lack of government capacity than of a lack of 
government will - seems less compelling today than years ago. The main reason is 
that it fails to take account of the changes that have taken place in the fiscal and 
administrative structures of the state. Reforms aimed at (re-)centralizing fiscal 
resources and administrative control - such as the introduction of the tax-sharing 
system or the adoption of the “salaries-from-above” and “cadre-in-residence” 
policies – should have provided higher-level governments and, ultimately, the central 
                                                 
49 The bureaucracies created to monitor and audit local governments - the General Auditing 
Administration and the Ministry of Supervision - have been decentralized, which has led to the 
paradoxical situation in which their staff at local levels are appointed and paid by the very same local 
government agencies they are required to supervise (Huang 1996; Tsai 2007b; Chien 2010). 
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government with new means to incentivize and monitor the performance of rural 
officials, especially at the township and village levels (Oi et al. 2012). Not only do 
village governments depend heavily on transfers under the new intergovernmental 
fiscal system, but also the leading village officials are now paid and more closely 
monitored by township and county governments. There is anecdotal evidence that 
village officials complain about the presence of “sent-down cadres” in their villages 
as an “infringement of the village’s sphere of self-governance” (Smith 2010: 614), 
and that they fear having their salaries withheld by township cadres for not 
implementing some of their mandates or directives (Oi et al. 2012: 257). Other 
reforms adopted by the central government in order to recruit and maintain “capable” 
village officials - such as increasing their salaries and improving their promotion 
opportunities – (Kung et al. 2009: 74) should also have given higher-level officials 
greater leverage over village cadres. The fact that village officials were rarely 
promoted to higher levels was seen as one of the reasons for the limited effectiveness 
of the cadre responsibility system at the village level (Chen 2007: 157; Tsai 2007b: 
235)50. However, the fact that the central government now encourages “selecting 
civil servants from among village cadres” (Kung et al. 2009: 74) implies that this 
might no longer be the case. 
Overall, this discussion suggests that agency problems between the centre and 
the localities may be less severe now than in the recent past, if only because higher 
levels have more – and seemingly more effective - means to elicit compliance from 
lower levels. Consequently, the question may not be so much whether but, rather, 
how the cadre responsibility system shapes the behaviour of township and village 
officials. This brings us back to the question with which we started: what are 
grassroots officials held accountable for? Are township officials held to account by 
their Party superiors for promoting village democratic reforms? Do they hold village 
officials accountable for investing in public goods?  
 
                                                 
50 Until recently, a regulation passed in 1996 stipulating that “rural civil servants (i.e., government 
officials) must not be selected directly from among incumbent village cadres” limited the career 
advancement opportunities for village cadres (Chen 2007: 157). 
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Based on the literature, we hypothesize that, while the cadre responsibility 
system may or may not have a positive impact on village public goods provision, it 
is unlikely to exert a positive effect on the implementation of village democratic 
reforms. Improving rural infrastructure and services has moved up on the policy 
agenda, especially after Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao came to power. Since 2003, every 
“Number One Central Document”51 has focused on rural issues, including rural 
service provision (World Bank 2007; Michelson 2012). Also since 2006, improving 
rural infrastructure and services has been a core component of “the New Socialist 
Countryside” programme (World Bank 2007; Schubert and Ahlers 2011, 2012b). 
However, recent studies suggest that after the rural tax reform, performance contracts 
with village officials still do not prioritize public goods provision (Chen 2015). On 
the other hand, the central government has not shown a strong commitment to push 
forward the implementation of village democratic reforms in recent years. Instead, it 
has increasingly emphasized the role of the cadre responsibility system and intra-
Party democratic reforms in increasing the accountability of rural officials to higher-
level officials and grassroots Party members (Whiting 2006; Chan 2007).  
 
 
3.4 Variables, Econometric Model and Estimation Method 
 
To address our research questions, we develop a two-equation simultaneous 
equation model of “village democracy” and “village public goods provision” and 
estimate it using three-stage least squares (3SLS). “Village democracy” is defined as 
a governance system in which village committees are elected in (reasonably) free and 
fair elections, and have the power to (co-)manage local affairs (with village Party 
branches). “Village public goods provision” refers to capital and current spending on 
infrastructure by village governments. 
As discussed in section 1.4, our choice of econometric model is driven by two 
main considerations. The first one is the likely reverse causality between village 
democracy and village public goods provision. In villages governed by 
                                                 
51 This is a key policy document issued by the State Council and the Party Central Committee at the 
beginning of each year to outline the priorities of the central government. 
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democratically elected village committees, village heads might have stronger 
incentives to invest in infrastructure in order to remain in office, while villagers might 
have stronger incentives to participate in village politics (e.g., village committee 
elections, village representative assemblies, etc.) in order to influence and control 
how public funds are spent and what public goods are provided52. Village democracy 
might affect and be affected by village public goods provision.  
A second consideration is that this model also allows us to include measures 
of the implementation of intra-Party elections and the cadre responsibility system as 
exogenous variables in each of the equations and to examine their impact on village-
level democratization and public goods provision. The assumption that these 
variables are exogenous to the system seems reasonable, given that decisions 
regarding both the method for (s)electing village Party secretaries, as well the terms 
of their performance contracts are made by county and township leaders.  
Additionally, we estimate a two-equation simultaneous equation system, in 
which “village democracy” and “government-financed investment” are the 
endogenous variables. In this case, we use the share of village investment financed 
by higher-level governments as the main dependent variable. This allows us to 
explore two questions: (i) whether county and township Party committees target 
resources to villages where the Party branch remains the dominant governing body; 
and (ii) whether this tends to undermine the demand for and implementation of 
grassroots democratic reforms. 
Finally, to estimate both models, we use three-stage least squares for two 
reasons: (i) using system estimation methods is more efficient than using single-
equation estimation methods; and (ii) 3SLS is the most commonly used system 
estimation method (Wooldridge 2006: 567). In the remainder of the section, we 
define the key variables included in the main model and provide descriptive statistics 
                                                 
52 There is evidence that elected and appointed village leaders face different incentives to improve 
public goods provision: investing in roads, irrigation and schools increases the probability of being 
re-elected, but not of being re-appointed (Luo et al. 2010: 678-680). Likewise, there is evidence that 
villagers in different localities face different incentives to participate in elections. According to He 
(2007: 81-84), the “value” of elections is one of the most important determinants of voter turnout: in 
villages where elections have not helped to reduced corruption and to improve service delivery 
participation levels are significantly lower. 
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of the main variables. We also explain how we address the identification problem in 
order to be able to estimate the two-equation models by 3SLS. 
 
 
3.4.1 Village Democracy and Village Public Goods Provision 
 
The first dependent variable in the model is “village public goods provision”, 
which refers to village spending on infrastructure. As can be seen in Table 3.5, there 
is great variation among the villages in the sample in terms of the level of funds 
allocated to the provision of basic infrastructures, such as roads, irrigation and 
drinking water systems or school buildings. Per capita spending on infrastructure 
(2003-04) varied from RMB 0 to RMB 1,374, with an average of RMB 134.85 and 
a standard deviation of RMB 208.45. Villages in Sichuan recorded the highest level 
of infrastructure spending (193.21 yuan per capita), and villages in Hebei the lowest 
(68.67 yuan per capita) during 2003-04.  
 
Table 3.5: Variation in village government expenditures on infrastructure (in yuan)  
 
 
Province 
Per capita 
expenditure on 
infrastructure 
construction 
Per capita 
expenditure on 
infrastructure 
maintenance 
Per capita expenditure on 
infrastructure construction and 
maintenance (2003-04) 
Mean  Mean Mean Std. Dev. 
Jiangsu 156.86 18.26 175.12 185.10 
Sichuan 188.16   5.05 193.21 150.59 
Shaanxi 112.61    3.93 116.54 320.26 
Jilin 81.72     9.15 90.87 107.66 
Hebei 66.04    2.62 68.66 111.60 
Fujian 144.48    17.47 161.95 286.30 
Sample 125.27 9.58 134.85 208.45  
 
Source: CCAP Village Survey (2005) 
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The measure of village public goods provision used in the main model is the 
log of per capita village government expenditure on infrastructure in 2003-04. This 
approach to measuring village public goods provision is consistent with recent 
findings in the literature. They suggest that, in order to explain inter-village 
differences in public goods investment, we need to distinguish between “subsidized 
investments” and “own investments”, because “each source of investment has its own 
determinants” (Zhang et al. 2007: 126-131). The characteristics of villages that make 
them more likely to receive investments from higher-level governments are not 
necessarily the same as those that make them more willing and able to invest in 
themselves. For instance, while higher-level governments may not necessarily target 
more investment to more democratic villages, more democratic villages may be able 
to mobilize more resources for infrastructure projects from villagers, due to the 
greater accountability and legitimacy of their leaders. Actually, evidence from the 
irrigation sector shows that in communities where elected village committees, rather 
than townships or village Party branches, have decision-making authority over 
irrigation matters, there are higher levels of (cash and labour) contributions from 
farmers to build or repair their irrigation systems, because “they are more confident 
that they will be able to capture the benefits of their investments” (Boyle et al. 2014: 
15). Using a measure of village public goods provision that captures the share of 
spending over which villages have effective control or full discretion might better 
reflect inter-village differences in the quality of their governance systems and in the 
accountability (or lack thereof) of their leaders. What we want to find out is whether 
democratically elected village committees are more responsive to local needs in the 
allocation of village funds when given the power to govern. Additionally, we will 
explore the question of whether more democratic villages receive more or less 
transfers from higher-level governments.  
“Village democracy” is the second dependent variable in the model. As 
pointed out in section 3.3.1, a possible limitation of existing studies on the 
relationship between local democracy and local public goods provision in rural China 
is that they focus on the “process” dimension of democracy – the freedom and 
fairness of village committee elections -, while paying insufficient attention to its 
“substantive” dimension – the power of village committees to govern. We thus 
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propose an alternative measure of village democracy: a single variable that captures 
inter-village variation in: (i) the quality of village committee elections; and (ii) the 
decision-making power of elected village committees. We construct a variable, called 
“village democracy index” (0-5), which is the product of: (i) an “election quality 
index” measuring the democratic quality of village committee elections (0-5); and 
(ii) a “power index” measuring the distribution of political power in the village (0-
1). This measure of grassroots democracy, the village democracy index, allows us to 
quantify inter-village variation in the degree of political decentralization. 
Assessing the quality of “authoritarian elections” (Landry et al. 2010) poses 
significant analytical challenges. There is, however, agreement that the freedom and 
fairness of Chinese village committee elections can be evaluated on the basis of 
“whether voters are free and have real choices in nominating candidates and voting 
for their choices by secret ballots”, and “whether electoral rules and procedures are 
administered free of violation, interference and fraudulence by village election 
committees” (Tan and Xin 2007: 582). Taking this into account, we develop an 
“election quality index” which incorporates information on the three most critical 
aspects or stages of the electoral process: how election committees53 were formed – 
whether their members were selected by villagers (coded 1) or local officials (coded 
0); how candidates were nominated – whether they were directly nominated by voters 
in open primaries (i.e., haixuan or “sea elections” method) (coded 1) or through 
other procedures (coded 0); and how votes were cast – whether secretly (coded 1) or 
publicly (coded 0); whether in person (coded 1) or by proxy (coded 0); and whether 
at a polling station (coded 1) or at roving ballot boxes (coded 0). We create a 
dichotomous variable for each of these election rules and procedures, which takes on 
the value of 1 if the village reported that it was duly implemented in the last election, 
and the value of 0 otherwise. We then combine these five variables into an additive 
index, the election quality index, which measures the democratic quality of the 
processes by which election oversight committees were formed, candidates 
nominated, and ballots cast in each of the sample villages. The election quality index 
scores range between 0 and 5, with higher scores denoting freer and fairer elections, 
in which: (1) election committee members were selected by villagers; (2) candidates 
                                                 
53 Village election committees are responsible for organizing and overseeing the electoral process. 
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were directly nominated by voters through the haixuan system (i.e., open primaries); 
(3) secret voting booths were used; (4) proxy-voting was not allowed; and (5) roving 
ballot boxes were not used.  
While these electoral practices are widely regarded as a conditio sine qua non 
in order to reduce opportunities for electoral manipulation and corruption (e.g., voter 
coercion, ballot box stuffing, vote buying, etc.) the survey data shows that some of 
them are still relatively uncommon in a majority of villages (see Table 3.6). For 
instance, the percentage of villages that in their last election used secret voting booths 
and banned proxy voting was as low as 11 percent and 35 percent, respectively54. As 
can be seen in Table 3.6, of the 115 villages surveyed, only 2 conducted their last 
election in full accordance with these five basic electoral rules and procedures. This 
finding is in line with those of other recent studies (e.g., Tsai 2007b; Lu 2012) and 
reflects the poor governance of Chinese village committee elections more than fifteen 
years after the enactment of the 1998 Organic Law of Village Committees.  
 
Table 3.6: Distribution of villages by level of election quality 
Election 
Quality Index 
Score Score 
No. 
Villages 
Percent Province Mean Std. Dev. 
0 5 4.4 Jiangsu 2.84 1.21 
1 18 15.7 Sichuan 2.15 0.93 
2 30 26.1 Shaanxi 2 0.89 
3 35 30.4 Jilin 3.48 1.03 
4 25 21.7 Hebei 2.42 1.02 
5 2 1.7 Fujian 2.25 1.29 
Sample 115 100 Sample 2.55 1.17  
 
Source: CCAP Village Survey (2005) 
 
A more fundamental problem, however, might be that democratically elected 
village committees are as powerless now as they were in the late 1990s. In addition 
to the “election quality index”, we create a dichotomous variable, called “power 
                                                 
54 Villagers participated in the selection of village election committee members and of candidates in 
69 percent and 89 percent of the sample villages, respectively. 51 percent of the villages reported not 
having used roving ballot boxes in their last election. 
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index” that captures the nature of the village power structure and whether those who 
govern are subject to popular electoral control. In particular, this index takes the value 
of 1 when (i) villages have a dual power structure and the village committee (head) 
plays (at least) as important a role in determining the level and composition of village 
spending as the village party branch (secretary); or when (ii) villages have a unitary 
power structure – that is, the posts of village head and Party secretary have been 
merged (yijiantiao) – and the village leader was chosen through competitive village 
elections that had an open nomination process (i.e, the “haixuan” or sea-elections 
method). Alternatively, the village democracy index takes the value of 0 when (i) the 
village has a dual power structure but only the village Party branch (secretary) 
exercises authority over village finances and important village affairs; or (ii) the posts 
of village committee head and Party secretary have been merged but the village 
leader did not gain his/her position through “haixuan” elections, that is, s/he was not 
directly nominated and elected by all villagers55. 
Table 3.7 shows that in more than 80 percent of the sample villages there was 
a dual power structure, and in 50 percent all major decisions were made by the village 
Party branch (secretary) during the period of study. Around 27 percent of the villages 
were (co-)governed by village committees (with village Party branches). And only 
in 6 percent of them was the village committee head the main decision-maker in 
determining the use of village funds. Around 16 percent of the villages had 
introduced a new system of concurrent office-holding (i.e., yijiantiao)56. However, 
their leaders were not subject to the same degree of electoral control. In this respect, 
we argue that it is necessary to establish a distinction between those villages where 
                                                 
55 More specifically, the village democracy index takes on the value 1 if the village reported that: (a) 
the village committee is the leading governing body and has control over village finances; (b) the 
village committee head is the leading official and has control over village finances; (c) the village 
Party branch and the village committee share decision-making and implementation responsibilities 
and have an equally important say in the allocation of public funds; or (d) the posts of village 
committee head and village Party secretary are held by the same person (yijiantiao) and the village 
election followed the “haixuan” (sea-elections) method. Alternatively, it takes the value 0 if the village 
reported that: (a) the village committee is the leading governing body and has control over village 
finances; or (b) the posts of village committee head and Party secretary have been merged but the 
village leader did not gain his/her position through “haixuan” elections. 
 
56 As explained in section 3.3.2, this is typically done either by requiring the incumbent Party secretary 
– whether appointed by the township or elected by village Party members - to run in village committee 
elections or, if (s)he fails to be elected, by appointing the newly elected village committee head as the 
Party secretary. 
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the person serving concurrently as village head and Party secretary is required to pass 
the test of “haixuan” elections (11 percent of villages) – that is, village committee 
elections where villagers are entitled to freely nominate candidates - and those where 
s/he is not (5 percent). This is for three reasons. First, villagers who are not Party 
members can only hold village Party secretaries (electorally) accountable if the latter 
run for the position of village committee head (i.e., village committee elections). 
Second, it is more difficult for local officials to manipulate village committee 
elections when candidates are nominated by villagers (i.e., “haixuan” elections) than 
when they are nominated by the township government, the village Party branch or 
the incumbent village committee. Third, and relatedly, village committee elections 
are a (potentially) more effective mechanism of “downward” accountability than 
Party branch elections (He 2007). 
For these reasons, the reform of merging the positions of village committee 
head and village Party secretary is likely to negatively affect village governance 
unless the village leader is made (electorally) accountable to the entire local 
population – and not only to Party members - through haixuan elections.  
 
Table 3.7: Distribution of villages by type of power structure 
Type of Power Structure No. Villages Percent 
Power concentrated in village Party 
branch (secretary) 
58 50.0 
Yijiantiao (same person holds the 
positions of VC head and VPB 
secretary) – No “sea elections” 
(haixuan) 
6 5.3 
Yijiantiao (same person holds the 
positions of VC head and VPB 
secretary) – “Sea elections” 
(haixuan) 
13 11.4 
Power shared between village Party 
branch and village committee 
31 27.2 
Power concentrated in village 
committee (head) 
7 6.1 
 
Source: CCAP Village Survey (2005) 
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Reflecting the limited democratization of village governance, Table 3.8 shows 
that in the few villages where village committee elections were implemented in a 
reasonably free and fair manner, power has tended to remain concentrated in the 
hands of the village Party secretary. This confirms the concerns raised by O’Brien 
and Han (2009: 359) that “changes in the ‘exercise of power’ have not kept up with 
changes in the ‘access to power’”. The main reason is that village committees remain 
powerless even when – or especially when – they are democratically elected. 
 
Table 3.8: Quality of elections and power of elected 
village committees 
 
 
Election 
Quality Index 
Score 
No. 
Villages 
Less 
democratic 
power 
structure 
More 
democratic 
power 
structure 
0 5 2 3 
1 18 13 5 
2 30 19 11 
3 35 15 20 
4 25 12 13 
5 2 2 0 
 
Source: CCAP Village Survey (2005) 
 
 Finally, to quantify inter-village variation in the degree of political 
decentralization, we combine the “election quality index” and the “power index” into 
a single composite index, the “village democracy index”, which is calculated as the 
product of these two indices. Table 3.9 reports the mean and standard deviation of 
the values of the village democracy index in each of the sample provinces. It shows 
that the degree of political decentralization is low and varies considerably across 
villages and provinces: village democracy index scores range from 0 (58% of the 
villages) to 4 (11%), with a mean of 1.21. Villages in Jilin province provide the 
clearest example that the democratization of the village electoral process does not go 
hand in hand with the democratization of the village power structure: they have the 
highest “election quality” score (mean of 3.48) and one of the lowest “village 
democracy” scores (mean of 1.14), given that 67 percent of them are in fact not 
governed by popularly elected leaders. 
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Table 3.9: Village democracy index scores, by province 
Village 
Democracy Index 
Score 
No. 
Villages 
Percent Province Mean Std. Dev. 
0 66 57.39 Jiangsu 1.58 1.77 
1 5 4.35 Sichuan 0.75 1.25 
2 11 9.57 Shaanxi 0.88 1.20 
3 20 17.39 Jilin 1.14 1.71 
4 13 11.30 Hebei 1.63 1.61 
5 0 0 Fujian 1.25 1.52 
Sample 115 100 Sample 1.21 1.54 
 
Source: CCAP Village Survey (2005) 
 
 
 
3.4.2 The Cadre Responsibility System  
 
One of the main exogenous variables in the model is the cadre responsibility 
system, one of the main mechanisms of top-down control within the Party-state. We 
seek to assess its impact on village-level democracy and public goods provision. As 
discussed in section 3.3.3, county and township governments have now new means 
to influence and monitor the decisions and behaviour of (elected and unelected) 
village officials (e.g., “salaries-from-above” and “cadre-in-residence” policies): what 
they consider to be their priority tasks, how they divide them among themselves, and 
how they perform them. Hence, when examining the effects of the cadre 
responsibility system, the main question may not be so much whether, but how, it 
affects village governance structures and processes: whether, by increasing the 
influence of townships over village governance (i.e., who governs and how), it makes 
villages more or less democratically accountable to villagers, and village spending 
more or less responsive to public goods needs.  
Our measure of the cadre responsibility system therefore needs to capture the 
extent to which village governance is shaped by higher-level governments. With this 
objective, we create a variable called “policy mandates index”, which measures the 
extent (%) to which the five top-priority tasks performed by village governments 
correspond to mandates or directives from township governments. Although this 
measure of bureaucratic control is a rough one, it gives an indication of the degree of 
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subordination and (upward) accountability of villages to townships. As can be seen 
in Table 3.10, the mean value of the index in our sample of villages is 82%, with a 
standard deviation of 18%. This finding indicates that higher-level governments exert 
tight control over village governments and raises the question of whether higher-level 
officials and villagers hold grassroots officials accountable for the same things.  
 
Table 3.10: Policy mandates index scores, by province  
 
 
 
Province 
Policy Mandates Index (0-100) 
No. Villages Mean  
(%) 
Std. Deviation 
Jiangsu 19 85 15 
Sichuan 20 96 10 
Shaanxi 16 75 15 
Jilin 21 80 18 
Hebei 19 85 13 
Fujian 20 73 25 
Sample 115 82 18 
Source: CCAP Village Survey (2005) 
 
According to Kung et al. (2009), one of the effects of the cadre responsibility 
system is that village cadres “tend to give priority to state tasks first, seeing these as 
‘hard responsibilities’, and they put community needs last”. They find that village 
officials allocate most of their time to (in descending order): “enforcement of the 
family-planning policy”; “organizing community agricultural production”; 
“addressing community members’ disputes”; “tax collection”; “community 
building”; and “receiving upper-level inspectors” (Kung et al. 2009: 66).  County and 
township governments do not only influence how villages are governed, but also by 
whom they are governed. Findings by Sun et al. (2013) show that, the greater the 
dependence of township cadres on village officials to perform the tasks mandated by 
their county superiors, the lesser the likelihood that democratically elected village 
committees become the “locus of power” in villages. 
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3.4.3 Intra-Party Elections 
 
The last institutional variable included in the model is village Party branch 
elections. To date, there has been very little research on this type of elections. One 
of the exceptions is the study conducted by Sun et al. (2013), the first one to provide 
a comprehensive analysis of how village Party secretaries are (s)elected and what 
this means for the distribution of power between Party branches and village 
committees. Their findings suggest that a minority of villages (48 percent) have 
introduced direct elections for village Party branches, in which Party members can 
directly nominate and elect the village Party secretary. Furthermore, an even smaller 
percentage of villages (13 percent) has implemented the so-called “two-ballot 
system” (Li 1999) and allowed all village residents, regardless of party membership, 
to participate in the nomination of candidates for the position of Party secretary (Sun 
et al. 2013: 12-14). These findings suggest that village Party branch elections are 
largely a top-down, intra-party affair.  
The purpose of including this institutional variable in our model is to gain a 
preliminary understanding of how the new system of intra-Party elections might 
affect patterns of democratization and public goods spending at the village level. As 
pointed out by Alpermann (2010: 92), whether this reform can improve local 
governance may depend on whether it can effectively “break the hold of township 
party committees over village party secretary appointments”. Thus, following Sun et 
al. (2013: 12-13), we create a dummy variable “intra-Party election quality”, which 
captures the role of township Party officials in the (s)election of village Party 
secretaries. It takes the value 0 if the village Party secretary was selected by 
appointment, rather than by election, or if there was interference from the township 
in the electoral process, and the value 1 otherwise. Table 3.11 shows that, in 25 
percent of the sample villages, Party secretaries were not democratically elected by 
Party members, either because there was no election and their Party secretaries were 
still directly appointed by the township (12 percent of villages) or because the 
township interfered in the electoral process, mainly through the nomination of 
candidates (7 percent). Sun et al. (2013) have found that the holding of competitive 
elections for village Party branches weakens village democracy by legitimizing the 
concentration of power in the hands of village Party secretaries. To our knowledge, 
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no previous study has examined the impact of village Party branch elections on 
village public goods provision.  
 
Table 3.11: Township interference in the (s)election of village Party secretaries 
 
Direct interference by 
the township in the 
(s)election of the village 
Party secretary 
 
Total 
sample 
Jiangsu Sichuan Shaanxi Jilin Hebei Fujian 
Yes (%) 25 32 40 38 5 32 5 
No (%) 75 68 60 62 95 68 95 
No. of villages 115 19 20 16 21 19 20 
 
Source: CCAP Village Survey (2005) 
 
 
3.4.4 Control Variables  
 
To distinguish between the effects of institutional and non-institutional 
factors on village public goods provision, a number of economic, social, 
demographic and geographic variables are included in the model as controls. Our 
choice of control variables is based on the empirical literature on public goods 
provision in rural China (Zhang et al. 2004; Luo et al. 2007, 2010; Tsai 2007ab; 
Wang and Yao 2007; Sato 2008; Kung et al. 2009; Lu 2015). 
 First, we include a set of economic variables that capture inter-village 
variation in the level of economic development and the availability of resources for 
investing in public goods, namely: the log of per capita village government revenue; 
the log of per capita net income; the amount of per capita farmland (mu); the number 
of collective, private, and individual (getihu) enterprises; and the proportion of 
migrants in the village labour force. To avoid endogeneity bias, we use the 2000 
values of these variables.  
 Second, to control for the effects of social structure and social divisions on 
public goods provision, the model includes measures of lineage structure and inter-
lineage relations in the sample villages. A village’s clan structure is measured by the 
proportion of households belonging to the three largest surname groups57, that is, by 
                                                 
57 This is in line with Manion (2006). 
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the degree of surname concentration. The nature of inter-clan relations is measured 
by a dummy variable, called inter-lineage tension index, which equals zero if 
relations between clans within a village are cooperative, and one if they are 
conflictual. 
Finally, the model also controls for demographic and geographic differences 
among villages, including: the log of the village population; the proportion of village 
land that is flat; the share of cultivated land that is irrigated; the log of the distance 
from the township (km); and the provincial location (five provincial dummies 
excluding Jiangsu). 
These three sets of control variables might affect the demand and supply of 
local public goods, as well as the cost of their provision. Previous studies have found 
that villages with a higher per capita income (e.g., Luo et al. 2007, 2010) and with 
more collective enterprises and self-employed households (getihu) (e.g., Zhang et al. 
2004; Zhang et al. 2007; Luo et al. 2010) tend to invest more in public goods. This 
is in contrast to villages with a larger number of clan groups (e.g., Kung et al. 2009; 
Tsai 2007b) and out-migrants (e.g., Zhang et al. 2007; Luo et al. 2010), where there 
tends to be less investment. There is also evidence that villages with higher levels of 
revenue do not necessarily have higher levels of public goods spending (Tsai 2007b; 
Wang and Yao 2007), although this has been called into question by more recent 
studies (Kung et al. 2009). 
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3.4.5 Econometric Model and Estimation Method 
 
To test the hypotheses put forward in section 3.3, a simultaneous equations 
model (SEM) of “village democracy” and “village public goods provision” is 
developed and estimated by three-stage least squares (3SLS). Before estimating the 
two-equation system, we must solve the identification problem. If each of the 
equations contains all the (endogenous and exogenous) variables included in the 
system, the model will not be identified. A necessary condition for the identification 
of the model is that the number of exogenous variables excluded from each equation 
be (at least) as large as the number of endogenous variables included (e.g., Green 
1993; Wooldridge 2006; Gujarati and Porter 2010). Hence, the identification and 
estimation of a two-equation system requires imposing (at least) two exclusion 
restrictions. This raises the question of which variable(s) included in the model 
should be excluded from each of the equations.  
To identify the “village public goods provision” and “village democracy” 
equations, lagged measures of the quality of village committee elections (1998-2000) 
and per capita village government revenue (2000) are included in the model. At the 
same time, the lagged election variable is excluded from the public goods provision 
equation, and the lagged government revenue variable is in turn excluded from the 
village democracy equation. It is the exclusion of each of these variables from each 
of the equations that will enable us to identify and estimate their parameters. The 
assumption underlying our identification strategy is that the quality of village 
elections in the previous period might have a direct impact on the quality of village 
democracy in the current period, but only an indirect impact on village public goods 
provision, through its effects on village democracy. In the same way, it is assumed 
that village government revenue (lagged) might have a direct effect on local public 
goods spending, but only an indirect effect on village democracy via local public 
goods provision. To the extent that these assumptions hold, both equations satisfy the 
order condition for identification. To further improve the model, we include an 
additional exogenous variable, a one-period lag of voter turnout in village committee 
elections (1998-2000). This variable will be used in the first-stage regression (Table 
3.14) as an additional instrument for the endogenous variables and, in particular, for 
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the village democracy variable. It will thus not appear in the second-stage regression. 
Table 3.12 shows the model specification and hypotheses. 
 
Table 3.12: Village Democracy and Village Public Goods Provision: Main Model 
Specification and Hypotheses 
 
 Village public goods 
provision 
(Eq. 1) 
Village democracy 
(Eq. 2) 
Measure of village democracy 
 
 Village democracy index (0-5) 
 
 
+ 
 
n/a 
Measure of village public goods 
provision 
 
 Ln (per capita village 
government investment in public 
goods) 
 
 
n/a 
 
+ 
Measure of intra-Party democracy 
 
 Intra-Party election quality (0-1)  
 
 
+ 
 
+/- 
Measure of bureaucratic control 
 
 Policy Mandates Index (0-100%) 
 
 
+/- 
 
- 
 
Economic controls 
 
 Ln (per capita village government revenue) 
 No. collective enterprises 
 No. private enterprises 
 No. individual businesses (getihu) 
 Ln (per capita net income) 
 % migrants in village labour force 
 
Social controls 
 
 Percentage of households belonging to the three largest surname groups 
 Inter-lineage tension index (0-1) 
 
Demographic and geographic controls 
 
 Ln (village population) 
 Per capita arable land (mu) 
 Percentage of flat land 
 Percentage of irrigated land  
 Ln (distance to the town, km) 
 
Exogenous variables or instruments only included in the first-stage regression 
 Voter turnout in village committee elections (variable lagged one period) 
Exclusion restrictions 
 Election quality index (0-5) (variable lagged one period and excluded from Eq. 1) 
 Ln (per capita village government revenue) (variable lagged one period and excluded 
from Eq. 2) 
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3.5 Results and Findings 
 
Tables 3.13 and 3.14 present the results of the 3SLS estimation of the main 
two-equation system. The results in Table 3.14 show that, as hypothesized, there is a 
two-way relationship between local democracy and local public goods provision: the 
two variables are positively and significantly associated with each other. In 
communities governed by democratically elected village committees, village heads 
might have incentives to allocate more spending to public goods in order to increase 
their chances of re-election, while villagers might have incentives to participate in 
village politics in order to hold village committees accountable for the provision of 
public goods, given that they continue to be seen as having both the responsibility 
and capacity to meet local public goods needs58. Village democracy might thus affect, 
and be affected by, the role of village committees as public goods providers, through 
the channels of political accountability and participation.  
Our main hypothesis – that village committee elections increase the 
accountability of village spending to village residents, provided that (i) elections are 
relatively well implemented, and (ii) village committees are granted discretionary 
authority over the allocation of village funds – is empirically supported. The 
estimated coefficient on village democracy indicates that a one-unit increase in the 
village democracy index is associated with a 42% increase in village spending on 
infrastructure (see equation 1 in Table 3.14).  This implies that, by adopting a broader 
conceptualization of grassroots democracy – one that considers not only how village 
committees are elected, but also whether they have the power to govern - we can find 
an answer to the puzzle of why existing studies on village elections have come to 
such different conclusions about their effectiveness as an accountability mechanism, 
and to the question of why villages with better elections often fail to deliver better 
public goods and services. The answer (or part of it) lies in the local power structure: 
in most villages, village committees remain powerless. 
 
                                                 
58 Consistent with this, Hu (2005) has found that the democratic quality of village committee elections 
is positively associated with the level of electoral competition and participation.  
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The results in Table 3.14 also show that the cadre responsibility system and 
intra-Party elections - have vastly different effects on village democracy and public 
goods provision. Our hypotheses on the impact of the cadre responsibility system are 
partly supported (see Tables 3.9 and 3.14). As hypothesized, the degree of control 
exercised by higher levels of the Party-state over village governments is negatively 
associated with the degree of village democracy (equation 2). At the same time, 
tighter bureaucratic control over village officials is not significantly associated with 
higher village spending on infrastructure (equation 1). These results indicate that 
village governments that are less autonomous from and more accountable to higher 
levels of the Party-state are less likely to be run by democratically elected village 
committees and, at the same time, are not any more likely to allocate more resources 
to local public goods provision. This suggests that, under the cadre responsibility 
system, neither are township cadres held accountable for promoting village 
democracy, nor are village officials held accountable for providing infrastructure. 
Indeed, by increasing the influence and control of township Party committees over 
village governance (i.e., who governs and how), the cadre responsibility system may 
have the (unintended) effect of making village governing bodies less 
(democratically) accountable to villagers, and village spending less responsive to 
public goods needs. These findings are consistent with previous research showing 
that bureaucratic institutions of accountability fail to provide “positive” incentives 
for village officials to use available funds to improve community infrastructure (Tsai 
2007b), while creating “perverse” incentives for Party cadres at various levels to 
resist the implementation of democratic reforms, either by interfering in village 
elections (Birney 2014) or by denying village committees the authority needed to 
govern (Sun et al. 2013).  
In contrast to the cadre responsibility system, we find that the election of 
village Party secretaries by village Party members has a significant positive impact 
on village public goods investment (first equation) and, at the same time, does not 
have a significant negative impact on village democracy (second equation). The 
results thus support the hypothesis that intra-Party elections can make village Party 
organizations more responsive to demands for local public goods, by creating a new 
relationship of accountability between village Party members and Party secretaries. 
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On the other hand, our results do not confirm those of Sun et al. (2013), who argue 
that intra-Party elections have a negative impact on the development of village 
democracy. This discrepancy suggests that further research is needed to determine 
whether, and under which conditions, intra-Party democracy can complement, rather 
than undermine, village-level democracy. 
In addition to institutional factors, economic, social and demographic factors 
also explain differences among villages in terms of how much they invest in 
infrastructure. As can be seen in Table 3.14, the control variables included in the 
model behave largely as expected. Like previous studies (Tsai 2007b; Wang and Yao 
2007), we find that inter-village variation in government revenue does not explain 
variation in public goods investment across villages. This can be interpreted as 
evidence of the weak accountability of village governments to villagers, who have 
“a strong preference for spending on public infrastructure”, as research by Luo et al. 
(2010: 666) has shown59. 
Also consistent with previous research are the findings that out-migration is 
negatively related to village public goods investment (e.g., Luo et al. 2010), while 
economic development - as measured by the level of per capita income - is positively 
associated with it (Zhang et al. 2004; Luo et al. 2007; Zhang et al. 2007). This latter 
finding might reflect the increased reliance of village governments on (voluntary) 
contributions from local residents and businesses for the construction and 
maintenance of infrastructure, especially after the implementation of the tax-for-fee 
reform (Tsai 2011: 51-54). This might be particularly the case in the richer ones, 
where there is greater demand and availability of resources for public goods 
provision.  
Regarding the impact of social and demographic factors, the results in Table 
3.14 show that in villages with a more homogenous social structure, where a majority 
of the population belongs to the same clan(s), more resources are allocated to the 
provision of public goods. This finding supports previous studies showing that 
villages where a “sizeable” proportion of the population shares the same surname 
                                                 
59 Eighty percent of the villagers surveyed stated that they were “dissatisfied with the current level of 
infrastructure” and ninety percent of them expressed a strong preference for village governments to 
spend more on infrastructure, including roads, drinking water, irrigation, schools and clinics (Luo et 
al. 2010: 666). 
142 
 
tend to invest more in infrastructure (Kung et al. 2009: 69-73), while villages with 
multiple clans or lineages tend to invest less, and are less likely to have paved roads, 
running water and new school buildings (Tsai 2007b: 158-164). One of the 
mechanisms by which ethnic heterogeneity, in general, and clan diversity, in 
particular, may undermine public goods provision is the inability of members of 
(ethnically) heterogeneous communities to hold their leaders accountable for the 
misallocation of public funds, whether through the use of political institutions (e.g., 
Keefer and Khemani 2005) or social sanctions (e.g., Tsai 2007b).  
Finally, we find, like Zhang et al. (2004), that the size of the population is 
negatively related to the level of (per capita) public goods spending: the per capita 
cost of infrastructure provision declines with the number of village residents. At the 
same time, population size is positively related to village democracy. A possible 
reason is that village committee elections are more likely to be monitored by the local 
offices of the Ministry of Civil Affairs and are, therefore, more likely to be better 
implemented60 in larger villages. 
Three main conclusions can be drawn from the results presented above. First, 
differences among villages in their spending on infrastructure mainly reflect 
differences in their (formal) governing structures and processes, as well as in their 
levels of economic development and social capital. Second, democratic institutions 
– whether in villages or within Party organizations – appear to be more effective than 
bureaucratic institutions in increasing the accountability of village officials for 
building and maintaining basic infrastructure in their communities. And, last but not 
least, bureaucratic and democratic institutions of accountability (i.e., the cadre 
responsibility system and village democracy) seem to conflict with each other.  
One of the most significant findings is that variation in the degree of political 
decentralization or democratization at the village level is positively associated with 
variation in the level of investment in infrastructure made by village-level 
governments. This raises the question of whether it is also associated with inter-
village variation in the level of investment received from higher-level governments 
and in what way. As discussed in section 3.4.1, the distinction made by Zhang et al. 
                                                 
60 In line with this interpretation, research conducted by Hu (2005) reveals that the presence of officials 
from the County Bureau of Civil Administration enhances participation in, and the democratic quality 
of, village committee elections. 
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(2007: 126-131) between “own investments” and “subsidized investments” in 
village-level infrastructure is a crucial one, given that different types of investment 
might be determined by different factors. While the focus of this chapter was on 
examining how village governance affects (and is affected by) the allocation of 
spending by village leaders (i.e., determinants of decentralized spending), an 
exploratory analysis of what determines the allocation of (capital) grants by higher-
level governments to villages (i.e., determinants of centralized spending) can provide 
further evidence on whether, and under which conditions, local democratic reforms 
matter for rural public goods provision.  
Following Zhang et al. (2007), we run an additional regression using as 
dependent variable the share of “subsidized” investment in total infrastructure 
investment (2003-04). The regression results are reported in Table 3.15. They suggest 
that, the distribution of earmarked grants among village governments is not only 
determined by economic or social considerations, but also by political factors: county 
and township governments tend to allocate a smaller share of available grant funds 
to villages governed by democratically elected village committees. This finding 
seems consistent with case study evidence of political targeting of fiscal transfers in 
Shaanxi and Zhejiang provinces. In their study of how county governments allocate 
grants to villages for infrastructure projects under the “new socialist countryside” 
program, Ahlers and Schubert (2009: 55) come to the conclusion that, in addition to 
village development indicators, “funding decisions also depend in part on the degree 
of “peaceful” cooperation within a village (between the village and party 
committees), which ensures smooth project implementation on the ground, and on 
the quality of communication between the cadres bureaucracies at the village, 
township and county levels (…)”. Thus, while the transfer system may be being used 
as a mechanism of fiscal redistribution, it may also be being used as a mechanism of 
political control.  
The fact that earmarked grants are allocated on an ad-hoc, discretionary basis 
makes them a useful instrument for targeting resources to politically favored villages, 
regardless of fiscal capacity or expenditure needs considerations. The political 
targeting of grants enables county and township Party committees to “reward” or 
“punish” villages on the basis of whether their village committees and villagers 
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acquiesce to or challenge the way power has traditionally been distributed and 
exercised in their jurisdictions. If this interpretation is correct, these results suggest 
that, not only bureaucratic institutions (i.e., the cadre responsibility system) but also 
fiscal institutions (i.e., the transfer system) may negatively affect the development 
and functioning of local democratic institutions. Paradoxically, those villages where 
more progress has been achieved in creating a system of checks and balances that 
prevents the concentration of power in institutions or individuals that are neither 
elected by nor accountable to all villagers are also the ones that are less likely to be 
fiscally supported by higher-level governments in their efforts to provide local public 
goods.  
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Table 3.13: Results of the first-stage regression (main model) 
 
 
Ln (per capita village govt. 
investment in public goods) Democracy quality index 
Intra-Party election quality 0.773 (2.14)** 0.239 (0.71)    
Policy mandates index -0.005 (-0.50)    -0.032 (-3.67)***    
Ln (p.c. village govt. revenue in 
2000) 0.293 (2.15)**    0.061 (0.47)    
No. of collective enterprises (2000) -0.002 (0.01)    -0.362 (-1.19)    
No. of private enterprises (2000) 0.014 (0.45)    -0.014 (-0.47)    
No. of individual businesses (getihu) 
(2000) 0.004 (1.09)    0.004 (1.12)       
Ln (per capita net income in 2000) 0.419 (1.08)  -0.241 (-0.66)        
Per capita arable land (2000) -3.170 (-1.57)    -2.070 (-1.10)   
% of migrants in village labour force 
(2000) -0.020 (-2.34)**    -0.007 (-0.85)    
% of households belonging to 3 
largest surname groups 0.016 (2.54)*** 0.011 (1.78)* 
Inter-lineage tension -1.016 (-0.83)    -2.925 (-2.54)***    
Ln (village population) -0.629 (-1.90)* 0.101 (0.33)    
% of flat land  0.005 (0.98)    0.004 (0.73) 
% of irrigated land  0.538 (1.02) 0.593 (1.20) 
Ln (distance to the town) 0.207 (0.98)    0.051 (0.26)    
Election Procedural Quality (2000) -0.051 (-0.36)    0.452 (3.43)***    
Voter turnout rate (2000) 0.799 (1.54)    1.501 (3.09)***    
Constant 2.9847 (0.82)    2.097 (0.61)    
Provincial dummies Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.46 0.39 
F-test [p-value] 3.39 [0.0000] 2.54 [0.0011] 
Observations 111 111 
Note: Figures in parentheses are absolute values of t-statistics  
* Significant at the 10% level 
** Idem, 5% 
*** Idem, 1% 
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Table 3.14: 3SLS estimates of the relationship between village democracy and village-
financed investment (main model)  
 
 
Ln (per capita village govt. 
investment in public goods) Village democracy index 
Ln (per capita village govt. 
investment in public goods)  1.064 (2.85)***    
Village democracy index 0.423 (2.12)**     
Intra-Party election quality 0.555 (1.74)*   -0.514 (-1.21)       
Policy mandates index 0.013 (1.19)    -0.029 (-3.12)***    
Ln (per capita village govt. revenue 
(2000) 0.109 (1.00)     
Election Procedural Quality (2000)  0.302 (2.34)**    
No. of collective enterprises (2000) 0.229 (0.76)    -0.443 (-1.37)    
No. of private enterprises (2000) 0.015 (0.54)    -0.030 (-0.92)    
No. of individual businesses 
(getihu) (2000)  0.002 (0.72)    -0.001 (-0.33)  
Ln (per capita net income in 2000) 0.684 (2.06)**  -0.782 (-1.66)*    
Per capita arable land (2000) -1.764 (-0.93)    0.875 (0.36)    
% of migrants in village labour 
force (2000) -0.016 (-2.03)**    0.012 (1.01)    
% of households belonging to 3 
largest surname groups 0.011 (1.87)*    -0.007 (-0.91)    
Inter-lineage tension  0.415 (0.35)    -1.867 (-1.52)  
Ln (village population) -0.747 (-2.55)***    0.955 (2.28)**   
% of flat land 0.003 (0.59)    -0.0004 (-0.07)    
% of irrigated land (%) 0.337 (0.70) -0.130 (-0.23) 
Ln (distance to the town) 0.180 (0.96)    -0.181 (-0.79)    
Constant 1.312 (0.41)    -1.322 (-0.35)    
Provincial dummies Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.42       -0.23        
F test [p-value] 4.33 [0.0000] 2.00 [0.0081] 
Observations 111 111 
Note: Figures in parentheses are absolute values of t-statistics  
* Significant at the 10% level 
** Idem, 5% 
*** Idem, 1% 
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Table 3.15: 3SLS estimates of the relationship between village democracy and 
government-financed investment (additional model) 
 
 
Share of public goods 
investment financed by 
higher-level govt. Village democracy index 
% of public goods investment 
financed by higher levels  -0.025 (-1.70)*    
Village democracy index -13.897 (-2.54)***     
Intra-Party election quality 8.165 (0.92) 0.524 (1.42)       
Policy mandates index -0.671 (-2.46)**    -0.035 (-3.44)***    
Ln (per capita village govt. revenue 
(2000) -4.918 (-1.68)*     
Election Procedural Quality (2000)  0.293 (2.25)**    
No. of collective enterprises (2000) -19.036 (-2.20)** -0.821 (-2.06)**    
No. of private enterprises (2000) -1.162 (-1.55)    -0.054 (-1.54)    
No. of individual businesses (getihu) 
(2000)  -0.122 (-1.61)    -0.002 (-0.46)  
Ln (per capita net income in 2000) 0.904 (0.10)  0.020 (0.05)  
Per capita arable land (2000) 4.618 (0.09)    -1.264 (-0.55)    
% of migrants in village labour force 
(2000) -0.085 (-0.36)    -0.012 (-1.27)    
% of households belonging to 3 
largest surname groups 0.029 (0.18)    0.008 (1.19)    
Inter-lineage tension  71.879 (2.30)** 0.122 (0.06)  
Ln (village population) 15.523 (1.91)*  0.506 (1.21) 
% of flat land 0.010 (0.08)    0.004 (0.62)    
% of irrigated land (%) -0.408 (-0.03) 0.266 (0.49) 
Ln (distance to the town) 2.496 (0.49)    -0.037 (-0.17)    
Constant 25.684 (0.27)    1.052 (0.26)    
Provincial dummies Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.20 0.15       
F test [p-value] 2.56 [0.0005] 2.09 [0.0057] 
Observations 111 111 
Note: Figures in parentheses are absolute values of t-statistics  
* Significant at the 10% level 
** Idem, 5% 
*** Idem, 1% 
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3.6 Summary  
 
Authoritarian regimes are often “reluctant decentralizers” (Landry 2008). An 
analysis of the distribution of resources and authority among different levels of the 
Party-state in China, and between Party and non-Party institutions in its rural 
communities, reveals a reluctance to devolve power to villages and, within villages, 
to democratically elected village committees. This has implications for public goods 
provision in rural communities.  
The objective of this chapter was to examine the institutional determinants of 
government performance in the provision of public goods in rural communities after 
the implementation of the tax-for-fee reform. Two simultaneous equations models of 
“village democracy” and “village-financed investment”, and of “village democracy” 
and “government-financed investment”, were estimated using cross-sectional survey 
data from 115 villages. Two main conclusions can be drawn from the empirical 
results. The first one is that in those villages, where (i) village elections are better 
implemented, and where (ii) the village committee (head) plays (at least) as important 
a role as the Party branch (secretary) in determining the allocation of village 
spending, village leaders tend to invest more in infrastructure. However, at the same 
time, they seem to receive a smaller share of (capital) grants from higher-level 
governments for infrastructure projects. This suggests that to the extent that public 
spending decisions are made either by county and township governments (i.e., village 
infrastructure projects funded by higher-level governments) or by village Party 
branches (i.e., village infrastructure projects funded by the village), village 
committee elections are unlikely to have a positive impact on the provision of village 
infrastructure.  
There are two possible reasons. The first is that, under such conditions, 
elections do not provide a mechanism for accountability, inasmuch as villagers 
cannot (threaten to) vote out of office those who are responsible for 
(intergovernmental or local) resource allocation decisions (e.g., county, township and 
village-level Party secretaries). The second is that earmarked grants might provide a 
mechanism for the political targeting of transfers, and that county and township 
governments might target more resources to less democratic villages, that is, those 
that are not governed by democratically elected village committees.  
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A second conclusion that emerges from the empirical analysis is that the 
Party’s accountability mechanisms have different effects on village governance. The 
implementation of the cadre responsibility system is not significantly and positively 
associated with the level of village public goods provision. However, it is negatively 
and significantly associated with the degree of village democracy. In contrast, the 
holding of elections for village Party secretaries has a significant positive impact on 
village public goods provision and does not have a significant negative impact on 
village democratic institutions. Although more research is needed, this would suggest 
that democratic institutions within villages and within grassroots Party organizations 
can complement each other in providing new channels by which village residents and 
Party members can hold village officials accountable for their performance. In 
contrast, the implementation of the cadre responsibility system conflicts with the 
development of democracy within rural communities, suggesting that the more 
accountable village officials are to higher-level Party leaders, the less accountable 
they are to villagers. 
Overall, our analysis and discussion lead to two conclusions. First, a critical 
determinant of the effectiveness of village committee elections as an instrument of 
accountability in the domain of infrastructure and service provision is whether village 
committees have control over fiscal resources (i.e., the power of village committees). 
Second, and relatedly, the potential benefits of political decentralization in terms of 
accountability are compromised by processes of fiscal and administrative (re-
)recentralization that shift power away from village committees. Our findings 
suggest that the problem of poor public goods provision in Chinese villages cannot 
be effectively addressed by (solely) increasing earmarked grants and top-down 
control. Indeed, by reducing the power and autonomy of village committees, the 
(re-)centralization of the fiscal and administrative systems leads to a reversal of 
political decentralization reforms, a further weakening of local democratic 
institutions, and a wider “accountability gap” between the rural population and the 
Party-state: “plus ça change, plus c´est la même chose” (Chan 2007). 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
The design and implementation of decentralization – how much power is 
given to local governments and whether they are directly accountable to the local 
population – has important implications, not only for the way in which local officials 
govern, as we saw in the previous chapter, but also for the way in which, and the 
purpose for which, citizens organize themselves (e.g., Manor 1999; Devarajan et al. 
2009). The overall goal of this chapter is to examine the development of self-
governing organizations and to assess their role and impact as (non-state) providers 
of basic goods and services in rural communities. 
There is a growing body of literature concerned with the interactive 
relationship between state capacity and non-state service provision in developing 
countries. It suggests that the relationship between state and non-state providers – 
whether one of complementarity or substitution - reflects and affects state legitimacy 
and capacity (Evans 1996; Narayan 1999; Ostrom 1996; Woolcock and Narayan 
2000; Robinson and White 2001; Joshi and Moore 2004; Cammet and MacLean 
2011; McLoughlin 2011; Tsai 2011; Batley et al. 2012; Bodea and Lebas 2014). This 
question has received growing attention in the literature on decentralization in China 
(e.g., Liu et al. 2012; Oi et al. 2012). Recent studies indicate that it has become 
increasingly difficult for grassroots officials to collect taxes and fees (Liu et al. 2012: 
194) and, even more, to raise voluntary contributions from villagers for the provision 
of infrastructure (e.g. Chen 2008, 2014, 2015; Fock and Wong 2008; Tian 2009; 
Göbel 2010; Boyle et al. 2014). This has been attributed to two different factors: a 
decline in political trust (Oi and Zhao 2007; Tsai 2007b) and an increase in the 
participation in community-based organizations that substitute for state institutions 
in the provision of basic goods and services (Liu et al. 2012). Villagers are more 
reluctant to pay taxes and to make voluntary contributions to (publicly-provided) 
public goods in communities where trust in the integrity and competence of 
grassroots officials is lower (Oi and Zhao 2007; Tsai 2007b). This finding is in line 
with the political economy literature on taxation, which emphasizes both the quality 
and legitimacy of political institutions in explaining tax compliance (Bräutigam 
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2008: 4-15; Fjeldstad et al. 2012: 8-12)61. At the same time, variation in the ability 
of grassroots governments to tax is also explained by variation in the ability of local 
communities to provide themselves with public goods. It has also been found that 
villagers are less willing to pay taxes and fees in communities where self-governing 
organizations have become a substitute for the (local) state, by raising funds and 
providing services independently from it (Liu et al. 2012: 202). This finding is, in 
turn, consistent with the empirical literature that examines the role of non-state actors 
as service providers in developing countries and how it affects the relationship 
between taxpayers and the state (DiJohn 2010; Cammet and MacLean 2011; Tsai 
2011; Sacks 2012; Ali et al. 2014; Bodea and Lebas 2014)62. One of its key findings 
is that non-state provision is negatively associated with tax compliance when it 
substitutes for, rather than complements, state provision (Ali et al. 2014; Bodea and 
Lebas 2014).  
Taken together, these studies suggest that the institutional factors explaining 
the unwillingness of Chinese rural residents to pay taxes and to make voluntary 
contributions to (government-provided) public goods are not different from those 
observed in other developing countries: whether they choose to comply with the 
state’s demands partly depends on the relative effectiveness and trustworthiness of 
state and non-state institutions as service providers or, as Bird et al. (2006, 2008) put 
                                                 
61 This literature argues that in countries or communities where the government does not fulfill its 
“fiscal contract” with the citizenry (Levi 1988; Moore 2004, 2008), where the payment of taxes leads 
neither to better political representation nor to better service provision, citizens are less likely to 
comply with their tax obligations (i.e., “fiscal exchange” theory). Similarly, it argues that a 
government’s ability to tax depends on its legitimacy in the eyes of taxpayers, that is, in their “belief 
or trust in the authorities, institutions and social arrangements to be appropriate, just, and work for the 
common good” (Ali et al. 2014: 830). The less trustworthy or legitimate a government is or is 
perceived to be, the less likely citizens are to comply with its tax demands (i.e., “legitimacy” theory) 
(Fauvelle-Aymar 1999; Tyler 2006).  
 
62 In particular, much of this literature examines whether, and under which conditions, the financing 
and provision of services by actors other than the state (e.g., donors, non-governmental organizations, 
traditional leaders, community and religious groups, private companies, etc.) may reduce state 
legitimacy and capacity. Their findings show that the effects of non-state service provision depend 
on: (i) who citizens credit (blame) for the improvement (deterioration) of services in their communities 
(Sacks 2012); (ii) whether the funds used to provide public services are channelled through the state 
or directly to non-state actors (Ghani et al. 2005; Di John 2010); and, relatedly, (iii) whether non-state 
service provision takes the form of “co-production” or “self-provision” or, in other words, whether 
the relationship between state and non-state providers is one of “complementarity” or “substitution” 
(Cammet and MacLean 2011; Tsai 2011). 
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it, on the availability of the “voice” and “exit” options in the service provision 
arena63.  
This raises the question of what determines the availability of the so-called 
“exit” option in the first place? Under what conditions are “substitutive informal 
institutions” (Helmke and Levitsky 2004) likely to emerge? To what extent are they 
able to fill the gap in service provision created by ineffective formal institutions, and 
with which consequences? The primary objective of this chapter is to identify the 
institutional, social and economic factors underlying the development of self-
governing organizations in Chinese rural communities. It also seeks to provide a 
preliminary assessment of the extent to which these organizations can serve as 
substitutes for the (local) state in the provision of basic infrastructure and of how this 
may affect its capacity to govern.  
There is case study evidence of the development of “autonomous” 
organizations (Watson 2008) and “substitutive” public goods provision (Tsai 2011) 
in rural China. For instance, survey data collected from 100 villages in five provinces 
in 2008 shows that in 30 percent of them “there had been at least one public project 
managed by villagers themselves” in the previous five years64 (Tsai 2011: 58). 
Likewise, statistical evidence shows that villages with autonomous community 
organizations, such as churches, tend to have lower levels of government investment 
in infrastructure (Kung et al. 2009) but are more likely to have paved roads and new 
school buildings (Tsai 2007ab), which can be interpreted as evidence of the growth 
of “substitutive public goods provision” (Tsai 2011) by these community groups. 
Case study evidence from a poor agricultural village in Hebei province (“South 
Bend”) supports this interpretation (Tsai 2007b: 144-146; Tsai 2011: 9-10)  and 
                                                 
63 Hirschman’s (1970) “exit, voice and loyalty” framework has been used to examine how citizens 
respond to dissatisfaction with the provision of public goods and services by their local or national 
government (e.g., Sharp 1984; Paul 1992; Dowding et al. 2000; Bird et al. 2008; Dowding and John 
2008). In some of these studies the term “exit” refers to tax avoidance and evasion (e.g., Bird et al. 
2008), in others to a change of service provider (e.g., Paul 1992), and yet in others to migration (e.g., 
Sharp 1984). We use the term here to refer to “exit” from state to non-state providers.  
 
64 In this study “management of public projects” was defined as “primary control of the funds invested 
in the public project and oversight of the day-to-day work on the project”. “Village public projects” 
were in turn defined as “the provision of public goods and services including village road and bridge 
works; construction or renovation of village school buildings or health clinics; repair or construction 
of infrastructure for drinking water, irrigation, drainage, electricity, and terraced fields; management 
of village public forests; reforestation; and the provision of village sanitation services and waste 
disposal” (Tsai 2011: 57-58). 
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shows that in this, like in other communities, “what public goods provision exists is 
organized by the church management committee of the village’s Catholic church, 
completely independently of the village government”65 (Tsai 2011: 9-10). 
To shed light on the factors behind these forms of collective action, this 
chapter seeks to examine whether, and in what ways, satisfaction with and trust in 
state institutions affects participation in self-governing organizations. Using 
Hirchman’s (1970) terminology, and based on the studies cited above (e.g., Bird et 
al. 2006, 2008; Bodea and Lebas 2014), it is plausible to hypothesize that when state 
institutions fail to meet citizen demands for representation and essential public 
services and, by extension, fail to elicit “loyalty” (i.e., trust), citizens may choose 
“exit” over “voice” as a response to dissatisfaction with their performance. In other 
words, they may turn to non-state providers for access to basic services, while 
disengaging from the state in various ways. In the rural Chinese context, the lack of 
trust in township officials, coupled with a poor provision of village public goods and 
a poor implementation of village elections, might provide incentives for villagers to 
form or participate in self-governing organizations. 
However, one thing is that citizens have an incentive to engage in more 
autonomous forms of organization and to cooperate in the production of certain 
goods and services, and another is that they have the capacity to do it. Communities 
may be able to do what markets and states fail to do (i.e., “market failure” and “state 
failure” in the form of under-provision of local public goods) (e.g., Bowles and Gintis 
2012) - or they may not. The ability of groups of individuals to solve the collective 
action problem involved in the formation of organizations and in the provision of 
public goods depends on factors such as group size (Olson 1971: 53-65) and 
heterogeneity (Baland and Platteau 1996: 284-345), the design of institutional 
arrangements that facilitate cooperation among group members (Ostrom 1990: 88-
102), and the “stock of social capital” – that is, of “trust, norms and networks” – 
within communities (Putnam 1993: 163-185).  
                                                 
65 Interestingly, Tsai (2011: 54) also found that in this village “noncompliance with state policies and 
taxation is very high and the Party secretary complains bitterly about this lack of power over villagers. 
The village church has far higher standing with villagers than the village government, and church 
authority is reinforced by the village public projects they finance and organize”. 
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Two crucial aspects of the community context in rural China are lineage 
structure (Tsai 2007ab) and out-migration processes (Lu 2015). Consequently, we 
also examine how lineage and migration networks constrain or enable the 
development of self-governing organizations. As we shall argue in section 4.3, they 
might crucially affect the ability of groups of individuals to organize themselves to 
cope with community problems, yet in ways different from those observed in other 
countries. Although inter-clan conflicts and out-migration flows could create 
obstacles to successful collective action at the village level, this may not be the case 
in rural China, given the prevalence of cooperative relations between village clans, 
and of circular migration between rural and urban areas. Our basic hypothesis is that 
villages with more cohesive lineage groups and with larger migration networks may 
provide the social conditions for the development of self-governing organizations. 
This hypothesis is in line with the literature on social capital, which points to the 
importance for rural development of what is variously called “bonding” and 
“bridging” social capital (e.g., Narayan 1999), or “intra-community ties” and “extra-
community networks” (e.g., Woolcock 1998), that is, different types of social 
networks at the community level that promote “integration” within communities, 
while providing “linkage” to external resources.  
 In addition to explaining what drives the development of self-governing 
organizations, this chapter also intends to explore both the limitations and unintended 
consequences of non-state provision by self-governing organizations. To this end, it 
provides a preliminary assessment of their role as (non-state) providers of basic 
village infrastructure, in particular, roads and bridges, drinking water and irrigation 
systems, as well as school buildings. Likewise, it examines whether participation in 
these organizations increases distrust between villagers and officials.  
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 examines 
the presence of self-governing organizations in Chinese villages and their 
performance in public goods provision on the basis of survey data of 552 community 
organizations. Section 4.3 develops hypotheses regarding the effects of political trust, 
local government performance, lineage structure, and out-migration flows on 
participation in self-governing organizations. In section 4.4 we present the 
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econometric model and estimation procedure and describe the main variables used in 
the model. Section 4.5 presents the econometric results, and section 4.6 concludes. 
 
 
4.2 Rural Social Organizations and Non-State Provision of Basic Services 
 
 “Governance in the countryside is changing, and non-state organizations are 
playing a bigger role” (Deng and O’Brien 2014: 188). Village temples (Dean 2003; 
Chau 2005; Tsai 2002, 2007ab, 2011), farmers’ cooperatives (Augustin-Jean and 
Xue 2012; Deng et al. 2010; World Bank 2006), old people’s associations (Hansen 
2008), and water user associations (Li et al. 2004) are a few examples of the 
traditional and new organizations that have emerged in Chinese villages and that 
provide essential goods and services to their residents. 
A review of the literature on their development and role indicates that rural 
organizations are characterized by: (i) a high degree of informality; (ii) a strong 
government involvement in their formation, governance, and activities; and (iii) a 
focus on service delivery, rather than on advocacy. Most village organizations are 
not formally registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs; have a close relationship 
with the state; and play a more important role in providing services than in mobilizing 
villagers to demand more accountability or better services from state institutions66 
(Shue 1994; White et al. 1996; Tsai 2002, 2007ab, 2011; Dean 2003; Li et al. 2004; 
Chau 2005; Fan et al. 2006; Hansen 2008; Unger 2008; Deng et al. 2010; Tong 2010; 
Augustin-Jean and Xue 2012; Bislev and Thogersen 2012)67. 
Yet, at the same time, this literature suggests that organizations differ in terms 
of: (i) how much autonomy they have in relation to the state (e.g., Watson 2008); and 
(ii) whether they provide infrastructure and services independently or in 
collaboration with state actors (e.g., Tsai 2011). Thus, in the analysis of non-state 
organizations and non-state service provision in rural China, it is important to make 
                                                 
66 This contrasts with what happens in India and much of Latin America, where “the non-state sector 
is not a major actor in direct provision but tends to play more of an advocacy role, mobilizing 
communities to demand services from the state” (Robinson and White 2001: 81). 
 
67 There is a significant body of literature on associational life in China during the reform period (e.g., 
White et al. 1996; Brook and Frolic 1997; Saich 2000, 2004; Howell and Pearce 2001; Ma 2002, 2005; 
Howell 2004; Unger 2008; Shieh 2009; Wang and He 2010). However, relatively less attention has 
been paid to the study of rural associations.  
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two distinctions. The first one is between self-governing and government-controlled 
organizations (Liu et al. 2012). “Self-governing organizations” are organizations 
which are institutionally separate from the state and in which local government and 
Party officials do not participate. Specifically, they are defined as those community-
based organizations that meet the following two criteria: (1) their leaders are not 
appointed by, and do not hold concurrent posts in, the local Party-state; and (2) they 
do not incorporate local officials in their activities or decision-making processes. In 
contrast, “government-controlled organizations” fail to meet either or both of these 
criteria: they have local officials among their leaders or members and are 
characterized by a low degree of organizational autonomy from the state.  
The second distinction is between different types of non-state provision of 
public goods: “substitutive provision” by non-state actors and “co-production” 
between state and non-state actors (Tsai 2011). The main difference lies in whether 
non-state actors provide services in collaboration with state agencies or 
independently. “Co-production” refers to “the provision of public services through a 
regular long-term relationship between state agencies and organised groups of 
citizens, where both make substantial resource contributions” (Joshi and Moore 
2004: 31). In contrast, “substitutive provision” by non-state actors “replaces state 
provision” and “takes place independently without increasing opportunities for 
interaction, exchange, and reciprocity between officials and citizens” (Tsai 2011: 48-
49). 
The fact that there is variation among villages in the autonomy that village 
organizations have, and in the form that non-state provision takes, raises questions 
that have not been addressed in previous studies: What proportion of villages have 
self-governing organizations? What forms do these organizations take? How many 
of them are involved in the provision of infrastructure, and how effective are they?  
The data in Tables 4.1 through 4.4 provide some answers to these questions. 
Table 4.1 shows the presence of a wide variety of social organizations in the sample 
villages, including wedding and funeral councils, old people’s associations, Buddhist 
temples and Christian churches, technical associations, mutual aid groups, 
consumers’ associations, public security and mediation committees, and others. Of 
the 552 social organizations in the sample, more than 18 percent are religious 
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organizations; 17 percent are cultural, recreational and health associations; 14 
percent are dispute mediation committees; 14 percent are public security committees; 
and another 14 percent are technology associations and mutual aid groups. 96 percent 
of the villages surveyed by CCAP (CAS) had at least one social organization68 in 
200569.  
 
 
Table 4.1: Classification of village organizations by type of activity 
Major Activity Top two types of organizations a  
Organizations 
Number % 
Weddings & 
funerals 
Wedding & funeral councils (42), 
Funeral councils (2) 
45 8.2 
Cultural, sports & 
health 
Old people’s association (60), Folk 
dance associations (10) 
92 16.7 
Social welfare and 
agricultural 
extension 
Family planning associations (18), 
Agricultural extension centres (9) 
42 7.6 
Religious 
Christian churches (32), Buddhist 
temples & associations (13) 
100 18.1 
Technology  
Technology associations (29), 
Science & Technology associations 
(6) 
63 11.4 
Mutual aid 
Seasonal mutual aid groups (3), 
small farmers’ mutual aid groups (2) 
13 2.4 
Rights protection 
Consumer complaint centres (8), 
consumer associations (6) 
31 5.6 
Mediation Mediation committees (77) 77 14.0 
Community order 
& security 
Public security committees (63), 
community patrol groups (6) 
76 13.8 
Others 
Financial management small groups 
(6) 
13 2.4 
Total  552 100 
Source: CCAP Village Survey (2005) 
Note:a Numbers in parentheses are the number of organizations in the corresponding sub-category 
 
 
                                                 
68 The average village had 4.8 social organizations (standard deviation 3.1) in 2004. 
69 The number of total social organizations in China is estimated to be more than 8 million (Watson 
2008). 
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The growth of village organizations can be seen as part of “the associational 
revolution” that is underway in China (Wang and He 2010: 37). However, more 
important than the rise in the number of organizations is the increasing diversity 
among them in terms of how they relate to the state and what role they play in 
providing public goods and services. 
As can be seen in Table 4.2, while the majority of village organizations in the 
sample (78%) were established by the state and have remained under its control, 22 
percent of them are run by villagers themselves. Perhaps unsurprisingly, virtually all 
family planning associations, public security and mediation committees, technology 
associations and consumers’ associations have close ties to the state70. In some cases, 
these organizations have been formed by township and village governments, either 
in response to directives from higher-level governments, or as a means of better 
meeting “the highest priority mandates” (Birney 2014) under the cadre responsibility 
system (e.g., implementation of the one-child policy, promotion of social stability 
and economic development, etc.). This is, for example, the case of farmer 
professional cooperatives (e.g., technical associations), family planning associations 
and public security and mediation committees (World Bank 2006; Deng et al. 2010; 
Tong 2010; Augustin-Jean and Xue 2011). In other cases, these organizations are 
simply village branches of “quasigovernmental organizations” that operate 
nationwide, such as the China Family Planning Association, the China Association 
for Science and Technology or the China Consumers’ Association (Wang and He 
2010).  
Regardless of their area of activity, what government-controlled 
organizations have in common is that they are formed and run in a “top-down” 
manner by local officials or their appointees. The fact that the state is the main driving 
force behind the development of rural organizations raises doubts about the extent to 
which they are willing and able to serve the interests of ordinary villagers. For 
instance, a recent report by the World Bank (2006: 19) on China’s famer professional 
                                                 
70 More surprising, perhaps, is the finding that not all democratic supervisory small groups (jiandu 
xiaozu) (“rights protection” category) and financial management small groups (licai xiaozu) (“others” 
category) are independent from those who they are supposed to monitor and to hold accountable for 
the management of village finances (not shown in Table 4.2) These organizations are responsible for 
the “democratic supervision” of the village committee and Party branch (e.g., Alpermann 2013; Levy 
2007; Su and Yang 2005). 
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cooperatives warns against the creation of organizations “which are simply an 
extension of the government” and calls for the development of “farmer-owned and –
controlled organizations”. 
In contrast to the above described associations, self-governing organizations 
have a “bottom-up” character and are run by villagers. Although they take a wide 
variety of forms, ranging from the so-called financial management small groups to 
famers’ mutual help associations, what stands out in Table 4.2 is that most of them 
are either religious organizations, such as Buddhist temples or Christian churches, or 
lineage-based organizations, such as old people’s associations and wedding and 
funeral councils71. Consistent with previous studies (Croll 1999; Tsai 2002, 2007ab, 
2011), our survey data show that, after decades of suppression under Mao, these 
organizations have re-emerged in rural areas under new forms and names (e.g., old 
people’s associations) to perform their traditional roles as non-state providers of 
services72, which will be discussed next. If our sample villages are representative of 
the country’s villages, there are reasons to think that self-governing organizations are 
now present in a majority (55%) of them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
71 Recent studies show that there is “a strong overlap” (Svensson 2012) between lineages and some 
new types of organizations, in particular, “old people’s associations” and “wedding and funeral 
councils” (e.g., Tsai 2007b; Tong 2010; Liu et al. 2012; Svensson 2012). 
 
72 Lineage and religious organizations played a crucial role in providing public goods and social 
welfare during the late Imperial and Republican periods (e.g., Freedman 1958; Duara 1988). 
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Table 4.2 Classification of village organizations by degree of autonomy 
Major Activity Top two types of organizations a  
Organizations 
 Govt.-
controlled
(%) 
Self-
governing 
(%) 
Weddings & 
funerals 
Wedding & funeral councils (42), 
Funeral councils (2) 
78 22 
Cultural, sports & 
health 
Old people’s association (60), Folk 
dance associations (10) 
80 20 
Social welfare 
and agricultural 
extension 
Family planning associations (18), 
Agricultural extension centres (9) 
98 2 
Religious 
Christian churches (32), Buddhist 
temples & associations (13) 
21 79 
Technology  
Technology associations (29), 
Science & Technology 
associations (6) 
94 6 
Mutual aid 
Seasonal mutual aid groups (3), 
small farmers’ mutual aid groups 
(2) 
85 15 
Rights protection 
Consumer complaint centres (8), 
consumer associations (6) 
100 0 
Mediation Mediation committees (77) 99 1 
Community order 
& security 
Public security committees (63), 
community patrol groups (6) 
97 3 
Others 
Financial management small 
groups (6) 
77 23 
Total  78 22 
Source: CCAP Village Survey (2005) 
Note:a Numbers in parentheses are the number of organizations in the corresponding sub-category 
 
As important as differences in the autonomy of social organizations are 
differences in their service delivery role. Survey research on rural public goods 
provision in the post-tax-for-fee reform era indicates that 80 percent of rural 
households are dissatisfied with the infrastructure provided in their villages (Luo et 
al. 2010: 666). It also indicates that roads, drinking and irrigation water, and schools 
are the types of public goods to which villagers attach the highest priority (Yi et al. 
2011: 120-122). It is not clear, however, to what extent village organizations can fill 
the gap left by the state in the provision of these local public goods. 
 
162 
 
Table 4.3 throws some light on this. It shows the degree of involvement of 
both government-controlled and self-governing organizations in the provision and 
maintenance of roads and bridges, drinking water and irrigations systems, as well as 
primary school buildings, between 2000 and 2005 in the sample villages. As can be 
seen, 19 percent of the organizations73 initiated (at least) one community project 
involving the construction and maintenance of roads, bridges or drinking water 
facilities in 2000-2005, and 67 percent of them were able to implement the project(s) 
successfully. The percentage of village organizations involved in the construction 
and maintenance of irrigation infrastructure and school buildings during this period 
was 16 and 12 percent, respectively. In this case, also about 70 percent of the 
organizations were able to complete the projects undertaken.  
There appear to be both differences and similarities between government-
controlled organizations and self-governing organizations in the scope, nature and 
effectiveness of their role as non-state providers (Tables 4.3 and 4.4). First, self-
governing organizations are somewhat more likely to get involved in the provision 
of infrastructure. Table 4.4 shows that more than 30 percent of this type of 
organizations reported having initiated (at least) one infrastructure project between 
2000 and 2005, although there are significant regional differences.  
Second, these organizations seem less willing than government-controlled 
organizations to participate in the “co-production” of infrastructure projects with 
local officials, and more likely to raise funds and carry out such projects 
independently (not shown in the table). For instance, although the majority of 
community organizations work together with the village committee and Party branch 
in the design and implementation of community infrastructure projects, 50 per cent 
of the local temples that initiated and successfully completed (at least) one 
infrastructure project in the 2000-2005 period acknowledged not having sought 
approval or support from the two village committees to carry them out. The fact that 
self-governing organizations are more likely to engage in what is called “substitutive 
public goods provision” (Tsai 2011) may explain the finding of a recent study that 
                                                 
73 The finding that very different types of social organizations are involved in local public goods 
provision is in line with the findings of recent studies showing that village-level associations are 
engaged in multiple activities and perform a wide variety of functions (e.g., Tong 2010). 
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variation in “tax resistance” or in the ability of grassroots governments to raise 
revenue from rural residents is associated with differences in the level of participation 
in self-governing organizations across villages: the higher the participation in these 
organizations, the lower the extractive capacity of grassroots governments (Liu et al. 
2012).  
Last, although government-controlled and self-governing organizations 
provide villagers with a means to participate in the provision and maintenance of 
community infrastructure, the capacity of these organizations to meet local 
infrastructure needs is limited, as reflected by the fact that (on average) 30 percent of 
those which aimed to address popular demands for better roads, drinking and 
irrigation water infrastructure, and school facilities were unable to do so (Table 4.3). 
This capacity problem seems to be more serious among certain types of self-
governing organizations, such as churches (Table 4.3), and in certain provinces, such 
as Shaanxi74 (Table 4.4).  
In sum, the analysis of the nature and role of self-governing organizations 
reveals to a large extent the resurgence of clan- and religion-based organizations as 
non-state service providers in rural China. While in some communities these 
organizations are able to raise funds and provide infrastructure independently from 
the state, in others they are not. It would thus be unwise to overstate their ability to 
replace state institutions in providing rural infrastructure without considering their 
capacity constraints, especially in poorer areas, where investment in infrastructure is 
most needed. At best, they can only partly fill the infrastructure gap left by the state.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
74 Not even one percent of self-governing organizations in the villages of Shaanxi province were 
involved in the development of infrastructure projects in the 2000-2005 period (Table 4.4). The fact 
that these villages have the lowest per capita income in the sample might be one of the reasons why 
self-governing organizations, which depend on voluntary contributions and donations from their 
members, do not play a more active role in providing village infrastructure. 
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Table 4.3: The role of village organizations in public goods provision, 2000-2005 (%) 
 
Major area of 
activity or 
type of social 
organization 
Roads, bridges, drinking 
water 
Irrigation  Schools 
%  
initiating a 
public 
project 
%  
completing 
the project 
successfully 
%   
initiating 
a public 
project 
% 
completing 
the project 
successfull
y 
% 
initiating 
a public 
project 
% of 
completing 
the project 
successfully 
Weddings & 
funerals 
19 86 14 80 14   80 
Cultural, 
sports & 
health 
35 57 21 69 17   62 
Social Welfare 
and 
Agricultural 
Extension 
19 50 23 57 17   80 
Local temples  11 80 10 25 5     0 
Churches & 
other religious 
organizations 
12 20 7 33 2 100 
Technology 15 75 20 70 8 100 
Mutual aid 17 50 25 67 8 100 
Rights 
protection 
19 80 31 75 23 100 
Mediation 18 85 12 78 12   89 
Community 
order & 
security 
11 71 11 43 6   75 
Others 30 100 30 100 40   75 
Total 19 67 16 65 12   78 
Source: CCAP Village Survey (2005) 
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Table 4.4: Self-Governing organizations and public 
goods provision (2000-05)  
Province 
Self-governing Organizations  
% involved in 
infrastructure 
provision 
% not involved 
in infrastructure 
provision 
Jiangsu 20 80 
Sichuan 29 71 
Shaanxi 0 100 
Jilin 33 67 
Hebei 25 75 
Fujian 47 53 
Total Sample 32 68 
Source: CCAP Village Survey (2005) 
 
There is a growing body of literature on the impact of lineage and religious 
institutions on governance and public goods provision in Chinese villages that is 
directly relevant to our research (Tsai 2002; 2007ab; 2011; Hansen 2008; Kung et al. 
2009; Thogersen 2009). Explicitly or implicitly, much of this literature applies Peter 
Evans’ work (1996) on “state-society synergy” to the rural Chinese context, 
highlighting the “complementarity” between social and state institutions, and the 
social “embeddedness” of state actors as a “catalyst for development” in rural China.  
Of particular importance is the work of Tsai (2007ab), which draws attention 
to the ways in which, and the conditions under which, the presence of traditional 
social organizations, such as lineages and temples, allows villagers to overcome “the 
accountability problem” associated with governmental public goods provision in 
rural communities. She proposes a “model of informal accountability” (Tsai 2007a: 
356-357; Tsai 2007b: 86-119), which posits that “in political systems with weak 
formal institutions of accountability, localities with encompassing and embedding 
solidary groups are likely to have better governmental provision of public goods than 
localities without these groups, all other things being equal”75 (Tsai 2007b: 120). 
                                                 
75 Solidary groups are defined as “collections of individuals engaged in mutually oriented activities 
who share a set of ethical standards and moral obligations” (Tsai 2007a: 356; Tsai 2007b: 4). 
Examples include temples, churches and lineages. These groups are “encompassing” when they are 
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Based on a sample of more than 300 villages from Shanxi, Hebei, Jiangxi and Fujian, 
her research finds that villages with temple and lineage groups, which are open to 
everyone in the village and which incorporate officials as members, are more likely 
to have higher levels of (village) government investment in public goods, and better 
infrastructure. She argues that “encompassing and embedding solidary groups” can 
improve village public goods provision by increasing “mutual accountability 
between villagers and officials” (Tsai 2007b: 166) – presumably, in ways that 
political institutions do not or cannot. In communities with these groups, officials are 
more likely to feel a strong social obligation to meet villagers’ demands for public 
goods, which in turn makes villagers more likely to be willing to comply with state 
policies (e.g., taxation) and to participate in the co-production of public goods with 
officials.  
Our study differs from and complements this line of research in four ways. 
The first difference has to do with the type of organizations studied. Two distinctions 
can be made between what we call “self-governing organizations” and what Tsai 
(2007ab) calls “encompassing and embedding solidary groups”. First, although a 
majority of self-governing organizations are, or have their origins in, “solidary 
groups”, they do not incorporate officials as leaders or members. In other words, they 
may be “encompassing”, but not “embedding”. Second, our analysis of village 
organizations is not confined to “solidary groups”, such as religious or clan-based 
organizations. As we saw, self-governing organizations take a wider variety of forms, 
such as farmers’ mutual aid groups or cooperatives, to name a few (Table 4.1). In 
short, the focus of our analysis is on voluntary community organizations, which may 
or may not be based on “solidary groups”, but which are not intertwined with the 
state. 
The second difference is related to the forms of public goods provision that 
are the focus of the analysis. As previously discussed, the presence of “encompassing 
and embedding solidary groups” is positively associated with higher levels of “state 
provision” by village governments (Tsai 2007ab) and of “non-state provision” in the 
form of “coproduction” between village governments and community groups (Tsai 
                                                 
“open to everyone under the local government’s jurisdiction”, and “embedding” when they 
“incorporate local officials into the groups as members” (Tsai 2007a: 356, Tsai 2007b: 13).  
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2011). By enabling villagers to use social sanctions against corrupt or incompetent 
cadres, these groups help address “the accountability problem” that prevents 
cooperation between village officials and villagers in the context of public goods 
provision (Tsai 2007ab). Unlike these organizations, self-governing organizations 
lack leverage over officials and, consequently, may be less able to hold them 
accountable for providing public goods76. They may also be less willing to engage in 
the co-production of public goods with local officials. However, as previously 
discussed, some of them are able to and do provide public goods themselves. These 
organizations may thus help villagers overcome the “collective action problem” 
associated with what is called “substitutive nonstate provision” (Tsai 2011). The 
literature on social capital suggests that membership in these organizations might 
reduce the free-riding problem associated with the (voluntary) provision of public 
goods in (at least) three ways: (i) by fostering “norms of reciprocity” among 
community members; (ii) by generating “information” about the behaviour of 
individual members; (iii) and by increasing the credibility of “social sanctions” 
against opportunistic or untrustworthy behaviour (Putnam 1993: 174). In all these 
ways, the presence of self-governing organizations may create the conditions for 
villagers to cooperate and to provide themselves with basic public goods that are 
under-provided by the state. 
A third difference between our study and the work of Tsai (2002, 2007ab, 
2011) has to do with the direction of the causal relationship between social 
organizations and institutional performance. Reflecting the influence of Putnam’s 
work, the main aim and contribution of her research is to explain how certain forms 
of social organization may (positively) affect local government performance. In this 
chapter, we examine the interactive relationship between both variables but, in line 
with research by Rothstein (Rothstein and Stolle 2008) and other scholars (Tendler 
1997; Ostrom and Ahn 2001), we emphasize the opposite direction of their causal 
relationship, that is, the impact of (local) government performance on villagers’ 
                                                 
76 The only way in which these organizations could hold local officials accountable is by engaging in 
confrontational forms of collective action, but this is not the focus of the present chapter. Recent 
research by Hurst et al. (2014) suggests that the presence of what they call “semi-autonomous 
organizations with mediating capacity”, such as old people’s associations, helps contain large-scale 
petitions and protests against local officials. 
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initiative to form or join self-governing organizations. This is because there are 
grounds to believe that “national, regional, and local governmental institutions 
strongly affect the level and type of social capital available to individuals to pursue 
long-term development efforts” (Ostrom and Ahn 2001: 16). Last, unlike in Tsai’s 
model of informal accountability, the main causal mechanism linking rural social 
organizations and local government performance in our research is not social control, 
but instead political trust. We examine whether political trust is shaped by, and 
shapes, the performance of state institutions, through villagers’ participation in self-
governing organizations. 
Finally, to illustrate the similarities and differences between self-governing 
and government-controlled organizations, Boxes 4.1 and 4.2 provide an example of 
each type of organization: the village elders’ association in Liyuan village (Liu et al. 
2012) and West Gate village (Tsai 2007b). Both organizations are old people’s 
associations; both have their origins in lineage or clan groups; both are located in 
Fujian province; and both contribute to improving access to basic infrastructure in 
their communities. However, they differ in the way they relate to the state, and in the 
strategies they adopt to improve the provision of infrastructure in their villages. The 
association in Liyuan is an example of a “self-governing organization” (Box 4.1), 
while that in West Gate exemplifies what we call “government-controlled 
organizations” (Box 4.2).  In the next section (4.3), we develop hypotheses regarding 
the determinants of participation in self-governing organizations on the basis of the 
existing literature. 
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Box 4.1: The Village Elders’ Association of Liyuan (Fujian)  
 
“The Village Elders’ Association was established in 1985 by a villager working in 
Fuzhou as a construction worker, Chen Wangti. Starting in 1996, however, VEA got 
more actively involved in managing village affairs, such as building a theatre, temple, 
road (…). In 2004, VEA initiated a project of building a cement road and mobilized its 
members for funding. Before long, it collected more than 500,000 yuan in contributions, 
an amount larger than the actual cost of the project. VEA’s effective resource 
mobilization derived from the prestige it enjoyed among the villagers. In terms of 
organizational building, the VEA governing body consisted of seven members. Each of 
the seven families (Lin and Huang being the two largest families) in the village 
recommended one elder from their families and ran the daily operations of the VEA. 
These highly respected elders have won VEA the trust among village residents. Their 
credibility was further enhanced by its handling of financial affairs. Because of the 
implicit checks and balances in its governance, VEA handled all financial matters in a 
relatively open fashion. Villagers knew how their money was spent therefore were 
willing to contribute to the cause. Finally, through relatives living in the village, VEA 
reached fellow family members thousands of miles away in the cities or abroad and 
solicited their financial contributions. Interestingly, VEA, being non-governmental, had 
actually broader mobilization network than village committees and party organizations” 
(Liu et al. 2012: 195). 
Box 4.2: The Village Elders’ Association of West Gate (Fujian) 
 
“West Gate has a temple community council that plays a significant role in village 
affairs and governance (…). Village officials are deeply embedded in the temple’s 
institutions and activities. Both village officials and council members see their interests 
as complementary, so much that in 1996, when the district government directed all its 
villages to set up senior citizens’ associations, village officials and council members 
agreed to make the temple council (which had already been operating since the 1980s) 
the village senior citizen’s association. By giving the council this official title the 
council head explained, village officials would be able to attend and participate in the 
council’s activities, which before they had avoided in accordance with the state’s ban 
on ‘feudal superstition’, and the council would be camouflaged from state censure (…). 
The temple council exerts a significant amount of leverage over village officials. 
Council members report that they regularly seek out the village Party secretary and 
village head ‘to tell them the good and bad things they are doing’. In comparison to 
neighboring villages (without villagewide temple groups), West Gate’s officials 
organize an impressive array of public services, ranging from dumpsters and sanitation 
works, to paved village roads bordered with rudimentary gutters. According to West 
Gate’s villagers, the village’s temple groups take the lead in collecting donations to 
repair a local road or build a drainage system and then push the village government to 
fund the rest of the project ” (Tsai 2007b: 139-141). 
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4.3 Hypotheses Development 
 
 
4.3.1 Political Trust 
  
A rational view of “trust” sustains that it is based on assessments of the 
trustworthiness of the potentially trusted person or institution (Hardin 2006; Levi 
1998; Levi ad Stoker 2000). “Individual trustworthiness” implies both “commitment 
to act in the interests of the truster” and “competence in the domain over which trust 
is given” (Levi and Stoker 2000: 476). “Institutional trustworthiness” involves 
“procedures for selecting and constraining the agents of institutions so that they are 
competent, credible, and likely to act in the interests of those being asked to trust the 
institution” (Levi 1998: 80)77. 
In most decentralized countries, trust in government varies across levels of 
government, however countries differ in how much trust citizens have in their central 
and local governments (Pharr 1997; Jennings 1998; Levi and Stoker 2000; Denters 
2002; Kincaid and Cole 2010; Tang and Huhe 2014). In the United States (Jennings 
1998), much of Western Europe (Denters 2002) and Japan (Pharr 1997), local 
governments are considered more trustworthy than the central government. This also 
appears to be the case in most sub-Saharan countries (Bratton 2012). In contrast, in 
some East Asian and Latin American countries, such as China, Mexico, or Vietnam, 
the opposite is true: citizens trust the central government, but do not trust local 
governments (Li 2004; Kincaid and Cole 2010; Tang and Huhe 2014). 
There is a growing body of literature on political trust in rural China and its 
effects on tax compliance and on political and social participation (O’Brien and Li 
1995; Shi 2001; Li 2004, 2008, 2011; Manion 2006; Saich 2007, 2008; Tao et al. 
2011; Liu et al. 2012). These studies show that, like their urban counterparts, rural 
residents “do not experience the Chinese state as a single entity with a single face” 
(O’Brien and Li 1995: 782), and that they “disaggregate” the state into “trustworthy 
higher levels” and “untrustworthy lower levels” (Li 2004: 231-232). 
 
 
                                                 
77 The first paragraph of this section draws heavily on Pesqué-Cela et al. (2009: 156-157). 
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This literature also suggests that the growing lack of trust in rural 
governments manifests itself in five ways. One is a decline in tax compliance. Since 
the rural tax reform was implemented, “tax resistance” has not so much declined as 
changed in form. Years ago, farmers resisted the “arbitrary” imposition of taxes and 
fees by local officials mainly through “violent” protest (Bernstein and Lü 2000, 2003, 
2008). Today, they resist paying “perfectly legal” taxes and fees in a “passive” way 
(Liu et al. 2012: 194). This is especially the case in communities where villager-cadre 
relations have deteriorated, “with peasants often expressing ill feelings toward 
township and village cadres” (Oi and Zhao 2007: 87).  
Another sign of the declining legitimacy of grassroots governments is their 
inability to raise voluntary contributions from villagers for infrastructure projects 
under the so-called “one-issue-one-discussion” (“yi shi yi yi”) system, a new form of 
“participatory budgeting” promoted by the central government (e.g. Chen 2008, 
2014, 2015; Fock and Wong 2008; Li 2009; Tian 2009; Göbel 2010; Boyle et al. 
2014). In communities where confidence in village officials has been undermined by 
problems of corruption, villagers refuse to pay 15-20 yuan annually to build and 
repair basic infrastructure, such as roads and irrigation systems (Chen 2008, 2014, 
2015). “Yi shi yi yi is really good”, they say, “village cadres do not work and we do 
not waste money” (Chen 2008: 332). 
A third consequence of the growing cleavage between villagers and local 
officials is the decline in voting and other forms of “institutionalized” political 
participation. In villages where distrust of township officials is high, and where 
neither elections nor village assembly meetings provide opportunities for meaningful 
participation in village governance, villagers disengage from the political arena (Tao 
et al. 2011). They point to their “lack of political influence” as the main reason for 
their lack of interest and participation in village politics (Schubert and Ahlers 2012a: 
100), while complaining that elections are just for “show” (Tsai 2002: 15; Hu 2008: 
616; Tao et al. 2011: 109) and that village assembly meetings are “tedious and futile” 
(Schubert and Ahlers 2012a: 152). 
Distrust of local officials is also reflected in the reluctance of villagers to join 
economic and social organizations that are actively promoted by them. This, for 
instance, explains the limited success of government efforts to increase participation 
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in farmers’ professional cooperatives (Shen et al. 2005; World Bank 2006; Deng et 
al. 2010). The fact that most of these organizations are established and run by local 
cadres raises “suspicion” among villagers, who see them as “tools” in the hands of 
local governments and large agribusiness firms (Augustin-Jean and Xue 2012: 196-
197). Small farmers wonder whether they are being created to help them access credit 
and technology, cheaper inputs and new marketing channels, or whether instead “the 
local authorities just want to charge fees or something like that from our pocket” 
(Augustin-Jean and Xue 2012: 192; 196).  
The fifth major consequence of the tension between villagers and rural 
officials is an increase in less or “non-institutionalized” forms of political 
participation, ranging from peaceful petitioning to violent protest. The combination 
of trust in the central government and distrust of local officials leads villagers to 
engage in what is called “rightful resistance” (Li and O´Brien 1996; O´Brien 1996; 
O´Brien and Li 2006) - a form of popular contention that entails the innovative use 
of the regime’s policies and laws in order to resist local officials who deny villagers 
the rights granted to them by the central government (O’Brien and Li 2006: 2). 
Through the letters and visits system, villagers lodge complaints against “arbitrary 
and self-serving” rural officials at higher levels of government, often to demand that 
they “work hard and live plainly and be willing to serve the people” (O’Brien and Li 
2006: 54; 9).  
When not satisfied with the process and outcomes of petitioning, villagers 
resort to violent collective action (Li L. 2008). Abuses of power and public trust by 
township and village governments explain the sharp increase in the number of violent 
protests in rural areas, most of which have been organized against officials who 
misappropriate public funds, impose illegal taxes, expropriate land without (or with 
little) compensation, manipulate village elections, or turn a blind eye to the 
environmental and health problems caused by enterprises in their jurisdiction 
(Bernstein and Lü 2000; 2003, 2008; Guo, 2001; Jing 2003; Zweig 2003; Thornton, 
2004; Deng and O’Brien 2014). In sum, an analysis of the literature reveals an 
unprecedented deterioration of state-society relations in China’s rural areas since 
1978.  
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These studies show how villagers’ perceptions of the trustworthiness of rural 
officials shape their behaviour in the tax, political and social arenas. In so doing, they 
tend to portray villagers either as “alienated apathetics” (Seligson 1980), who 
disengage from the public sphere, or as “alienated activists” (Seligson 1980), who 
engage in violent collective action. However, the repertoire of societal responses to 
the decline of legitimacy of the local state may be wider. In this sense, the 
development of self-governing organizations and the growth of (substitutive) non-
state provision may be other symptoms or manifestations of the lack of public trust 
in the willingness and ability of grassroots governments to meet local needs.  
This lack of trust may reduce the incentives of villagers to cooperate with 
officials, while strengthening their incentives to cooperate among themselves in 
order to address community needs. It may lead them to form and participate in village 
organizations that are autonomous from the state and that are able to raise funds and 
provide services independently from it. Based on this discussion, it is hypothesized 
that lower levels of trust in grassroots officials may be associated with higher levels 
of participation in self-governing organizations.  
To test this hypothesis, we examine villagers’ assessments of the 
trustworthiness of township officials. This is for two reasons. First, the analytical 
focus is on political actors, rather than on political institutions, because research on 
political trust suggests that, in explaining participatory behaviour, “distrust of 
government may not be as important as distrust of particular authorities” (Levi and 
Stoker 2000: 495). Second, the focus is on township officials, rather than on village 
officials, because, as we saw in chapter three, they crucially influence how and by 
whom villages are governed but are not themselves subject to elections or any other 
form of control by villagers. It is this interference of the township in village 
governance that may explain why villagers choose to participate in self-governing 
organizations. 
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4.3.2 Local Government Performance 
 
Institutional and cultural theories of political trust offer different views of the 
relationship between political trust and government performance (Newton and Norris 
2000; Mishler and Rose 2001; Shi 2001; Wong and Hsiao 2011). Cultural theories 
argue that the origins of political trust lie in the cultural values and norms that are 
acquired through socialization. From a cultural perspective, political trust is “an 
extension of interpersonal trust, learned early in life and, much later, projected onto 
political institutions, thereby conditioning institutional performance capabilities” 
(Mishler and Rose 2001: 31). In contrast, institutional theories contend that political 
trust is a rational response on the part of individuals to the performance of 
government institutions and leaders. It is not a cause but a consequence of 
institutional performance (Mishler and Rose 2001: 31).  
The results of cross-country studies testing these competing theories in the 
United States, Western Europe, Eastern and Central Europe, the former Soviet 
Union, as well as East Asia (including China), support the superiority of institutional 
explanations of political trust (Newton and Norris 2000; Mishler and Rose 2001; 
Wong and Hsiao 2011). However, the ongoing debate on whether political trust is 
politically exogenous or endogenous and on the relationship between political trust 
and government performance has significant implications for our research78: it 
suggests that it might be necessary to examine the impact of objective measures 
(rather than subjective perceptions) of local government performance on villager 
participation in self-governing organizations. Doing so will allow us to determine: 
(a) whether the performance of government institutions has a direct impact on 
participation in self-governing organizations or an indirect impact through political 
(dis-)trust formation; and (b) which dimensions of local government performance, if 
any, are most important in shaping villagers´ beliefs about the trustworthiness of their 
leaders.  
 
 
 
                                                 
78 More specifically, it raises the question of whether political trust can be considered a good proxy 
for government performance (as largely assumed in the previous section). 
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In China, the aspects of local government performance that matter most to 
villagers are: the provision of local public goods and the implementation of village 
democratic reforms79. Our basic hypothesis is that, all else being equal, a poorer 
provision of public goods and a poorer implementation of village elections (a) may 
directly increase participation in self-governing organizations; and (b) may indirectly 
increase participation rates, by reducing political trust in grassroots officials. 
First, there might be a direct link between the performance of grassroots 
governments and the development of self-governing organizations. When local 
governments fail to meet villagers’ demands for representation and for service 
provision, they may choose to participate in self-governing organizations as a 
response to dissatisfaction with their performance. 
 There is ample evidence that grassroots governments often fail to deliver 
what villagers demand: accountable and responsive governance.  
 
Many villagers consider that VCs do not adequately represent villagers’ 
interests, and that decisions are made by a small inner circle dominated by 
the Party branch and its secretary. Many also feel that village leaders have 
only very limited influence, and that both their and their villagers’ wishes 
will not be taken into account by the township and county governments 
when decisions are made. Leakage of funds is also a problem, with 
villagers accusing township and county officials of siphoning off funds 
intended for village development or poverty reduction. (Plummer and 
Taylor 2004: 81) 
 
There is also evidence that traditional social organization, such as temple or 
lineage-based organizations, are generally seen by villagers as an example for 
grassroots governments to follow, both in terms of how they are governed and how 
they respond to community needs.  
 
The village government is corrupt (fubai), but the leaders of local religious 
associations would not dare (bu gan) to embezzle collective properties; the 
village government is broke and does nothing for collective welfare 
(gongyi), but the temple builds streets, schools and old people’s homes; the 
village government’s accounting practices are obscure, while ancestral 
halls and temples make theirs public. (Brandstädter and Schubert 2005: 
809) 
                                                 
79 Two criteria commonly used to evaluate local government performance in developing countries are 
responsiveness and accountability (Andrews and Shah 2003). Hence, the choice of “village election 
quality” and “public goods investment” as proxies for local government performance is also supported 
by the general literature. 
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This suggests that in communities where state institutions can neither provide 
sufficient public goods nor provide sufficient democratic accountability, self-
governing organizations may emerge as a way of filling the gap in village 
governance.  
Second, the performance of local governments may affect participation in 
self-governing organizations indirectly, through its effects on political (dis-)trust 
formation. A comparison between the survey findings of Saich (2007, 2008) and 
those of Li (2004) suggests that there is a relationship between the (perceived) quality 
of government performance across various indicators, including service provision, 
and the level of trust in various levels of government. Specifically, their findings 
show high levels of satisfaction with, and trust in, the central government that decline 
dramatically with each level of local government. In Saich’s (2007, 2008) study, 86 
percent of respondents (n=3,697) reported being “very satisfied” or “somewhat 
satisfied” with the performance of the central government, but this percentage 
dropped to 75 percent for the provincial level, to 52 percent for the district and county 
levels, and to around 44 percent for the township, village and urban street levels. 
Similarly, the study of Li (2004) found that 53 percent and 42 percent (n=1,259) of 
respondents believed that the central government and provincial governments 
enjoyed “a very high level of trust”, but this percentage was 26%, 16%, and 13% for 
county-, township- and village-level governments, respectively80. 
Perceptions about the trustworthiness of government might not only be 
influenced by the quality of public services, but also by the quality of village 
elections. Research by Manion (2006: 308) shows that variation in the degree of 
electoral contestation and participation across villages is associated with variation in 
the percentage of villagers reporting that “most local leaders are clean and not 
corrupt”. Her research suggests that, the more competitive village elections are, the 
more trustworthy local officials are perceived to be. To conclude, whether directly 
or indirectly (via political trust), the quality of local government may affect 
participation rates in self-governing organizations: specifically, it is hypothesized 
that the poorer the performance of local governments, in terms of processes (i.e., 
                                                 
80 China differs from most decentralized countries in that the level of dissatisfaction with and distrust 
of government increases “as government gets closer to the people” (Saich 2007: 5). 
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village election quality) and outcomes (i.e., public goods investment), the higher the 
participation in self-governing organizations is likely to be. 
 
 
4.3.3 Lineage Ties 
 
A crucial aspect of the community context in rural China is lineage 
structure81. Much of the empirical literature from both developed (e.g., Alesina et al. 
1999; Alesina and La Ferrara 2000) and developing countries (e.g., Okten and Osili 
2004; Miguel and Gugerty 2005) indicates that ethnic heterogeneity is associated 
with: (i) lower levels of participation in community activities (Alesina and La Ferrara 
2000); lower levels of (monetary and time) contributions to community organizations 
(Okten and Osili 2004); and lower levels of public goods provision (Miguel and 
Gugerty 2005).  
These findings are attributed to four main factors, some of which are 
interrelated. First, people living in ethnically fragmented communities are less likely 
to participate in community activities, particularly in the presence of “mixed groups”, 
given that “individuals prefer to interact with others who are similar to themselves in 
terms of income, race or ethnicity” (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000: 850). Second, 
members of different ethnic groups generally have different preferences for public 
goods and, consequently, are both less likely to agree about which public goods 
should be provided in the community (Alesina et al. 1999), and less willing to 
contribute to the provision of “compromise types” (Miguel and Gugerty 2005). 
Third, individuals living in heterogeneous communities may derive different utility 
from the welfare of different community members, depending on whether they are 
fellow (ethnic) group members (positive utility) or not (no or negative utility). As a 
result, they may be less willing to pay for goods and services that are not enjoyed 
                                                 
81 Like castes, tribes and other ethnic groups, lineages identify and organize themselves around claims 
of common descent (Tsai 2007b: 149). In the pre-revolutionary period, lineage organizations, together 
with religious institutions, constituted “the most important organizational reality” in rural China 
(Brandstädter 2003: 90). However, this changed dramatically with the establishment of the People´s 
Republic of China in 1949. Under Mao, the state sought to eliminate lineage organizations, as clan 
identity threatened to dilute class consciousness among Chinese peasants (Perry 1985: 15-16). With 
the introduction of economic reforms in the post-Mao period, lineages have re-emerged in rural areas, 
particularly in the Southeastern provinces, where lineage genealogies have been compiled, ancestral 
halls rebuilt, and rituals resumed (e.g., Liu and Murphy 2006; Hansen 2008; Svensson 2012). 
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exclusively by members of their group (Alesina et al. 1999; Vigdor 2004; 
Habyarimana et al. 2007). Fourth, social sanctions against free riders are weaker in 
ethnically heterogeneous communities (Miguel and Gugerty 2005; Habyarimana et 
al. 2007). The reason given is that social sanctions are “strong” within groups and 
“non-existent” across groups (Miguel and Gugerty 2005: 2331), due to “the dense 
networks of information and mutual reciprocity that exist in groups but that are not 
possible across groups” (Miguel and Gugerty 2005: 2330).  
This body of literature suggests that ethnic diversity may have a negative 
impact on local governance in (at least) two ways: (i) it may weaken the incentives 
of individuals to form or join organizations (i.e., “taste for homogeneity”) and to 
contribute to public goods from which non-co-ethnics cannot be excluded (i.e., “taste 
for discrimination”); and (i) it may increase the transaction costs of collective action, 
by making decision-making more difficult (i.e., diversity of preferences over public 
goods) and/or by making free-riding easier (i.e., weakness of social sanctions).  
However, their findings might not fully reflect the way in which, and the 
channels through which, clan diversity affects local governance in China. Recent 
research has found no evidence that in villages with multiple lineages “different 
lineage groups prefer different types of public goods, prefer not to fund public goods 
that benefit people in other groups, or trust each other less” (Tsai 2007b: 167). In 
fact, there is evidence that villagers in single-lineage villages and in multi-lineage 
villages differ neither in their willingness to make voluntary (monetary and labour) 
contributions to public goods, nor in their ability to overcome the free-rider problem 
and to engage in collective action (Tsai 2007b: 166-169). Two conclusions can be 
drawn from these findings. First, in rural China lineage diversity does not equate with 
a lack of social cohesion: inter-lineage relations in multi-lineage villages are not 
inherently conflictual. Second, and relatedly, the fact that the level of trust and 
cooperation among villagers in multi-lineage villages is not lower than in single-
lineage villages can be interpreted as evidence of: (i) the existence of “networks of 
information and mutual reciprocity” (Miguel and Gugerty 2005: 2330), not only 
within groups, but also across groups; and consequently of (ii) the ability of multi-
lineage villages to impose social sanctions on opportunistic behaviour, and to do it 
effectively. 
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This discussion suggests that villages with multiple lineage groups, which 
represent the overwhelming majority of our sample villages, might not have lower 
levels of associational activities or (voluntary) provision of public goods. We would 
not expect lineage diversity, per se, to be negatively associated with the development 
of self-governing organizations, unless intra-lineage cohesion is gained at the 
expense of inter-lineage conflict, which may happen in a small number of villages. 
Furthermore, while the presence of multiple clans might not weaken a community’s 
capacity for collective action, our finding (chapter 3) and those of other studies (Tsai 
2007ab; Kung et al. 2009) that multi-lineage villages tend to have lower levels of 
(village) government investment in public goods suggests that it is precisely in these 
communities where incentives for self-organization and self-provision might be 
strongest.  
In light of these considerations, in our analysis of the determinants of 
participation in self-governing organizations we examine the effects of both a 
community’s lineage structure and relations and anticipate that, in the absence of 
inter-lineage conflict, the co-existence of active lineage groups in a village might be 
positively associated with participation in this type of organizations. This hypothesis 
is in line with recent evidence from developing countries showing a positive 
relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and the private provision of public goods 
(Kimenyi 2006; Schündeln 2013). 
 
 
4.3.4 Labour Migration  
 
Another contextual variable that might crucially affect associational life and 
non-state service provision in rural communities is out-migration. During the reform 
period, China has been experiencing what is considered “the largest migration in 
human history” (Roberts 2002: 141): the number of rural-urban migrants increased 
from less than 16 million in the 1980s to more than 158 million in 2011 (Hu et al. 
2011: 64; Lu 2015: 11).  
Much has been written on the socioeconomic effects of rural-urban migration 
on rural communities (e.g., Murphy 2002, 2009), but less attention has been paid to 
its sociopolitical effects. Evidence from the United States and other developed 
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countries indicates that (internal) migration has a negative impact on civic 
engagement and social capital (Putnam 2000: 205). However, migration in China, 
like in many other developing countries, is predominantly circular: “migrants 
regularly return to their villages and retain their ties to the land as part of a strategy 
of spatial and sectoral diversification of household labor” (Roberts 1997: 250)82. 
Circular migration does not necessarily break traditional ties within rural 
communities (Brown 2002; Hare 1999) and at the same time it creates new ties to 
urban communities, which provide (non-migrant) villagers with access to resources 
otherwise unavailable. Supporting this view, Matthews and Nee (2000: 613) point 
out that “custom requires male migrants to maintain their social ties and status in the 
village community by sending regular remittances to support their families. 
Otherwise they risk losing face not only among relatives and neighbours in the 
village, but also within the emigrant network of fellow villagers in the city”.  
Seen in this light, one reason why rural-urban migration may be positively 
associated with the development of self-governing organizations in rural areas is 
related to the resources embedded in migration networks - the “sets of interpersonal 
ties that link migrants, former migrants, and nonmigrants in origin and destination 
areas by ties of kinship, friendship, and shared community of origin” (Massey 1990: 
7). Through their (economic and social) remittances (e.g., money, skills, information, 
etc.), migrants can and do provide crucial support to their families and home 
communities in various ways (Murphy 2002, 2009). In particular, (return) migrants 
can contribute to the growth of non-state provision of public goods in their villages, 
either by making donations to community infrastructure projects (Liu et al. 2012) or 
by providing leadership to the community organizations that carry them out (Ge et 
al. 2011).  
Another reason why higher levels of out-migration might result in higher 
levels of participation in self-governing organizations in rural areas is related not to 
the resources that migration brings, but to the needs that it creates. As a consequence 
of migration, new social organizations have emerged both in urban and rural areas 
                                                 
82 Permanent migration to cities is often neither feasible nor desirable, due to the restrictions imposed 
by the household registration system (hukou), as well as to the harsh working and living conditions 
faced by rural migrant workers (Davin 1998; Solinger 1999; Wang 2005; Chan and Buckingham 
2008). 
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that help migrants and non-migrants cope with the difficulties they face (Howell 
2009; Tong 2010; Watson 2008) 83.  
In the city, rural migrant workers (mingong) have responded to being denied 
their labour rights and access to basic services by forming advocacy and service 
delivery organizations, such as labour non-governmental organizations 84 (Watson 
2008; Zhang and Smith 2009) and schools for their children (Howell 2009). In the 
village, new social organizations have been formed to offset the negative impact of 
migration on the welfare of those “left-behind” (i.e., women, children and the 
elderly), such as womens’ organizations and old people’s associations (Tong 2010). 
These organizations can help women cope with farm work, in addition to child and 
elder care (Biao 2007; Mu and van de Walle 2011). They may play an important role 
in meeting the needs of (non-migrant) villagers and in performing the social welfare 
functions (e.g., elderly care) that the state is unwilling or unable to perform. For these 
reasons, (circular) rural-urban migration may be positively associated with the 
development of self-governing organizations in rural communities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
83 The literature on social capital and collective action suggests that village-based migration networks, 
like other types of social networks, may create incentives for villagers – whether living in the village 
or not – to cooperate and to contribute to the community, by providing a mechanism for monitoring 
and sanctioning behaviour that deviates from community norms and expectations (Ostrom and Ahn 
2001). 
84 Most of these organizations tend to assume a service delivery role rather than an advocacy role. 
They provide crucial services to migrant workers, including legal advice and support, education on 
labour laws and regulations, and training on occupational health and safety. Most of them are funded 
by international donors (Zhang and Smith 2009). 
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4.4 Variables, Econometric Model and Estimation Method 
 
The central question addressed in this chapter is: what determines 
participation in self-governing organizations in rural communities? As discussed in 
section 4.2, we define self-governing organizations as those community-based 
organizations meeting the following criteria: (1) their leaders are not appointed by, 
and do not hold concurrent posts in, the local Party-state; and (2) they do not 
incorporate local officials in their activities or decision-making processes.  
We test the hypotheses put forward in section 4.3 by estimating a two-
equation model, in which “political trust” and “participation in self-governing 
organizations” are the jointly dependent variables. The advantage of using a 
simultaneous equations model is that it takes into account the possible endogeneity 
of the political trust variable. Political trust may both affect and be affected by 
participation in self-governing organizations. This possibility is suggested by the 
recent finding that village cadres believe that “substitutive public goods provision” 
by community groups undermines their authority and has a negative impact on cadre-
villager relations (Tsai 2011).  
The two-equation model is estimated using the three-stage least squares 
(3SLS) method. As discussed in section 3.4, the main reason why we use three-stage 
least squares, rather than two-stage least squares, is that system estimation methods 
are considered more efficient than single-equation estimation methods (Wooldridge 
2006: 567). The remainder of the section discusses the variables included in the 
model and their measurement, as well as the identification strategy used to estimate 
the model by 3SLS.  
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4.4.1 Political Trust and Participation in Self-Governing Organizations 
 
The first dependent variable in the model is the participation rate in self-
governing organizations at the village level in 2004-2005. It is calculated by dividing 
the total number of memberships in self-governing organizations by the total village 
population during this period. 
Table 4.5 shows the rates of participation in self-governing and government-
controlled organizations in the sample villages (2004-2005). As can be seen, self-
governing organizations accounted for around one-third of memberships in all 
organizations. Participation rates in self-governing organizations ranged from 0 to 81 
percent, with an average participation rate of 4 percent. There is evidence of 
significant variation in the level of participation in these organizations across 
provinces. The average participation rate in Fujian was 15 percent as compared to 
only 0.2 percent in Sichuan. This indicates that villages differ not only in the 
“vibrancy” of their associational life (Putnam 1993) but also in the nature or character 
of their associations: the question is thus not – or not only – whether villagers 
participate in associational activities, but in which organizations they participate and 
why. 
 
Table 4.5: Participation rates in self-governing organizations, by province 
 No of villages Self-governing 
Government-
controlled 
All types of 
organizations 
Jiangsu 19 2.08 8.38 10.46 
Sichuan 20 0.21 2.75 2.96 
Shaanxi 16 4.08 4.81 8.89 
Jilin 21 1.65 9.81 11.46 
Hebei 19 1.55 4.64 6.19 
Fujian 20 15.07 17.20 32.27 
Sample 115 4.13 8.08 12.21 
Source: CCAP Village Survey (2005) 
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The second dependent variable is political trust. A village-level measure of 
political trust was created, using responses from villagers to five survey questions 
about the integrity and competence of township officials. As can be seen in Table 
4.6, questions 1-2 asked respondents to assess the trustworthiness and reputation 
(weixin) of both township officials and those awarded the title of “model cadre” and 
“model Party member” by the township government. Questions 3-5 asked 
respondents to assess the willingness and ability of township officials to serve their 
interests and needs. A dichotomous variable was created for each of the political trust 
questions. Each variable was coded 1 if the respondent answered “agree” or 
“somewhat agree”, and 0 otherwise. We then combined the five variables into an 
index, by averaging them. The political trust index, ranges from 0 to 1, with higher 
scores indicating higher levels of political trust. Table 4.7 reports the average value 
of the index and its components across villages by province. A comparison of Tables 
4.7 and 4.5 suggests that there might be a link between levels of political trust and 
patterns of social participation. Villages in Sichuan and Fujian are the ones with the 
highest and lowest scores on the political trust index (Table 4.7), and are also the 
ones with the lowest and highest participation rates in self-governing organizations 
(Table 4.5). 
 
Table 4.6: Survey questions on the trustworthiness of grassroots officials 
1. Do you agree that township officials are highly respected by villagers? 
2. Do you agree that “model cadres” and “model Party members” are held in high regard? 
3. Do you agree that township policies truly promote the interests of peasants? 
4. Do you agree that township officials are willing to uphold justice for peasants? 
5. Do you agree that addressing complaints to township officials is an effective way to 
solve problems? 
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Table 4.7 Political trust index scores, by province 
 
Township 
cadres 
respected 
Model 
cadres 
highly 
regarded 
Township 
policy 
beneficial 
Willingness 
to uphold 
justice 
Ability to 
solve 
problems 
Political 
trust 
index 
Jiangsu 0.37 0.41 0.53 0.60 0.66 0.51 
Sichuan 0.46 0.47 0.65 0.76 0.86 0.64 
Shaanxi 0.27 0.34 0.37 0.47 0.70 0.43 
Jilin 0.43 0.54 0.52 0.62 0.65 0.55 
Hebei 0.37 0.32 0.47 0.56 0.65 0.47 
Fujian 0.32 0.26 0.34 0.39 0.58 0.38 
All 
sample 
0.37 0.39 0.48 0.57 0.69 0.50 
Source: CCAP Village Survey (2005) 
 
 
4.4.2 Local Government Performance 
 
Two (time-lagged) measures of local government performance are included 
in the model: village public goods provision and election quality. The variable 
“village public goods provision” refers to (per capita) village government investment 
in infrastructure in 2003-2004. “Election quality” refers to the democratic quality of 
the last village election before 2004.  It is measured by an election quality index, 
which ranges from 0 to 5, with higher scores denoting freer and fairer elections, in 
which: (1) election committee members were selected by villagers; (2) candidates 
were directly nominated by voters through open primaries (i.e., haixuan); (3) secret 
voting booths were used; (4) proxy-voting was not permitted; and (5) roving ballot 
boxes were not used85. 
 Table 4.8 reports the average values of the government performance variables 
in our sample villages. During the period of study, villages in Sichuan recorded the 
highest level of infrastructure investment (188 yuan per capita), and villages in Hebei 
the lowest (66 yuan per capita). Villages in Jilin obtained the highest score in the 
                                                 
85 A more detailed explanation of these variables was given in section 3.4.1. It should be noted that 
the measure of “village public goods provision” in this chapter only includes capital expenditures on 
infrastructure.  
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election quality index (3.29), and villages in Shaanxi the lowest (1.75). A comparison 
of Tables 4.7 and 4.8 suggests that there might be a link between how much local 
officials invest in public goods and how trustworthy they are perceived to be. 
However, there does not seem to be an obvious link between how well village 
elections are implemented and how much villagers trust their leaders. 
 
Table 4.8: Measures of local government performance 
 No. of 
Observations 
Village Public Goods 
Investment 
Village Election 
Quality 
Jiangsu 19 156.86 2.68 
Sichuan 20 188.16 2.20 
Shaanxi 16 112.61 1.75 
Jilin 21 81.72 3.29 
Hebei 18 66.04 2.28 
Fujian 20 144.48 1.90 
Sample 114 125.27 2.38 
Source: CCAP Village Survey (2005) 
 
 
4.4.3 Lineage Ties and Migration  
 
 Two contextual variables that may affect the development of self-governing 
organizations are lineage institutions and migration processes. Migration is measured 
by the proportion of the village labour force working outside the county in 2000. To 
avoid endogeneity concerns, this variable is also lagged one period. Migrants 
accounted, on average, for about 28 percent of the village labour force in 2000. 
Lineage institutions are measured in three ways: (i) the type of clan structure; 
(ii) the nature of intra-clan relations; and (iii) the nature of inter-clan relations. First, 
following previous studies (e.g., Manion 2006), a village’s lineage structure is 
measured by the proportion of households belonging to the three largest surname 
groups or, in other words, by the degree of surname concentration. 91 percent of the 
sample villages are multi-surname communities, and the average percentage of 
households belonging to the three largest surname groups was 56 percent (with a 
standard deviation of 27 percent) in 2004. 
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Second, and also in line with previous studies (e.g., Tsai 2007ab), the 
presence of active lineage groups and the degree of cohesion within clans in a village 
is measured by the number of ancestral halls which, as evidence from Fujian and 
Zhejiang shows, are “at the center of the social, political and cultural life of lineages 
and whole villages” (Svensson 2012: 157-158). About 23 percent of the sample 
villages had (at least) one ancestral hall in 2004. 
Finally, the degree of cooperation or conflict between clan groups is 
measured by a dummy variable, the inter-clan tension index, which takes the value 0 
if relations are cooperative, and 1 if they are conflictual. In around 74 percent of the 
sample villages, inter-clan relations were described as cooperative at the time of the 
survey, while in the other 26 percent they were considered somewhat conflictual 
(24%) or conflictual (2%). 
 
 
4.4.4 Control Variables 
  
The model controls for a number of economic, demographic and geographic 
factors that may affect participation in self-governing organizations. It includes a set 
of economic variables representing the level of village economic development, 
namely, the log of per capita net income, the amount of per capita farmland, as well 
as the number of collective, private, and individual (getihu) enterprises. Additionally, 
the model includes a set of demographic and geographic controls, in particular, the 
log of the village population, the proportion of flat land in the village, the log of the 
distance to the township, as well as provincial dummies. 
 
 
4.4.5 Econometric Model and Estimation Method 
 
To address potential problems of endogeneity, we specify a simultaneous 
equations model, with “political trust” and “participation in self-governing 
organizations” as the endogenous variables, and estimate it using three-stage least 
squares. For the model to be identified, we need (at least) two exclusion restrictions. 
One exogenous variable in the “participation” equation must be excluded from the 
“trust” equation, and vice versa. To this end, the variable “number of collective 
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enterprises” is excluded from the participation equation and included in the trust 
equation, while the variable “number of ancestral halls” is omitted from the trust 
equation and included in the participation equation.  
The plausibility of these exclusion restrictions rests on two crucial assumptions. 
The first one is that the “number of collective enterprises” has a direct impact on 
political trust, but only an indirect impact on participation in self-governing 
organizations, through its effects on political trust. This assumption is reasonable. 
The presence or absence of collective enterprises in rural communities has been 
identified as the single most important determinant of the severity of the so-called 
“peasant burden” problem and the resulting conflict between villagers and officials 
over taxation issues (Benstein and Lü 2000, 2003, 2008). 
The second assumption is that the “number of ancestral halls” has a direct 
impact on participation in self-governing organizations, but only an indirect impact 
on political trust (via participation in these organizations). This assumption also 
seems reasonable in light of evidence showing that lineage-based organizations, such 
as old people’s associations, often have their “centres” (Hansen 2008) or “offices” 
(Svensson 2012: 162) in ancestral halls. 
In order to refine the model further, two additional exogenous variables are 
included in the first stage of the 3SLS estimations. These variables are: (1) the 
number of villagers who participated in the Anti-Japanese War (1937-45), the 
Liberation War (1945-49), and the Korean War (1950-53) under the leadership of the 
Chinese Communist Party; and (2) the number of villagers who were persecuted 
during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). These historical variables are clearly 
exogenous and, as pointed out by Tao et al. (2011: 115), may have influenced 
political attitudes in the Chinese countryside across generations. They may exert a 
direct impact on political trust, but only an indirect impact on participation in self-
governing organizations, through their effects on political trust86.  
                                                 
86 There might be a positive relationship between the number of war veterans and the level of political 
trust in a village, and a negative relationship between the number of villagers persecuted during the 
Cultural Revolution period and the level of political trust. The first-stage results of the regression 
indicate that the number of war veterans has a positive significant impact on the level of political trust 
but has no significant (direct) impact on participation in self-governing organizations. This is shown 
in Table 4.10. 
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The simultaneous equations model and the main hypotheses are summarized in 
Table 4.9. As previously discussed, existing evidence suggests that there may be a 
two-way relationship between the endogenous variables (i.e., political trust and 
participation in self-governing organizations). This justifies the use of a nonrecursive 
simultaneous equations model (Table 4.9) to test our hypotheses on the determinants 
of participation in self-governing organizations. However, we also need to consider 
the possibility that there is a one-way relationship between these variables. Political 
trust may influence participation in self-governing organizations, but participation in 
these organizations may have no impact on the political attitudes of their members. 
For this reason, we also specify a recursive simultaneous equations model and 
estimate it using three-stage least squares.  
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Table 4.9 Political Distrust and Participation in Self-governing Organizations: Main 
Model Specification and Hypotheses 
 
 Participation in self-
governing organizations 
(Eq. 1) 
Political trust 
(Eq. 2) 
Measure of political trust 
 
 Political trust index at the village 
level (0-5) 
 
 
- 
 
n/a 
Measure of participation in self-
governing organizations 
 
 Participation rate in self-
governing organizations 
 
n/a 
 
- 
(Time-Lagged) Measures of local 
government performance 
 
 Ln (per capita village government 
investment in public goods) 
 Village election quality index (0-
5) 
 
 
- 
 
 
Measures of clan structure and 
relations 
 
 Percentage of households 
belonging to the three largest 
surname groups 
 No. of ancestral halls 
 
+ 
 
 
 
 Inter-clan tension index (0-1) -  
Measure of out-migration 
 
 % migrants in village labour force 
 
+ 
 
 
Economic controls 
 Ln (per capita net income) 
 No. private enterprises 
 No. collective enterprises 
 No. self-employed businesses 
 
Demographic and geographic controls 
 Ln (village population) 
 Per capita arable land (mu) 
 Percentage of flat land 
 Ln (distance to the town, km) 
 
Exogenous variables or instruments only included in the first-stage regression 
 No. of war veterans  
 No. of villagers persecuted during the Cultural Revolution 
 
Exclusion restrictions 
 No. of collective enterprises (variable excluded from Eq. 1) 
 No. of ancestral halls (variable excluded from Eq. 2) 
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4.5 Results and Findings 
  
The results of the 3SLS estimation of the two-equation models are presented 
in Tables 4.10, 4.11 (nonrecursive model), and 4.12 (recursive model). Our main 
hypothesis – that lower levels of trust in grassroots officials lead to higher levels of 
participation in self-governing organizations – is confirmed. As can be seen in Tables 
4.11 and 4.12, a one percent decrease in the political trust index is associated with a 
0.65 (Table 4.11) or a 0.60 (Table 4.12) percentage point increase in the participation 
rate. The results in Table 4.12 also show that there is a reciprocal relationship 
between these two variables. Political distrust is both a cause and a consequence of 
participation in self-governing organizations. The fact that villagers form their own 
organizations to address community needs not only reflects, but also contributes to, 
their growing apathy and disengagement from the state. 
 The hypothesis regarding the impact of government performance on the 
development of self-governing organizations is partially supported. The results in 
Tables 4.11 and 4.12 (Eq. 1) indicate that the performance of government institutions 
does not affect participation in self-governing organizations directly, but indirectly 
through political trust (Eq. 2). They also indicate that public goods provision is the 
aspect of government that is most important in shaping villagers’ perceptions about 
the trustworthiness of government officials. The coefficient on the public investment 
variable (Eq. 2) is positive and significant at the 5 percent (Table 4.12) or 10 percent 
level (Table 4.10) in the recursive and nonrecursive models. This suggests that 
villages with lower levels of government investment in infrastructure are also the 
villages with lower levels of political trust and, consequently, those with higher levels 
of participation in self-governing organizations.  
In addition to institutional factors, social and economic factors also explain 
differences among villages in the extent of participation in these organizations. As 
can be seen in Tables 4.11 and 4.12, our hypotheses about the effects of clan structure 
and migration processes are largely supported by the results. The presence of 
cohesive and active lineage groups in a village – as measured by the number of 
village ancestral halls – has a positive and significant impact on participation in self-
governing organizations. The coefficients on the surname concentration variable and 
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the inter-clan tension variable have the predicted negative sign but are not significant 
at conventional levels. Like lineage institutions, migration is positively and 
significantly associated with participation in self-governing organizations in both 
model specifications.  
These latter results can be interpreted as evidence of the absence of good 
government and of the presence of social capital in communities with multiple clans 
and higher levels of (circular) rural-urban migration. On the one hand, our findings 
in Chapter 3 suggest that villages where a smaller number of households belong to 
the three largest surname groups and where a larger share of the labour force works 
outside the county receive less investment in infrastructure. On the other hand, the 
presence of clan and migration networks may enhance the ability of communities to 
provide themselves with the public goods that are under-provided by the state. These 
different forms of social capital may provide a means not only to prevent the 
opportunistic behaviour of community members, but also to access resources outside 
the community. 
Regarding the effect of the control variables, the results show that, while the 
presence of self-employed households in a village has a significant negative impact 
on membership in self-governing organizations, the presence of larger private 
enterprises has the opposite effect. The causal mechanism by which these variables 
influence the development of self-governing organizations may be related to 
differences in the willingness and ability of self-employed individuals (getihu) and 
private entrepreneurs to make (time and money) contributions to these organizations. 
It may also be related to differences in political attitudes. There is evidence that 
villagers with higher incomes are more likely to believe that elected village 
committees should be autonomous from township governments and village Party 
branches and should be given the power to govern their communities (Tan and Xin 
2007: 591).  
To conclude, a comparison of the determinants of participation in self-
governing and government-controlled organizations (see Table 4.11) highlights how 
the decline in political trust and the revival of traditional networks (i.e., clans) 
underpin the incipient development of autonomous associational life in Chinese rural 
communities.  
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Table 4.10: Results of the first-stage regression (nonrecursive model) 
 Participation rate in 
self-governing 
organizations  
Participation rate in 
govt.-controlled 
organizations 
Average political 
trust 
No of villagers persecuted during the 
Cultural Revolution 
-84.875  
(0.50) 
60.351 
(0.27) 
-2.071  
(0.91) 
No of  war veterans -99.597  
(1.20) 
119.654  
(1.08) 
2.452  
(2.22)** 
Election quality index (last election 
before 2004) 
0.245  
(0.24) 
1.117  
(0.83) 
0.011  
(0.78) 
Per capita village government 
investment in public goods (2003-04) 
-96.264  
(1.64) 
84.142 
(1.08) 
1.310  
(1.68)* 
No. of ancestral halls 2.198  
(3.37)*** 
-0.018   
(0.02) 
-0.013   
(1.49) 
% of households belonging to the three 
largest surname groups 
0.036   
(0.77) 
-0.039 
(0.62) 
-0.001  
(1.03) 
Inter-clan tension index -6.031  
(0.55) 
-1.134  
(0.08) 
-0.189   
(1.29) 
% of  migrants in village labour force 
(2000) 
0.222  
(3.57)*** 
0.154 
(1.85)*** 
0.001   
(1.27) 
No. of collective enterprises -0.138  
(0.06) 
-2.320 
(0.72) 
0.020  
(0.61) 
% of  self-employed households -0.165  
(1.46) 
-0.002 
(0.01) 
-0.001  
(0.39) 
No. of private enterprises 0.186  
(1.46) 
0.197 
(1.16) 
0.001  
(0.76) 
Ln (per capita net income) 2.196   
(0.84) 
-7.284  
(2.08)** 
0.019  
(0.54) 
Per capita arable land 1.712  
(0.12) 
19.443 
(1.00) 
0.026  
(0.13) 
Ln (village population) -0.548  
(0.23) 
5.120 
(1.60) 
0.052  
(1.63) 
% of flat land 0.056  
(1.51) 
-0.034 
(0.68) 
-0.001  
(1.78)* 
Ln (distance to the town) -0.868  
(0.58) 
-3.331 
(1.67)* 
0.011  
(0.57) 
Constant -21.553  
(0.84) 
29.935 
 (0.87) 
-0.036   
(0.11) 
Provincial dummies Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.459 0.222 0.432 
F test   
[p-value] 
3.72  
[p = 0.000] 
1.25 
[p = 0.233] 
3.33                        
[p = 0.000] 
    
Observations 114 114 114 
    
Note: Figures in parentheses are absolute values of t-statistics  
* Significant at the 10% level 
** Idem, 5% 
*** Idem, 1% 
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Table 4.11: 3SLS estimates of the relationship between political distrust and 
participation in self-governing organizations (nonrecursive model) 
 Self-governing organizations  Government-controlled 
organizations 
 Participation 
rate 
(Eq. 1) 
Average 
political trust 
(Eq. 2) 
 Participation 
rate 
(Eq. 1) 
Average 
political trust 
(Eq. 2) 
Average political trust -64.869      
(3.20)*** 
  50.977       
(2.89)*** 
 
Participation rate in self-
governing org. 
 -0.009   
(2.24)** 
   
Participation rate in govt.-
controlled org. 
    0.019 
(2.65)*** 
Election quality index (last 
election before 2004) 
0.715               
(0.76) 
0.008   
(0.62) 
 0.754               
(0.58) 
-0.014  
(0.57) 
Per capita village government 
investment in public goods (2003-
04) 
12.899             
(0.22) 
0.772    
(0.95) 
 -15.439             
(0.21) 
0.283 
(0.20) 
No. of ancestral halls 1.000             
(1.73)* 
  -0.009             
(0.02) 
 
% of households belonging to the 
three largest surname groups 
-0.0003               
(0.01) 
-0.0002  
(0.30) 
 -0.007           
(0.12) 
0.0000 
(0.12) 
Inter-clan tension index -17.753            
(1.61) 
-0.233  
(1.52) 
 8.210             
(0.56) 
-0.161  
(0.60) 
% of  migrants in village labour 
force (2000) 
0.304         
(4.65)*** 
0.003 
(2.97)*** 
 0.093           
(1.11) 
-0.002  
(0.91) 
No. of collective enterprises   0.007   
(0.30) 
  0.005 
(0.17) 
% of self-employed households -0.198            
(1.87)* 
-0.002  
(1.12) 
 0.084              
(0.60) 
-0.002  
(0.62) 
No. of private enterprises 0.271           
(2.23)** 
0.003   
(1.50) 
 0.167            
(1.00) 
-0.003  
(0.94) 
Ln (per capita net income) 2.833               
(1.15) 
0.028   
(0.76) 
 -7.998         
(2.35)** 
0.154 
(1.86)* 
Per capita arable land 1.397 
(0.10) 
0.018   
(0.09) 
 25.250 
(1.36) 
-0.484 
(1.30) 
Ln (village population) 3.815 
(1.72)* 
0.055  
(1.85)* 
 1.507 
(0.52) 
-0.029 
(0.49) 
% of flat land -0.005 
(0.14) 
-0.0004  
(0.78) 
 0.020 
(0.52) 
-0.000  
(0.43) 
Ln (distance to the town) -0.048 
(0.03) 
0.004   
(0.21) 
 -4.1260 
(2.11)** 
0.080  
(1.81)* 
Constant -26.030 
(1.11) 
-0.192  
(0.52) 
 34.993 
(1.08) 
-0.671 
(1.01) 
Provincial dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.081 0.204  -0.15 -2.14 
F test    
[p-value] 
4.78  
[0.000] 
3.31   
[0.000] 
 2.30                     
[0.002] 
1.81 
[0.025] 
Observations 114 114  114 114 
      
Note: Figures in parentheses are absolute values of t-statistics  
* Significant at the 10% level 
** Idem, 5% 
*** Idem, 1% 
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Table 4.12: 3SLS estimates of the relationship between political distrust and 
participation in self-governing organizations (recursive model) 
 
 Self-governing 
organizations 
 Gov-controlled 
organizations 
 Participation 
rate (Eq. 1) 
Average 
political 
trust (Eq. 2)  
 Participation 
rate (Eq. 1) 
Average 
political 
trust (Eq. 2) 
Average political trust -59.724      
(2.61)*** 
  86.571       
(2.82)*** 
 
Election quality index (last election 
before 2004) 
 0.002   
(0.18) 
  0.008  
(0.74) 
Per capita village government investment 
in public goods (2003-04) 
 1.424   
(2.14)** 
  1.196 
(1.89)* 
No. of ancestral halls 1.306             
(1.90)* 
-0.012  
(1.57) 
 1.147             
(1.19) 
-0.012  
(1.54) 
% of households belonging to the three 
largest surname groups 
-0.003               
(0.07) 
-0.0004  
(0.75) 
 0.005               
(0.08) 
-0.0000 
(0.74) 
Inter-clan tension index -15.497            
(1.32) 
-0.175  
(1.29) 
 15.869               
(0.97) 
-0.188  
(1.39) 
% of  migrants in village labour force 
(2000) 
0.294         
(4.38)*** 
0.002 
(2.10)** 
 0.043           
(0.46) 
0.002  
(2.10)** 
No. of collective enterprises 0.558               
(0.23) 
0.017   
(0.58) 
 -4.644              
(1.38) 
0.023  
(0.77) 
% of self-employed households -0.202            
(1.82)* 
-0.0003  
(0.21) 
 0.042               
(0.27) 
-0.0000  
(0.20) 
No. of private enterprises 0.265           
(2.03)** 
0.001   
(0.81) 
 0.090                
(0.49) 
0.001  
(0.79) 
Ln (per capita net income) 2.701               
(1.05) 
0.008   
(0.25) 
 -8.650          
(2.39)** 
0.011 
(0.33) 
Per capita arable land -0.673 
(0.05) 
-0.019   
(0.11) 
 18.776 
(0.93) 
-0.004  
(0.02) 
Ln (village population) 3.391               
(1.56) 
0.046  
(1.76)* 
 0.418 
(0.14) 
0.044  
(1.68)* 
% of flat land -0.003 
(0.08) 
-0.0008 
(1.82)* 
 0.044 
(0.79) 
-0.001 
(1.84)* 
Ln (distance to the town) -0.053 
(0.03) 
0.011   
(0.60) 
 -4.397 
(2.06)** 
0.011  
(0.59) 
Constant -23.162 
(0.94) 
0.104   
(0.34) 
 32.953 
(0.94) 
0.089  
(0.29) 
Provincial dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.140 0.394  -0.629 0.394 
F test   
[p-value] 
4.50  
[p = 0.000] 
3.94  
[p = 0.000] 
 1.61                       
[p = 0.062] 
3.91 
[p = 0.000] 
Correlation between participation rate and 
the error terms of political trust equation 
r = -0.048 [p = 0.613]  r = -0.136 [p = 0.151] 
Observations 114 114  114 114 
      
Note: Figures in parentheses are absolute values of t-statistics  
* Significant at the 10% level 
** Idem, 5% 
*** Idem, 1% 
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4.6 Summary 
  
 Throughout the developing world, there are numerous examples of 
“substitutive informal institutions” (Helmke and Levitsky 2004) that have emerged 
in response to the ineffectiveness of formal institutions in providing public services 
in rural areas (e.g., Narayan 1999; Narayan and Walton 2000; Woolcock and Narayan 
2000). “Rondas” in Peru (Muñoz et al. 2007), “harambees” in Kenya (Miguel and 
Gugerty 2005), and “informal panchayats” in India (Pur 2007) are just a few of them. 
Although informal institutions may fill the gap left by the state in the provision of 
rural infrastructure, education, health, and other basic services, they are often “poor 
substitutes” for formal institutions (Narayan 1999: 37). Worse yet, by substituting 
for the state in rural service provision, they may undermine its legitimacy and 
performance in rural areas, insofar as the two types of institutions compete to 
mobilize resources and support from rural residents (Cammet and MacLean 2011; 
Batley et al. 2012; Ali et al. 2014).  
The goal of this chapter was to examine the rise of self-governing 
organizations in rural China and to assess their role and impact as (non-state) 
providers of basic infrastructure services. The analysis of survey data on 552 village 
organizations reveals that most of them were established by the state and have 
remained under its control. However, almost one-fourth of these community-based 
organizations are self-governing in that they are run by villagers, not by local 
officials.  
Although self-governing organizations take a wide variety of forms, we 
found that the majority of them are either religious organizations, such as Buddhist 
temples or Christian churches, or lineage-based organizations, such as old people’s 
associations and wedding and funeral councils. Consistent with previous studies 
(Croll 1999; Tsai 2002, 2007ab, 2011), the survey data indicate that religious and 
clan organizations, which constituted “the most important organizational reality in 
rural society” in the pre-1949 period (Brandstädter 2003: 90), have re-emerged in 
rural areas, sometimes under new names, and often to perform their traditional roles 
as non-state service providers. In this respect, we found that around one-third of self-
governing organizations were involved in the construction and maintenance of 
village infrastructure during the 2000-2005 period. While some of these associations 
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may be able to raise funds and carry out infrastructure projects independently without 
the support of the two village committees (e.g., local temples in Fujian), they have a 
limited capacity to fill the gap left by the state in the provision and maintenance of 
roads, drinking and irrigation water, and schools - the types of public goods to which 
villagers attach the highest priority (Yi et al. 2011: 120-122). This is most obvious 
among certain types of organizations, such as churches, and in poorer provinces, such 
as Shaanxi. For this reason, the formation of self-governing organizations can only 
be a second-best solution to the problem of underprovision of public goods in rural 
communities. 
In addition to exploring the service delivery role of self-governing 
organizations, the main objective of this chapter was to examine the effects of various 
institutional, social and economic factors on villagers’ participation in these 
organizations, including political trust, government performance, clan structure and 
migration processes. For this purpose, a two-equation simultaneous equations model, 
in which political trust and membership in self-governing organizations were the 
endogenous variables, was estimated using three-stage least squares.  
Three major findings emerged from the results. First, whether villagers 
participate in government-controlled or self-governing organizations depends on 
how much they trust township officials. The more trustworthy villagers perceive 
township cadres to be, the more willing they are to join government-controlled 
organizations. Conversely, the less villagers trust township officials, the more likely 
they are to join self-governing organizations. While differences in government 
performance are associated with differences in the level of participation in self-
governing organizations, the causal relationship between these two variables seems 
to be indirect and mediated by political (dis-)trust. More specifically, villages with 
lower levels of government investment in infrastructure are also the villages with 
lower levels of political trust and, consequently, those with higher levels of 
participation in this type of organizations.  
These findings are consistent with those in Chapter 3. We found that, by 
increasing the influence of township officials over village governance, the cadre 
responsibility system makes village governments less democratically accountable to 
villagers, and village spending less responsive to public good needs. Specifically, 
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village governments that are less autonomous from, and more accountable to, 
township governments are less likely to be run by (democratically elected) village 
committees and are not more likely to invest in public goods. Villagers are aware of 
the extent to which, and the way in which, township officials influence how and by 
whom their communities are governed. This is why, in villages where township 
officials neither govern nor let others (i.e., village officials) govern in the interest of 
their residents, the latter may have strong incentives to form and participate in self-
governing organizations as a means to disengage from the state and to address 
community needs independently from it. 
 Second, villages with more cohesive lineage groups and with larger migration 
networks provide a context conducive to the development of self-governing 
organizations. This may be for two reasons. The first one is related to a community’s 
incentives for collective action. Our findings in chapter 3 and those of other studies 
show that villages in which a larger share of the population are migrants (Luo et al. 
2010), and in which a smaller share of the population belongs to the largest surname 
group (Kung et al. 2009), invest less in infrastructure. Hence, it is in these 
communities where villagers are more likely to have strong incentives to participate 
in and contribute to social organizations that provide basic infrastructure services. 
The second reason is related to a community’s capacity for collective action, which 
is itself affected by its “stock of social capital” (Putnam 1993, 2000), whether in the 
form of “intra-community ties” (i.e., “bonding social capital”) or “extra-community 
networks” (i.e., “bridging social capital”) (Woolcock 1998; Narayan 1999). Lineage 
ties and migration networks are types of “bonding” and “bridging” social capital 
(Woolcock 1998; Narayan 1999) and, as such, they can promote “integration” within 
rural communities while at the same time providing access to remittances and 
“linkages” to urban areas. Although in principle inter-clan conflicts and out-
migration flows could create obstacles to successful collective action at the village 
level, our findings suggest that this is not the case, because inter-clan relations are 
often cooperative, and rural-urban migration is still predominantly circular. 
Third, participation in self-governing organizations is not only a result but 
also a cause of the growing lack of trust in township officials. By reducing the 
legitimacy of rural governments, these organizations may further undermine their 
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capacity to govern effectively. Recent studies point in this direction. For example, it 
has been found that the presence of self-governing organizations has a negative 
impact on the ability of grassroots governments to raise revenues from villagers (Liu 
et al. 2012), and that (substitutive) non-state provision has a negative effect on the 
perceptions that grassroots officials have of their own authority and ability to 
implement government policies in rural communities (Tsai 2011). This suggests that 
presence of self-governing organizations may give rise to a vicious circle between 
weak state legitimacy and weak state capacity. 
Overall, our findings on the rise and role of self-governing organizations in 
rural China speak to the literature on decentralization. They raise the question as to 
whether, by weakening the (downward) accountability of grassroots officials, the re-
centralization of power within the Party-state may paradoxically lead to a 
“decentralization by default”87 (Manor 1999), characterized by the resurgence of 
traditional community organizations, such as religious and clan-based organizations, 
in response to the service provision gap resulting from the unwillingness or inability 
of grassroots officials to meet local needs and demands. They also suggest that 
participation in self-governing organizations should be viewed as a symptom of poor 
local governance rather than as a solution to it, insofar as it reflects and contributes 
to the growing cleavage between citizens and officials in rural areas. This 
interpretation is consistent with the finding of other studies that it is 
“disengagement”, not “harmony”, what characterizes state-society relations in 
Chinese villages after the rural tax reform (Chen 2014: 725). 
In rural China, as in the rural areas of other developing countries, the 
challenge is thus “to transform situations where a community's social capital 
substitutes for weak, hostile, or indifferent formal institutions into ones in which both 
realms complement one another” (Woolcock and Narayan 2000: 238). However, 
improving state-society relations in rural areas may require reforming central-local 
state relations in the first place. As Levi (1998: 87) reminds us, “trustworthy 
government actors are generally those who are embedded in trustworthy 
                                                 
87 Manor (1999) and others (Davis et al. 1994; Olowu and Wunsch 2004) have used the term 
“decentralization by default” to refer to an “unintended” form of decentralization, in which non-state 
organizations at the grassroots level take over the role of the state in the provision of basic public 
goods and services. 
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institutions”. In China, building trustworthy institutions at the county, township and 
village levels may require promoting and consolidating, rather than preventing or 
reversing, the processes of political, fiscal and administrative decentralization. 
Arguably, unless rural officials are provided with adequate authority, resources and 
incentives to be responsive to villagers’ needs, they are unlikely to be, and to be 
perceived as, trustworthy. At the same time, in the absence of trust between societal 
and state actors, the pattern of interaction between informal and formal institutions 
in local governance is likely to be one of substitution rather than complementarity.  
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5.1 Introduction 
 
Decentralization is threatened when the wrong mix of powers is devolved, 
encumbering local authorities without giving them sufficient resources to be 
effective. It is threatened where non-representative or unaccountable actors are 
empowered, taking authority away from democratic actors or from the public 
arena. It is also threatened when local actors are so restrained by oversight that 
they have no room to act independently on behalf of local people. When local 
authorities cannot deliver goods or respond to local needs they cannot gain 
respect and legitimacy or engage local populations in public action. (Ribot 
2002: 55) 
 
Decentralization has long been advocated as a way of making government 
more “accountable” and “responsive” to the governed (Faguet 2012). However, 
despite these claims about the potential benefits of decentralization and a large 
literature examining its effects on the quality of governance and public services in 
the rural areas of developing countries, the empirical evidence remains mixed and 
inconclusive88 (e.g., Rondinelli et al. 1983; Parker 1995; Crook and Manor 1998; 
Agrawal and Ribot 1999; Manor 1999; Blair 2000; Rosenzweig and Foster 2003; 
Francis and James 2003; Olowu and Wunsch 2004; Khemani 2005; Bardhan and 
Mookherjee 2006a; Tsai 2007b; Faguet and Sánchez 2008; Lu 2015). 
Decentralization has improved government accountability and rural service provision 
in some countries but not in others (e.g., Crook and Manor 1998), and in some regions 
or communities but not in others89 (e.g., Lu 2015). 
This lack of conclusive evidence is partly due to differences in the design and 
implementation of decentralization reforms across and within countries: countries 
and regions have decentralized in different ways and to varying degrees 90 (Parker 
                                                 
88 For a comprehensive overview of the state of knowledge on decentralization see Faguet (2012: 179-
191). 
 
89 Litvack et al. (1998: 30) have pointed out that “it is not much of an exaggeration to say that one can 
prove, or disprove, almost any proposition about decentralization by throwing together some set of 
cases or data”. For every study that finds a positive relationship between decentralization and service 
provision (e.g., Estache and Sinha 1995; Parker 1995; Besley and Burgess 2002; Rosenzweig and 
Foster 2003; Eckardt 2008; Faguet 2008), or a negative relationship between decentralization and 
corruption (e.g., Huther and Shah 1998; Fisman and Gatti 2002), there is another study which finds 
no, or even the opposite, relationship (e.g., Francis and James 2003; Akin et al. 2005; Khemani 2005; 
Fan et al. 2009).  
 
90 Another reason for the lack of conclusive evidence is that we should not have expected to find it in 
the first place, given that the outcomes of decentralization are contingent on contextual factors (e.g., 
Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006a; Ahmad and Brosio 2009; Faguet 2012).  
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1995; Ribot 2002; Azfar et al. 2004; Yilmaz et al. 2010). At the same time, existing 
studies suggest that decentralization is unlikely to lead to better government 
performance unless: (i) it entails a mixture of political, fiscal, and administrative 
decentralization (Manor 1999; Parker 1995); (ii) it takes the form of devolution, 
rather than that of deconcentration or delegation (Olowu and Wunsch 2004; Bardhan 
and Mookherjee 2006a); and consequently (iii) it implies that “powers and resources 
are transferred to authorities representative of and downwardly accountable to local 
populations” (Ribot 2002: ii). These same studies suggest that, in much of the 
developing world, decentralization reforms have ultimately failed to make elected 
local governments more accountable to citizens for the provision of services because 
they have failed to devolve power and resources to them in the first place (e.g., Parker 
1995; Crook and Manor 1998; Ribot 2002; Olowu and Wunsch 2004; Bardhan and 
Mookherjee 2006a; Faguet 2012). China does not seem to be an exception.  
The analysis of the political, fiscal, and administrative dimensions of 
decentralization at the village level reveals what we have called “the accountability-
power paradox” in village governance: villagers have more – and seemingly more 
effective – mechanisms to hold village committees accountable, but village 
committees have less, if any, power to govern. This study has investigated some of 
the possible reasons behind this paradox, including the centralization of the fiscal and 
administrative systems, as well as its implications for accountability and participation 
in local governance and public goods provision in rural communities. More 
specifically, it has examined how the recent turn towards centralization in China has 
affected the “voice” and “exit” options (Hirschman 1970) available to villagers for 
improving public goods provision in their communities, by addressing two main 
questions. The first question investigated was, whether, by shifting power away from 
village committees and towards county, township, and village-level Party 
committees, recent fiscal, administrative and political reforms have undermined the 
effectiveness of village-level democratic institutions and, thereby, constrained the 
ability of villagers to use the “voice” option to create incentives for rural officials to 
meet their demands for public goods and services. The second question examined 
was, whether, when state institutions fail to meet local needs and demands and, by 
extension, fail to elicit “loyalty” (i.e., trust), villagers choose to “exit” from state 
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provision to non-state provision through the formation of social organizations that 
take over responsibility for the provision of basic infrastructure services in their 
communities. In the remainder of the chapter, we summarize the main findings and 
contributions of our research. 
  
 
5.2 Main Findings 
 
5.2.1 The “Accountability-Power Paradox” in Village Governance 
 
Recent legal, fiscal, administrative and political reforms reflect the reluctance 
of the central government and, especially, of intermediate governments to devolve 
power to villages and, within villages, to democratically elected village committees. 
First, the 2010 Organic Law of Village Committees remains ambiguous regarding 
the division of power and functions between village committees, on the one hand, 
and township and village Party organizations, on the other (e.g., Alpermann 2013). 
Second, the elimination of agricultural taxes and fees has sharply reduced the amount 
of resources over which village governments have control or discretion, limiting the 
scope of what they can do and be held accountable for (e.g., World Bank 2007; Fock 
and Wong 2008; Tian 2009; Oi et al. 2012; Takeuchi 2014). Third, the adoption of 
the so-called “cadre-in-residence” and “salaries-from-above” policies (Oi et al. 2012; 
Smith 2010) has reduced the autonomy of village officials vis-à-vis their Party 
superiors and transformed village governments into “outposts of township 
governments” (Smith 2010: 614). Last but not least, the introduction of elections for 
village Party secretaries has helped to legitimize and thus to reinforce their dominant 
position in village governance (Sun et al. 2013).  
The implementation of these fiscal, administrative and political reforms 
represents a clear shift in China’s (de-)centralization policies. By shifting power 
away from village committees towards county, township and village-level Party 
committees, these reforms may have undermined the effectiveness of village 
elections and other mechanisms of external accountability and may have created an 
“accountability gap” in village governance that cannot be filled by internal 
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mechanisms of accountability alone, whether fiscal (e.g., earmarked transfers), 
administrative (e.g., performance contracts) or political (e.g., intra-Party elections). 
However, at the same time, there is evidence of differences in the 
implementation implications of these reforms across villages. Villages have not 
become equally dependent on fiscal transfers to provide public goods (e.g., Takeuchi 
2014), nor are they subject to the same degree of bureaucratic control (e.g., Smith 
2010; Oi et al. 2012; Sun et al. 2013), and nor do they (s)elect their Party leaders in 
the same way (e.g., Sun et al. 2013)91. Furthermore, they still differ in the quality of 
their elections and in the distribution of power between their village and Party 
committees (e.g., O’Brien and Zhao 2011; Sun et al. 2013). The evidence points to 
the emergence of a variety of local governance systems that differ in at least two key 
respects: (i) the nature of and interrelationships among the political, fiscal and 
administrative dimensions of (de-)centralization at the village level; and (ii) the 
relations of power and accountability among villagers, village committees, village 
Party branches and higher-level governments.  
Against this background this study aimed to assess the potential and limits of 
political decentralization as a means to improve local governance and local public 
goods provision in the context of an authoritarian and (fiscally and administratively) 
centralized state. It raised three main questions: (i) whether political decentralization 
– if and where it has occurred – has resulted in a better provision of public goods by 
village governments; (ii) whether the implementation of the fiscal, administrative and 
political reforms outlined above has undermined political decentralization, and in 
what ways; and (iii) whether accountability in the provision of public goods can be 
achieved without political decentralization or, in other words, whether earmarked 
                                                 
91 For instance, research by Takeuchi (2014: 186) shows that “although rural tax reforms (…) were 
introduced universally in China, their implementation and effects on rural governance varied from 
area to area”. They had a particularly negative impact in poor agricultural areas, where local 
governments became trapped in a vicious circle: on the one hand, they “lost revenue sources, struggled 
to cover administrative costs, and were unable to provide public goods”. On the other, they “lost the 
authority to govern their localities as villagers blamed local governments for the lack of public goods 
and the declining quality of rural governance” (Takeuchi 2014: 86). Recent research by Sun et al. 
(2013), Oi et al. (2012) and Smith (2010) also shows that there are significant variations across villages 
and provinces in terms of: the dependence of township cadres on village officials to meet their 
performance targets under the cadre evaluation system (Sun et al. 2013);  the number of township 
officials that work as “sent-down” cadres in villages under the “cadre-in-residence” policy (Smith 
2010; Oi et al. 2012); and the type of procedure by which village Party secretaries are (s)elected (Sun 
et al. 2013). 
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transfers, performance contracts, and intra-Party elections can be a good substitute 
for village-level elections and other democratic institutions. 
In line with these questions, this study examined empirically: (i) whether 
variation in political decentralization across villages explains variation in their 
investment in infrastructure (i.e., village-financed investment); (ii) whether and how 
variation across villages in the degree of transfer dependence (i.e., government-
financed investment), top-down Party control (i.e., the cadre responsibility system), 
and intra-Party democracy (i.e., intra-Party elections) is associated with variation in 
the degree of political decentralization (i.e., village democratic reforms)92; and (iii) 
whether and how variation across villages in the degree of top-down Party control, 
and intra-Party democracy is associated with variation in the level of village-financed 
investment in infrastructure. 
Two simultaneous-equation models of “village democracy” and “local public 
goods provision” were estimated using cross-sectional data for 115 villages from the 
Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy Village Survey (2005). The main dependent 
variable in the first model was “village-financed investment”, while in the second 
model it was “government-financed investment”. Measures of the implementation of 
the cadre responsibility system and the intra-Party election system were included as 
exogenous variables in each of the models. Both were estimated using three-stage 
least squares. 
Two main findings emerged from the empirical analysis. The first finding is 
that villages where (i) elections are better implemented, and where (ii) popularly 
elected village committees (leaders) have control over village finances, tend to invest 
more in infrastructure (i.e., village-financed investment). However, at the same time, 
they seem to receive a smaller share of (capital) grant funds from higher-level 
governments (i.e., government-financed investment). This suggests that whether 
village elections matter (or not) for public goods provision crucially depends on: (i) 
                                                 
92 The underlying question was: (i) whether the cadre responsibility system creates perverse incentives 
for township officials to obstruct village democratic reforms; (ii) whether the intergovernmental 
transfer system leaves room for county and township governments to target more resources to 
politically favoured villages, namely, those where the village Party branch remains the dominant 
governing body; and (iii) whether the implementation of intra-Party democratic reforms justifies or 
legitimizes the lack of progress in the implementation of village democratic reforms. In other words, 
the use of performance contracts, intergovernmental transfers and intra-Party elections as mechanisms 
of accountability in rural governance may subvert rather than reinforce village democratic institutions.  
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who finances village infrastructure projects – the village or higher-level governments 
– and (ii) who controls village finances - the village committee and/or the Party 
branch. When local spending decisions are made by village Party branches (i.e., 
village-financed investment) or by county and township Party committees (i.e., 
government-financed investment) the potential positive relationship between village 
elections and public goods provision either disappears or is reversed. There are two 
possible reasons. The first one is that, under such conditions, village elections do not 
provide a mechanism for villagers to ensure accountability in public goods provision 
because power over spending decisions has not been devolved to village committees. 
The second one is that earmarked grants might provide a mechanism for higher-level 
officials to target more resources to less democratic villages, that is, those governed 
by village Party organizations rather than by popularly elected village committees.  
A second finding is that the the cadre responsibility system and intra-Party 
elections have different effects on local governance and local public goods provision. 
Consistent with previous studies (Tsai 2007b; Sun et al. 2013), we found that tighter 
township control over villages is not positively associated with local public goods 
provision (i.e., village-financed investment), but it is negatively associated with local 
democracy. Village governments that are less autonomous from township Party 
committees are less likely to be run by popularly elected officials, while they are not 
more likely to invest in public goods. In contrast, the election of village Party 
secretaries by village Party members (without the interference of township officials) 
has a significant positive impact on local public goods provision (i.e., village-
financed investment) and does not have a significant negative impact on local 
democracy. This latter finding is in contrast to that of Sun et al. (2013), who found 
that intra-Party democracy undermines village democracy, and calls for further 
research. 
Taken together, our empirical findings point to the lack of a coherent 
framework for government accountability at the village level, where the political, 
fiscal, and administrative dimensions of decentralization tend to conflict with, rather 
than complement, one another. Our findings can be interpreted as follows: (1) 
political decentralization has a positive impact on the financing and provision of 
public goods by village governments; (2) the processes of political decentralization 
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and intra-Party democratization can complement one another in making village 
officials more (downwardly) accountable to villagers and Party members for the use 
of funds over which they have control or discretion; (3) administrative and fiscal 
centralization have a negative impact on political decentralization and compromise 
its potential benefits, mainly by reducing the power and autonomy of democratically 
elected village committees; and last (4) centralized bureaucratic and fiscal control 
may be poor substitutes for democratic accountability, given that (i) (earmarked) 
transfers can be used to distribute patronage to politically favoured villages, where 
power remains concentrated in the hands of Party organizations (i.e., government-
financed investment); and that (ii) performance contracts are not used to create strong 
incentives for Party officials to invest in public goods (i.e., village-financed 
investment). 
These findings make two contributions to the literature on political 
decentralization and public goods provision in rural China. The first contribution is 
to shed light on the conditions under which village residents can and do use elections 
to hold their leaders to account for the use of public funds. They show that a critical 
determinant of the effectiveness of village elections in ensuring accountability in 
public goods provision is not only whether villagers are given (electoral) control over 
village committees (i.e., the quality of village elections), but more fundamentally 
whether village committees are given control over fiscal resources (i.e., the power of 
village committees). This provides an answer to the puzzle of why relatively well-
run elections often fail to deliver better governance and public goods provision. The 
answer (or part of it) lies in the local power structure: in most villages, village 
committees remain powerless. The problem with political decentralization in China 
is not that it does not work but that it has not taken place. 
To date, the empirical literature on village elections disagrees on whether they 
provide an effective mechanism for villagers to hold grassroots officials accountable 
for the quality of service provision (Zhang et al. 2004; Luo et al. 2007, 2010; Tsai 
2007ab; Wang and Yao 2007; Sato 2008; Kung et al. 2009; Meng and Zhang 2010; 
Martinez-Bravo et al. 2011; Mu and Zhang 2014; Lu 2015). Some studies argue that 
introducing direct elections for village committees is in itself sufficient to improve 
accountability in village governance (e.g., Luo et al. 2007, 2010), while others argue 
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that it is neither necessary nor sufficient (e.g., Tsai 2007ab). Our findings suggest 
that village elections are necessary but far from sufficient to address the problem of 
political accountability in rural communities. They show that their effectiveness is 
contingent upon the power structure in which village committees are embedded: only 
if village committees are given the power to govern (i.e., control over resources), can 
(free and fair) elections be expected to deliver accountability.  
A second contribution of this study is to identify some of the obstacles to 
political decentralization or, in other words, some of the reasons for its poor 
implementation. The empirical results show that the potential benefits of political 
decentralization in terms of making village committees more accountable to villagers 
are compromised by processes of fiscal and administrative (re-)recentralization that 
shift power away from village committees. We found that villages that are tightly 
controlled by township governments and that finance a greater share of their 
expenditures from transfers are less likely to be governed by popularly elected village 
committees. Hence, as O’Brien and Han (2009: 376) have pointed out, “(…) the 
quality of democracy in much of the countryside remains stubbornly low, mainly 
because VCs [village committees], once an election is over, are situated in a socio-
political environment that has changed surprisingly little”. Indeed, our research 
suggests that the reform of the fiscal and administrative systems has been 
instrumental in preventing political change at the grassroots level. Bureaucratic and 
fiscal institutions (i.e., the cadre responsibility system and earmarked transfers) 
provide more incentives and means for local Party officials at various levels to 
undermine grassroots political reforms93.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
93 The cadre responsibility system still creates perverse incentives for township officials to resist the 
implementation of local democratic reforms, while the new intergovernmental transfer system leaves 
room for township Party committees to target more resources to less democratic villages. 
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5.2.2 Non-State Provision by Self-Governing Organizations: “Decentralization by 
Default”? 
 
Despite the implementation of the rural tax reform, it has become increasingly 
difficult for grassroots officials to collect (legal) taxes and fees (Liu et al. 2012: 194) 
and, even more, to raise voluntary contributions from villagers to provide public 
goods and services (e.g. Chen 2008, 2014, 2015; Fock and Wong 2008; Tian 2009; 
Göbel 2010; Boyle et al. 2014). This seems to be particularly the case in villages 
where “self-governing organizations”  have become a “substitute” for the (local) state 
in the provision of basic goods and services (Liu et al. 2012: 202).  
This finding raises questions about the interactive relationship between levels 
of (local) state legitimacy and capacity, on the one hand, and forms of community 
participation and non-state provision, on the other, that this study sought to answer: 
What explains participation in self-governing organizations? What forms do they 
take? To what extent are they able to substitute for the (local) state in the provision 
of basic infrastructure? And what implications does this have for its legitimacy and 
ability to govern rural communities effectively? 
If our sample villages are representative of China’s villages, there are 
reasons to believe that self-governing organizations are present in a majority (55%) 
of them. These voluntary organizations have two distinctive features: (i) they are run 
neither by local officials nor by their appointees but by villagers, and (ii) they do not 
incorporate local officials in their activities or decision-making processes. Although 
they take a wide variety of forms, we found that most of them are either religious 
organizations, such as Buddhist temples or Christian churches, or lineage-based 
organizations, such as old people’s associations and wedding and funeral councils.  
We also found that, during the 2000-2005 period, around one-third of self-
governing organizations were involved in the construction, repair and maintenance 
of village roads and bridges, drinking water and irrigations systems, as well as 
primary school buildings - the types of public goods that villagers care most about, 
and that are often under-provided by the state (Luo et al. 2010; Yi et al. 2011). As 
shown by other studies (Liu et al. 2012), self-governing organizations are less likely 
than other organizations to participate in the co-production of public goods with local 
officials, and more likely to engage in what is called “substitutive public goods 
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provision” (Tsai 2011), however we found that there are differences among them in 
terms of their role as non-state providers. While some organizations in some 
provinces have the capacity to raise sufficient funds from villagers to build, repair 
and/or maintain village infrastructure independently (e.g., local temples in Fujian), 
others lack the capacity to fill the gap left by the state in the provision of basic 
infrastructure services. This is especially the case among certain types of 
organizations, such as churches, and in poorer provinces, such as Shaanxi.  
Against this background, this research sought to identify both the 
determinants and consequences of the growth of self-governing organizations and 
non-state provision in rural communities, with a focus on the issues of (local) state 
legitimacy and capacity. To this end, we first examined whether differences among 
villages in the level of participation in self-governing organizations are explained by 
differences in: (i) the level of trust between villagers and township officials; (ii) the 
amount of investment in village infrastructure; (iii) the quality of village elections; 
and (iv) the nature of the socioeconomic structure. Additionally, we examined 
whether and how participation in self-governing organizations affects trust between 
village residents and township officials.  
A simultaneous equations model of “political trust” and “membership in self-
governing organizations” was estimated by three-stage least squares, using survey 
data from 115 villages collected by the Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy in 
2005. Measures of (i) village-financed investment (lagged), (ii) village election 
quality (lagged), (iii) rural-urban migration (lagged), as well as (iv) clan structure 
and intra-clan and inter-clan relations, were included in the main model as exogenous 
variables. To account for the possibility that there is a one-way relationship between 
political trust and participation in self-governing organizations and that they are both 
influenced by government performance, our hypotheses on the determinants of 
participation in these organizations were also tested using a recursive simultaneous 
equations model, which was estimated by three-stage least squares. 
Two main findings emerged from the analysis. The first one is related to the 
determinants of participation in self-governing organizations. We found that the 
amount of participation in this type of organizations is largely a function of the 
amount of trust villagers have, or do not have, in township-level cadres: the less 
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trustworthy township officials are (or are perceived to be), the more likely villagers 
are to form and join self-governing organizations. Government performance – as 
measured by the amount of investment in village infrastructure and the quality of 
village elections – does not have a direct impact, but an indirect impact on the 
development of self-governing organizations. First, while differences among villages 
in the level of government performance are associated with differences in the level 
of participation in these organizations, the causal relationship between these 
variables seems to be mediated by political (dis-)trust. Second, the level of public 
goods provision, rather than the quality of village committee elections, appears to be 
the dimension of government performance that influences villagers’ perceptions 
about the trustworthiness of government officials.  
These results need to be interpreted in the context of the wider trend towards 
the centralization of power within the local Party-state. Township officials can and 
do influence how and by whom villages are governed – whether through formal 
channels (e.g.., allocating transfers to villages, setting performance targets for village 
officials, working as “sent-down” cadres in villages, etc.) or informal ones (e.g., 
manipulating elections for village committees and Party branches). However, at the 
same time, they are neither elected by nor (directly) accountable to villagers. 
Furthermore, our finding that villages that are subject to greater (bureaucratic) 
control by townships are less likely to be governed by (democratically elected) 
village committees, but are not more likely to invest in public goods, suggests that 
township officials are not themselves held accountable by county officials for the 
quality of village governance and village public goods provision under the cadre 
responsibility system. This implies that in villages where township officials neither 
govern nor let others govern (i.e., village officials) in the interest of their residents, 
the latter are more likely to organize independently in order to cope with community 
needs. Our results indicate that the lack of trust in township officials creates 
incentives for villagers to form their own organizations and to cooperate among 
themselves in the provision of the goods and services that are under-provided by the 
state. 
However, one thing is that villagers have an incentive to engage in these 
forms of collective action, and another is that they have the capacity to do it. In this 
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respect, we found that villages with (i) more cohesive lineage groups – proxied by 
the number of village ancestral halls - and with (ii) larger migration networks – as 
measured by the proportion of the village labour force working outside the county – 
tend to have higher levels of participation in self-governing organizations. This 
finding is consistent with the social capital literature, which stresses the importance 
for rural development of what is called “bonding” and “bridging” social capital (e.g., 
Narayan 1999), or “intra-community ties” and “extra-community networks” (e.g., 
Woolcock 1998), that is, different types of social networks at the community level 
that promote “integration” within the community, while providing “linkage” to 
resources outside the community. Although inter-clan conflicts and out-migration 
flows could prevent successful collective action in rural communities, our research 
suggests that this is not the case because inter-clan relations are often cooperative, 
and rural-urban migration is predominantly circular. In fact, the presence of clan 
networks and migration networks can provide a means to (i) foster cooperation and 
prevent opportunistic behaviour among community members; and to (ii) access 
resources otherwise unavailable to them (e.g., transfers, self-organization skills, etc.) 
– all of which is crucial to the development and role of self-governing organizations 
as non-state providers of basic goods and services in rural areas.  
A comparison of the determinants of participation in self-governing and 
government-controlled organizations sheds further light on the institutional sources 
of variation across rural China in the form that non-state organizations and non-state 
provision take. Two differences stand out. First, political trust has a significant 
positive impact on participation in government-controlled organizations, but exerts a 
significant negative impact on participation in self-governing organizations. Second, 
clan solidarity exerts a significant positive effect on participation in self-governing 
organizations but has no significant effect on participation in government-controlled 
organizations. This lead us to conclude that the decline in trust in local political 
institutions (i.e., township governments) together with the revival of traditional social 
institutions (i.e., clans) are the single most important factors explaining the 
development of self-governing organizations in rural communities. 
Our second main finding is related to the consequences of non-state provision 
by self-governing organizations for (local) state legitimacy. The empirical results 
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show that there is a reciprocal relationship between political trust and participation 
in self-governing organizations. In other words, the rise of these organizations is not 
only a consequence but also a cause of the growing lack of trust in township officials 
and, more generally, of the declining legitimacy of the (local) state. The fact that 
villagers form their own organizations to address community needs not only reflects, 
but also contributes to, the growing cleavage between state and society at the village 
level. This is consistent with and complements the findings of recent research 
showing that (i) participation in self-governing organizations is negatively associated 
with the “extractive capacity” of grassroots governments (Liu et al. 2012: 191); and 
that (ii), unlike other forms of non-state provision (e.g., co-production), “substitutive 
public goods provision” by community organizations is positively related to “village 
officials’ perceived difficulty in completing tasks assigned by higher levels” (Tsai 
2011: 61). Taken together, these findings can be interpreted as evidence that non-
state provision by self-governing organizations negatively affects two key 
dimensions of (local) state capacity – the capacity to tax (Liu et al. 2012) and to elicit 
compliance with state policies (Tsai 2011) -, through its negative effects on (local) 
state legitimacy.  
Two main conclusions can be drawn from these findings. First, the 
centralization of power in the hands of officials that cannot be held to account by 
villagers for meeting their needs is leading in some areas to a “decentralization by 
default” (Manor 1999), characterized by the resurgence of traditional grassroots 
organizations, such as religious and clan-based organizations, to meet the needs for 
goods and services that are unmet by the state. There is evidence that recent re-
centralization reforms have created a “vacuum in village administration” (Chen 
2015), especially in agricultural regions. For instance, Chen (2015: 230) describes, 
how as a result of the implementation of the rural tax reform, village cadres “(…) 
found that they had no (major) functions to perform, no authority to govern, no 
capacity to undertake tasks, and no motivation to work” (Chen 2015: 230). Our 
findings suggest that in some parts of rural China, this vacuum has been partly filled 
by self-governing organizations. Second, as “substitutive informal institutions” 
(Helmke and Levitsky 2004), self-governing organizations are only a “second-best 
solution” to the problem of under-provision of public goods in rural communities.   
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In some cases these community organizations play a negligible role as providers of 
infrastructure services, while in others the fact that they succeed in providing services 
independently from the (local) state further undermines its legitimacy and, as a result, 
its capacity to tax and govern. In brief, self-governing organizations appear to be an 
ineffective response to “government failure” in poorer villages, while they may 
become a source of “government failure” in richer ones.  
This study fits into a growing body of literature on the role of community 
organizations in local governance and local public goods provision in Chinese 
villages (e.g., Tsai 2002, 2007ab, 2011; Hansen 2008; Kung et al. 2009; Thogersen 
2009; Lu 2015; Xu and Yao 2015). One of its main contributions is to rethink the 
way in which state and societal actors interact in village governance. Previous studies 
on this topic have stressed that the presence of community organizations in which 
local officials participate may enhance the performance of local governments (e.g., 
Tsai 2007ab; Lu 2015; Xu and Yao 2015). While we also examine the interactive 
relationship between community participation and local government performance, 
we emphasize the opposite direction of their causal relationship, that is, how the 
quality of local government affects the types of organizations villagers join and 
contribute time and money to. It highlights the need and the challenge of creating a 
relationship of complementarity between state and non-state actors in the context of 
public goods provision in the absence of trustworthy (local) state institutions, that is, 
institutions that have the necessary authority and resources to govern, and that can 
be held accountable by rural residents for their performance. 
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5.3 Contributions to the “Varieties of Governance” Literature 
 
 
(…) it is no longer possible to find a stereotyped or regular pattern regarding 
whether and how cadre power works in villages. Instead, rural reforms over 
the past three decades – especially the recent RTR [rural tax reform] and the 
AAT [abolition of agricultural taxes] – have given rise to a variety of different 
ways in which cadres govern their villages. Political authority has mostly, if 
not entirely, evaporated in some villages and has turned into a source of tension 
and protest in some others. Still, in quite a few villages, cadres have retained 
or regained enough authority for them to govern effectively. (Chen 2015: 136) 
 
A new literature on “varieties of governance” in rural China (Lu 2015) has 
emerged to explain variation in the quality of public goods provision across villages. 
As some have noted (Lu 2015: 3), few studies within this literature have tried to 
establish a comprehensive theoretical framework that helps us understand the 
institutional determinants of “good” government at the village level. Two notable 
exceptions are the studies by Tsai (2007ab) and Lu (2015). Both studies seek to 
explain why some village governments provide more public goods than others, by 
examining how – and how effectively -  they address the “collective action problem” 
and the “accountability problem” associated with state provision (Tsai 2007a: 356-
357, 2007b: 12-19; Lu 2015: 84-131).  
Tsai develops a “model of informal accountability” (Tsai 2007a: 356-357; 
Tsai 2007b: 86-119), which posits that “villages with village-wide solidary groups 
that incorporate the participation of local officials are more likely to have a better 
governmental performance and public goods provision than villages without these 
groups” (Tsai 2007b: 20). Based on survey and case study data collected between 
1999 and 2002 from a sample of more than 300 villages in the provinces of Fujian, 
Hebei, Jiangxi and Shanxi, her research finds that “encompassing and embedding 
solidary groups”, such as village-wide lineages, improve local governance and public 
goods provision by increasing “mutual accountability” between villagers and 
officials (Tsai 2007b: 166). In communities with these groups, officials are more 
likely to feel a strong social obligation to respond to villagers’ demands for public 
goods, which in turn makes villagers more willing to pay taxes and to make 
(monetary and labour) contributions to public projects. Her research also finds that 
local democratic reforms have failed to make village governments more accountable 
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to villagers, presumably due to the structural weaknesses of local elections as 
mechanisms of accountability: “(…) even in villages with extremely good 
implementation of democratic reforms, citizens do not necessarily have a great deal 
of leverage over officials, accurate information about their activities, or a particularly 
strong sense of civic duties” (Tsai 2007b: 190). In her view, the strengthening of 
local democratic institutions is not a conditio sine qua non for the development of 
accountable local governments: “we can have accountability without formal 
democracy if we have the right kinds of social groups (…)” (Tsai 2007b: 257).  It is 
the presence of “encompassing and embedding solidary groups” that explains the 
emergence of “pockets of good governance” in parts of rural China (Tsai 2007b: 
267).  
Like Tsai (2007ab), Lu (2015) compares the role of formal institutions (i.e., 
village elections) and informal institutions (i.e., clans) in creating incentives for 
villagers to comply with taxation (i.e. the “collective action problem”) and for village 
officials to use public funds responsibly (i.e., the “accountability problem”). In his 
view, informal institutions (i.e., lineages) are neither intrinsically superior nor 
inferior to formal institutions (i.e., elections) in leading villagers and village officials 
to work together for the public good: “In some villages only indigenous relation-
based institutions work; in other villages, only rule-based institutions function; and, 
still in other villages, neither indigenous nor imposed institutions work well” (Lu 
2015: 109). 
To explain this finding, he develops a model of public goods provision, which 
argues that the (relative) effectiveness of “indigenous relation-based institutions” 
(i.e., clans) and “imposed rule-based institutions” (i.e., elections) to overcome the 
“collective action” and “accountability” problems associated with state provision is 
contingent on a community’s level of outward migration and, as a result, varies across 
the spectrum of what he calls “close-knit”, “loosely coupled” and “atomized” 
communities.  
Using survey data collected in 2008 from more than 300 villages in Henan, 
Hubei, Shandong and Shanxi, his research finds that rural-urban migration processes 
affect public goods provision in rural communities, through their effects on the 
performance of informal and formal institutions in preventing opportunistic 
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behaviour by villagers and village officials. Lu (2015) argues that informal 
institutions (i.e., lineages) facilitate public goods provision in “close-knit” 
communities, and that so do formal institutions (i.e., elections) in “loosely coupled” 
villages. However, in “atomized” communities, where out-migration is highest, 
neither informal nor formal institutions can address problems of poor local 
governance and inadequate public goods provision effectively. Hence, from his 
perspective, it is rural-urban migration that is mainly responsible for the emergence 
of pockets of poor governance in the Chinese countryside. 
 
A close-knit social environment – more specifically, frequent and 
continuous social interaction and the existence of dense and extended 
social networks – favors the operation of indigenous relation-based 
institutions, while imposed rule-based institutions enjoy an advantage 
in loosely coupled communities. In contrast, in atomized 
communities, neither can work effectively as the institutional 
foundation of local governance. (Lu 2015: 9) 
 
 
 As can be seen, the two most recent and comprehensive studies on the 
emergence of “varieties of governance” across the Chinese countryside provide 
different answers to the question of why some village governments provide more 
public goods than others. For Tsai (2007ab), the key to explaining variation in village 
government performance lies in social institutions (i.e., encompassing and 
embedding solidary groups), while for Lu (2015) it lies in economic institutions (i.e., 
rural-urban migration).  
Our research contributes to this new literature on the institutional determinants 
of “good” government at the village level in three ways. Its main contribution is to 
shift the analytical focus from economic and social institutions to political 
institutions in order to account for variation in local government performance in rural 
China. Based on survey data collected by the Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy 
in 2005 from more than 100 villages in Jilin, Shaanxi, Hebei, Jiangsu, Fujian, and 
Sichuan, our research finds that, in villages where democratically elected village 
committees have the power to govern, village officials tend to be more responsive to 
the demands of village residents for investment in basic infrastructure, such as village 
roads and bridges, drinking water and irrigations systems, and schools. It provides 
the basis for the development of a model of public goods provision by village 
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governments, in which the ability of village elections to solve the “collective action” 
and “accountability” problems associated with state provision is contingent not only 
on the quality of the electoral process but also on the power of the elected village 
committee (leader), that is, on the effective implementation of political 
decentralization. It contends that, in villages where elections are better implemented, 
and where elected village committees (leaders) have the power to govern (i.e., control 
over fiscal resources), their leaders are better able and more willing to mobilize 
resources from villagers to invest in public goods: they have a mandate and incentive 
to improve community infrastructure and services.  
Our study thus suggests that the key to explaining variation in village 
government performance lies in the uneven implementation of political 
decentralization reforms across villages. The reason why some village governments 
perform better than others in providing public goods is because they have become 
what Gilley (2010) calls “democratic enclaves” in an authoritarian regime. In these 
villages, grassroots democratic institutions provide meaningful opportunities for 
villagers to voice their demands and to hold village officials accountable for meeting 
them. Hence, in our view, it is the emergence of “democratic enclaves” (Gilley 2010) 
that explains the existence of islands or pockets of good governance in parts of rural 
China. 
Our research makes two additional contributions to the “varieties of 
governance” literature: it identifies some of the institutional causes and consequences 
of poor governance in rural areas. Research by Tsai (2007ab) and Lu (2015) suggests 
that poor governance is mainly a function of two local contextual factors, namely, 
the absence of (encompassing and embedding) solidary groups and the existence of 
out-migration. In its analysis of the causes of poor governance, our research shifts 
the focus of analysis from the community context to changes and variation in the 
implementation of (de-)centralization policies. It finds that one of the main obstacles 
to “good governance” lies in the tension between, on the one hand, the process of 
political decentralization and, on the other, the processes of fiscal and administrative 
(re-)centralization.  
Our research shows that political decentralization has only taken place in a 
minority of villages (i.e., “democratic enclaves”). In a majority of them, elected 
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village committees have been established but remain powerless, while power has 
been delegated to governing bodies that are, at best, only upwardly accountable to 
higher levels of the Party-state (i.e., county-, township- and village-level Party 
committees)94. It also suggests that variation in the degree of fiscal and administrative 
centralization across villages is negatively associated with the degree of political 
decentralization: villages with less fiscal and administrative autonomy from 
townships are less likely to be governed by democratically elected village 
committees. While more research is needed, our findings suggest that the 
centralization of the fiscal and administrative systems has created new obstacles to 
political decentralization. State and party actors who oppose political 
decentralization, such as township officials, can now use the intergovernmental 
transfer system and the cadre responsibility system in ways that undermine the 
“demand” and “supply” of local democratic reforms (Kennedy 2010a) – whether by 
allocating a smaller share of (earmarked) transfers to villages where political 
decentralization has gone furthest, or by interfering in village governance and not 
giving democratically elected village committees the autonomy and authority needed 
to govern. In brief, one of the main obstacles to political decentralization and the 
potential governance benefits it brings lies in the fiscal and administrative aspects of 
the intergovernmental system. 
A last contribution of this study to the literature on “varieties of governance” 
is to identify some of the institutional consequences of poor governance in the 
Chinese countryside. Our findings suggest that variation in the quality of governance 
across villages partly explains variation in the forms that non-state organizations and 
non-state provision take. In the absence of good governance, villagers are less willing 
to participate in community organizations that are run by local officials or their 
appointees (i.e., government-controlled organizations), and to provide public goods 
in collaboration with the (local) state (i.e., co-production). Instead, they are more 
likely to form their own organizations (i.e., self-governing organizations) and to 
                                                 
94 This situation is common in developing countries. For instance, according to Ribot (2002: 3), “many 
reforms are taking place in the name of decentralization, but they are not setting up the basic 
institutional infrastructure from which to expect the positive outcomes that decentralization promises. 
Instead, local democracies are created but given no power, or power is devolved to non-representative 
upwardly accountable local authorities”. 
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provide themselves with the public goods that the (local) state under-provides (i.e., 
self-provision or substitutive non-state provision).  
More specifically, this study finds evidence that the decline in trust in formal 
institutions (i.e., township governments), together with the (re-)emergence of 
traditional informal institutions (i.e., lineages), is the single most important factor 
explaining participation in self-governing organizations, whose main role is to fill 
the service provision gap at the grassroots level. In a majority of villages, the 
centralization of power in local Party organizations has constrained the ability of 
villagers to exercise “voice” to improve the quality of service provision (Hirschman 
1970). At the same time, in villages with active and cohesive lineage groups, villagers 
can use social sanctions to prevent free-riding and to overcome the “collective action 
problem” associated with (substitutive) non-state provision. Hence, when state 
institutions fail to respond to their demands for basic services, villagers in these 
villages tend to form or join self-governing organizations and to “exit” from state to 
non-state provision.  
By shifting attention from what Tsai (2007ab) calls “encompassing and 
embedding solidary groups”, and what Lu (2015) calls “indigenous, relation-based 
institutions”, to what we call self-governing organizations, this study shows that 
increasing participation in traditional community organizations is not always a source 
of good governance, but rather a symptom or even a source of poor governance. 
While these studies argue that the key to good governance in rural China lies in 
having “the right kind of organizations” i.e., those that bring officials and villagers 
together (Tsai 2007b: 247), our findings point to the difficulty of having the right 
kind of organizations without having the “right” kind of government. 
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